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To counter the deeply-entrenched disciplinary reluctance to consider the history of 
philosophy’s overlaps with the histories of empire and colonisation, this thesis draws on 
insights from postcolonial studies to argue that one way to reckon with these histories is 
through a critical analysis of the ‘geopolitical imaginary’ of philosophy and its construction 
out of  so-called discovery literatures. While the thesis is, as a whole, specifically focused on 
German philosophies of  history in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
importance of  discovery literature to the emergence of  the modern concept of  history is in 
Part One interrogated in relation to how time in the eighteenth century was spatialised, as 
temporal distance came to be projected onto peoples across the globe. Joseph-François 
Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages amériquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps (1724) is here 
shown to have paradigmatically articulated a regime of  comparability through which a shift 
from a view of  ‘savages’ as exemplars of  ‘natural man’ to that of  ‘primitive man’ could be 
effected. 
  Against this background, Part Two constructs three critical models in the philosophy 
of  history in order to articulate different inscriptions and projections of  a geopolitical 
imaginary: one centred on Immanuel Kant’s concept of  universal history with a cosmopolitan 
aim; one centred on G.W.F. Hegel’s critique of  Kantian cosmopolitanism through a 
philosophy of  world history; and one centred on Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt’s 
counter-teleological conception of  civilisation and planetary humanity. Chapter Three 
demonstrates how, in the Kantian model, the concepts of  race and that of  cosmopolitanism 
are linked through a differentiated conception of  the educability of  humankind in the 
Kantian philosophy of  history. Chapter Four foregrounds the centrality of  Hegel’s 
philosophy of  history to the very construction of  the concept of  Eurocentrism to give an 
account of  their complex interrelation. Chapter Five argues that both a different philosophy 
of  history and a different cosmopolitanism, which integrate a conception of  cultural 





Humboldts. With these three models, the thesis aims to escape the subsumption of  all 
philosophies of  history under a unified ‘philosophy of  history’, instead seeing within each a 
specific configuration of  notions of  territory and temporality, in the projection of  different 
geopolitical imaginaries. 
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The philosophy of history is not a thing of the past; this is the premise that runs through this 
thesis such that it both informs the work undertaken and is explored within its parameters. 
As it is most often understood, the canonical, German form of ‘the philosophy of history’ 
emerged during the last decades of the eighteenth century and established itself in the first 
decades of the nineteenth. Despite the fact that, since this point, several well-founded 
critiques have taken their aim at its concepts, motives, construction, and arguments, it is my 
contention that it has not been surpassed but re-shaped and re-articulated within an 
increasingly globalised world. Similarly, and connected thereto, the rise to prominence of 
discourses on the Anthropocene and planetarity has not resolved the tensions and 
contradictions of earlier discussions of cosmopolitics, geopolitical imaginaries, and the 
realities that subtend them, but has rearticulated these tensions within new terminological 
registers. To comprehend how this may be so, the very idea of a singular philosophy of 
history must first of all be dissolved in the face of a recognition that, even within the period 
of its most canonical articulations, philosophies of history were always plural and always 
internally differentiated.1  
 At the heart of this study is a return to three such philosophies: to Immanuel Kant’s 
idea of a universal history toward cosmopolitanism; G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophical world 
history; and Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt’s alternative cosmopolitanism, 
subtended by an alternative philosophy of history. These three readings in the history of 
philosophy are gathered here not simply out of historical interest, however much they might 
also in their own right merit to be studied as such. Their selection, rather, owes something 
to Theodor W. Adorno’s concept of the critical model: ‘They are not examples; they do not 
simply elucidate general considerations’, and are therefore to be understood as opposed to 
 
1 The insistence upon a pluralisation of the very concept of ‘the philosophy of history’ owes much to Bertrand 
Binoche’s work, in particular Les trois sources des philosophies de l’histoire, 1764–1798, . For further discussion of this 




that philosophical usage of examples that views them ‘as matters of indifference in 
themselves’.2 Rather, it is their topicality that guides the construction of each critical model, 
a topicality that derives from their integral position in the history of concepts operative in 
our present historical conjuncture. Cosmopolitanism is one such concept, but it cannot stand 
alone. In each instance, it is confronted within and refracted through others; specifically, 
those of race, culture, and Eurocentrism. Similar to what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak once 
remarked in regard to Kant, Hegel, and Karl Marx, it is because the bodies of works 
considered for each critical model constitute ‘source texts of European ethico-political self-
representation’ that the philosophy of history cannot simply be disregarded as something like 
a false science.3 Because they, as conceptual constructs retain effectivity and structuring force 
within contemporary discourses, to simply turn once back on them ‘when so much of one’s 
critique is clearly if sometimes unwittingly copied from them, is to disavow agency and 
declare kingdom come by a denial of history’.4  
 The wager of  this thesis is that a mutual illumination might be generated out of  
critically attending to these issues from the standpoint of  a present that is profoundly marked 
by globalisation. By mutual illumination, I mean that our historical perspective illuminates 
certain truths about prior philosophical texts, just as such philosophical texts might reveal 
something true of  our current historical moment. How, this thesis asks, are discourses of  
history in the ‘world historical sense’ philosophically intelligible today after intensified 
processes of  globalisation and critiques of  imperialist and colonial projects? On this view, 
globalisation names the tendential accentuation of  a structural asymmetry within which the 
true ‘globality’ of  finance capitalism produces ‘localised effects’ within and among nation-
states, whilst the ‘real’ universalisation of  capitalist social relations places into question the 
geo-historicity of  the universalist concepts of  political modernity.5 This epistemological and 
 
2 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973) xx (translation 
modified). To think in models is, for Adorno, what generates the rigour of systematic philosophies which do 
not construct systems. The model is, in other words, the methodological key to systematicity without a system. 
In Negative Dialectics – wherein the third part comprises three interpretive models – ‘Freedom: On the 
Metacritique of Practical Reason’, ‘World Spirit and Natural History: An Excursion into Hegel’, and, 
‘Meditations on Metaphysics’ – the model is contrasted to the simple examples in that it ‘strikes at the specific 
and at the more than specific, without letting it evaporate into its more general over-concept’, ibid., 29 
(translation modified). Stewart Martin has convincingly shown that while Adorno’s concept of the model to a 
certain degree remains obscure, it can be understood as an attempt to appropriate Walter Benjamin’s early 
perspectival conception of the constellation as the mode of presentation of ideas. See Stewart Martin, ‘Adorno’s 
Conception of the form of Philosophy’, Diacritics 36, no.1 (spring, 2006), 51. 
3 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge 
MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8. 
4 Ibid. 
5 This is understood according to Giacomo Marramao’s notion of a ‘passage west’. See Giacomo Marramao, 
The Passage West: Philosophy After the Age of the Nation State (London: Verso, 2012). 
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political predicament was what Dipesh Chakrabarty concisely summarised in the opening 
statement of  Provincializing Europe: 
 
Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the 
law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular 
sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and so on all bear the burden of European public thought 
and history. One simply cannot think of political modernity without these and other related concepts 
that found a climactic form in the course of the European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century. 
 These concepts entail an unavoidable – and in a sense indispensable – universal and secular view 
of the human. The European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment 
humanism at the colonized and denied it in practice.6 
 
Following this, I consider it to be the case that the idea of  universal world history – which in 
one way or another is at stake within each of  the three sites – is increasingly a problem for 
thought, as the empirical unification of  the globe unfolds. If, for a brief  moment, discourses 
on globalisation could sustain the belief  that history had irreparably relegated the significance 
of  nationalised territorial divides and state sovereignty to the past, it now seems increasingly 
clear that, within the remit of  global crises, there are numerous mediations of  forces which 
assert the boundaries of  sovereign territories with those that render these very bounds 
porous. While the notion of  a unified history of  humankind is no doubt as chimeric today 
as when it came to prominence, the histories of  those numerous processes of  conflictual 
unification that shaped the world can be glimpsed within different conceptions of  it. No mere 
examples of  the philosophy of  history, I treat each as a different model in the philosophy of  
history, which itself  has only a conflictual unity. 
 
Secularisation and Colonisation: The Histories of  the Philosophy of  History  
As a term, ‘the philosophy of  history’ made its entry into philosophical vocabularies 
primarily through French, after Voltaire polemically used La Philosophie de l’histoire as the title 
to a 1765 pamphlet surveying the histories of  ancient peoples, dedicated to the Empress 
Kathrine II of  Russia and published under the assumed name of  l’abbé Bazin.7 In Voltaire’s 
sense, a philosophy of  history is philosophical first and foremost because it is critical, in the 
spirit of  Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697): it sought to perform a work of  
demystification in regard to those theologies of  history which placed its origins in biblical 
times. Thereby, Voltaire took aim, in particular, at Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s Discours sur 
l’histoire universelle (1681) and the regeneration found therein of  an Augustinian parallelism 
 
6 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 4. 
7 Voltaire, La Philosophie de l'histoire, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire vol. 59, ed. J. H. Brumfitt (Geneva: Institut et 
Musée Voltaire, 1969). For further discussion of this text, see Chapter One of this thesis. 
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between a providential and a historical order.8 For this reason, Karl Löwith, in Meaning in 
History (1949), took care to separate out Voltaire’s notion of  philosophical history from a 
characterisation of  the philosophy of history as essentially secularised Judeo-Christian 
eschatology, a characterisation which has since come to form a contentious centre for 
ensuing interpretations.9 Indebted to Carl Schmitt’s assertion that ‘[a]ll significant concepts 
of  the modern theory of  the state are secularised theological concepts’,10 Löwith sought to 
demonstrate how ideas of  progress, revolution, and liberation, oriented toward a future 
qualitatively different from both present and past, embedded the structure of  the eschaton 
within conceptions of  intra-worldly historical development. This narrative of  the coming-
to-be of  the philosophy of  history hinged on his claim that Augustine’s The City of  God against 
the Pagans (426) and its proposal that worldly history is guided by providence, remained 
operative within modern conceptions of  progress. According to Löwith, the philosophy of  
history was first of  all a ‘systematic interpretation of  universal history in accordance with a 
principle by which historical events and successions are unified and directed toward an 
ultimate meaning’.11 This insight was put to work in a tremendous hermeneutical 
concatenation, sketching a history of  the philosophy of  history read backwards from Marx 
to eschatological scriptures. In this movement from the historically familiar toward the 
unfamiliar, the aim was to demonstrate that the most significant aspects of  those concepts 
of  history that emerged in the eighteenth and blossomed in the nineteenth century, were not 
to be found in their conceptual innovations or in their ruptures from what had come before, 
but rather in their continuity with an idea of  history as the history of  fulfilment and salvation. 
While Löwith’s version of  the secularisation thesis may have left many puzzled as to what 
‘secularisation’ as transformation and preservation precisely signified,12 the thesis itself  
 
8 The background to Voltaire’s historiographical interventions is complex and intimately bound up with disputes 
between constitutionalist and absolutist conceptions of sovereignty. An overview of this background insofar as 
it relates to Voltaire’s practice as a historian can be found in Karen O’Brian, Narratives of Enlightenment: 
Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 36–41. 
9 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949). This work first appeared while Löwith was in exile in an English translation but the 
subtitle of the later published German edition, ‘Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie’, captures 
better the argumentative arch of Löwith’s reading: that the presuppositions of the philosophy of history were 
essentially theological and, therefore, even its secularised articulations remained bound to theological 
commitments. Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen: Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie, 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1953). 
10 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 1985), 36. 
11 Löwith, Meaning in History, 1. 
12 From the outset, Löwith’s reading was sharply critiqued by Hans Blumenberg who in an early paper argued 
that the idea of progress in history was better understood to have been gerenalised from out of a number of 
more restricted notions of progression – most notably in the sciences and in technological development. This 
critique was since expanded in the major study The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1966). See Hans Blumenberg, 
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nevertheless functioned as a both powerful and enduring unificatory device for 
understandings of  the philosophy of  history as one. The problem with this view, and with 
the secularisation thesis more broadly, lies not so much in the very idea that theological 
concepts came to be re-inscribed within discourses of  a worldly and temporal realm, but 
rather in how it, at several levels, failed to fully consider the spatial and geographical 
dimensions at play in its own account of  the ‘temporalisation of  history’.13 This is true both 
in the sense of  the differential introduced into the very idea of  secularisation, when a plurality 
of  different geographically located processes of  secularisation are properly reckoned with, 
and in the sense of  just how integral geographical imaginaries of  globally distributed human 
diversity were to the formation of  late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century 
philosophies of  history. It is with the significance of  the latter of  these that I am primarily 
concerned. The degree to which it can be said to form a missing piece in Löwith’s reading 
can be gauged from a crucial, but less commented upon, presupposition within his analysis; 
namely, that a specifically Judaeo-Christian conception of  mankind as an idea and ideal to be 
realised was ‘the necessary horizon for the eschatological concept of  history and its 
universality’.14 Insightful as this observation is, it also serves to emphasise the extent to which 
Meaning in History glossed over the character of  the crisis that this conception of  humankind 
was led into after the discovery of  the Americas. This was a crisis led by those natural-
historical typologies of  the human species that were produced in the wake of  that nexus of  
European trade expeditions, territorial conquest missions, and exploratory voyages that 
characterised so-called early modern globalisation. In effect, Löwith glossed over the idea 
that European modernity was always colonial modernity, and that this profoundly influenced 
those schemas of  representation in which planetary humankind both came to be thought as 
such and came to function as the internally divided subject/object of  history.15 
 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1985). There exists a host 
of literature dealing with the central questions of this debate as they concern conceptualisation of the continuity 
and discontinuity of modernity with its past. For a thorough overview of their parameters as they were 
articulated in the Löwith–Blumenberg disputes, see Robert M. Wallace, ‘Progress, Secularisation and Modernity: 
The Löwith–Blumenberg Debate’, New German Critique, no. 22 (winter 1981), 63–79. 
13 For the full implications of the expression ‘the temporalisation of history’ see Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Time and 
History’, trans. Kerstin Behnke, in The Practice of Conceptual History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 
100–14. Koselleck both complicated and extended the narrative first presented by Löwith. While an account of 
Koselleck’s epistemology of historical temporalities is beyond the scope of this study; for further discussion, 
see Chapter One of this thesis. 
14 Löwith, Meaning in History, 18. 
15 Sylvia Wynter, ‘1492: A New World View’, in Race, Discourse, and the Origin of the Americas, ed. Vera Lawrence 
Hyatt and Rex Nettleford (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1995), 43. See also Giuliano 
Gliozzi, Adam et le nouveau monde: La naissance de l’anthropologie comme idéologie coloniale: des généalogies bibliques aux 
théories raciales (1500–1700), trans. Arlette Estève and Pascal Gabellone (Prais: Théétèe, 2003). 
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 This view onto the philosophy of  history has instead been afforded by a range of  
critical genealogies that, from the 1970s onwards, took as their object the discursively 
constituted images of  those populations that made up western Europeans’ geo-historical 
‘others’.16 Explored therein was the insight that modern colonisation and imperialism not 
only functioned through different forms territorial control but also had deep epistemic (and 
socio-psychic) consequences in a long history of  sociocultural ‘territorialisations’ through 
which Europe and later ‘the West’ came to be cast as the sole custodian of  analytic and 
reflexive knowledge and as the gatekeepers of  political emancipation.17 First articulated 
within the context of  twentieth-century anti-colonial struggles, this insight, and the potential 
consequences it carried for contemporary politics of  knowledge production, has become the 
point of  orientation for a wide range of  work in postcolonial critique and decolonial studies.18 
Fundamental to these, and among the best known, was Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), 
which sought to demonstrate a nineteenth century complicity between three fields: 
‘Orientalism’ as a discipline within the comparative sciences (of  physiognomies, languages, 
literatures and religions), depictions of  ‘the orient’ in cultural production more broadly 
conceived, and the imperialist projects of  the French and the English. To recognise the extent 
to which Western voices produced ‘the Orient’ of  which they spoke, Said argued that it was 
necessary to trace the histories of  the binary categorial knots (us/them, advanced/backward, 
West/East) which bound these three fields together and imprisoned nearly all forms of  
 
16 I will discuss here Edward Said’s Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978) but from a different geographic 
and disciplinary perspective see also Valentin-Yves Mudimbe’s The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the 
Order of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
17 While the politicised epistemological observations of the 1970s themselves also grew out of important 1950s 
and 1960s anti-colonial struggles, there are important prefigurations of both in the history of thought. One of 
the most striking examples of which is De l'égalité des races humaines (Paris, 1885) by the Haitian anthropologist 
Anténor Firmin, only translated into English in 2000. See Anténor Firmin, On the Equality of the Human Races, 
trans. Asselin Charles (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000). 
18 I am aware that in placing post- and decolonial frameworks side by side, I am to a certain extent choosing to 
overlook important differences and even divergences between them. These differences are reflected both in 
their primary geographic points of reference (Southeast Asia for postcolonial theory and Latin America for 
decolonial thinking) and in their theoretical genealogies (where Said’s discourse analysis was foundational to 
postcolonial theory, Enrique Dussel’s liberation theology and Aníbal Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of 
power was so to decolonial thought). Most important, however, are their differences as strategies for how to 
contend with the colonial question within the politics of knowledge and the divergence between: a) what 
Matthieu Renault has described as postcolonial critique’s dual strategy of rupture and repetition which is 
operative within ‘a double movement of decentering (provincialisation) and translation, of wrenching and 
appropriation of the “gifts” of the West’; and b) the decolonial strategic idea of a complete de-linking from 
Western epistemic frameworks which Walter Mignolo has come to spearhead. As should become clear, I have 
drawn in particular on work in the postcolonial tradition. While there is much to be said about the merits and 
limitations of both strategies, I do not believe it is unjust to present them both as responses to the same 
fundamental problematic. This is also the view proposed by Bhambra Gurminder, ‘Postcolonial and Decolonial 
Reconstructions’, in Connected Sociologies (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 117–40. Matthieu Renault, 
‘Rupture and New Beginning in Fanon: Elements for a Genealogy of Postcolonial Critique’, in Living Fanon, ed. 
Nigel C. Gibson (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 105. 
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European comparativism within a superiority complex; a complex that overdetermined 
attempts to see, understand, and explain foreignness as anything other than a derivative 
version of  the self-same. While ‘the philosophy of  history’ was of  relatively little concern to 
Said, the critique of  a specific conception of  history nevertheless subtended his endeavour 
and later came to be expressly articulated by several others in the attempt to assess the 
historical colonial gaze but also the reproduction of  this epistemic heritage within the 
contemporary moment.19 It did so not least because, in its brutal reality, the violence of  
colonial exploitation, domination, and in some cases genocide was matched by what Frantz 
Fanon called the ‘perverted logic’ by which colonisation disfigures the past of  those 
colonised, in a dual process of  de-historicisation and racialisation. In The Wretched of  the Earth 
(1961), Fanon asked, rhetorically, if: 
 
[p]erhaps it has not been sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not content to merely impose its 
law on the colonised country’s present and future. Colonialism is not satisfied with snaring the people 
in its net or of  draining the colonised brain of  any form or substance. With a kind of  perverted logic, 
it turns its attention to the past of  the colonised people and distorts it, disfigures it, and destroys it.20  
 
The historical role of  anthropology – the study of  human difference and similitude which 
initially took as its object the ‘primitive others’ of  ‘Western’ populations – in shaping these 
distortions and the way in which it as a science was conditions by the very fact of  colonial 
encounters, caused Claude Lévi-Strauss to characterise it as the ‘outcome of  a historical 
process which made the larger part of  mankind subservient to the other’ and as the ‘daughter 
to this era of  violence’.21 And, as critical anthropology began to assess its own imbrication 
in this process and, thereby, the history of  its own disciplinary formation, the relations 
between colonial domination, so-called discovery literature, natural histories of  humankind, 
and philosophical histories of  commerce and civil society in the eighteenth century became 
privileged objects of  analysis.22 In order to discern the contours of  the epistemic field within 
which universal histories of  humankind had emerged, focus therefore partly shifted from 
Said’s nineteenth century of  high imperialism to the Enlightenment of  the eighteenth 
century.23 Indeed, the late eighteenth century ‘stands as a kind of  threshold for postcolonial 
 
19 Said, Orientalism, 234. Later prominent examples include Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and 
the West (London: Routledge, 1990), and Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
20 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1961), trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004) 148–
49. 
21 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology II (1973), third English edition, trans. Monique Layton (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 54–55. 
22 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983). For more on Fabian, see Chapter One of this thesis. 
23 David Lloyd ‘The Pathological Sublime: Pleasure and Pain in the Colonial Context’, in The Postcolonial 
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theory, marking both the emergence of  categories that assert their own universal validity and 
the formation of  political states in which they are to be instantiated’.24 Though it can of  
course be questioned, this designation of  the eighteenth century as a period that stands in a 
crucial relation to the contemporary moment is far from arbitrary; instead, it hinges on the 
importance of  this period to the formation of  modern concepts of  history. Because the 
question of  history has not left us, the relevance of  the eighteenth century has not been 
exhausted. What postcolonial critique offered in this respect was a much-needed extra-
European critical perspective onto the construction of  history as an object of  knowledge. 
Where Reinhart Koselleck’s analysis of  semantic changes within German discourses on 
politics and history had registered the singularisation of  the idea of  multiple histories (historie) 
into the collective singular of  ‘history’ (Geschichte) or ‘history as such’; what postcolonial 
critique named was that this unification of  history at a global level also rested upon the 
temporalisation of  (colonial)difference. Understood as the conceptual apotheosis of  this 
specific form of  the temporalisation of  difference, the syntagm ‘the philosophy of  history’ 
in postcolonial critique thereby came to function as shorthand for the idea that Europe was 
at the forefront of  processes of  a global historical developmental process. With this, late 
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century philosophies of  history were seen to 
prefigure two iterations of  the idea of  a ‘civilising mission’.25 The first of  these being the 
explicit articulation of  this idea, which, during nineteenth century high imperialism, was used 
to legitimise colonial occupation through the promise of  ‘civilisation’ brought to colonised 
populations under the tutelage of  European colonial powers. The second, more nebulously, 
being the translation of  this idea into the notion that a global socio-political homogenisation 
both would and should be the normative accompaniment to the globalisation of  capitalist 
social relations. As such, ‘the philosophy of  history’ became the name for the afterlife of  a 
colonial ideological formation, inscribed within theories of  globalisation as modernisation, 
within which a certain idealised version of  Europe was elevated to the teleological model 
towards which all other nations should aspire. We might then say that while the secularisation 
thesis unified the philosophy of  history though its internal and geographically delimited 
transmission of  a theological heritage, postcolonial critique unified it by focusing on its 
relation to a colonial ‘outside’ and by homogenising distinct philosophies of  history through 
 
Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Colonialism and Postcolonial Theory, ed. Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 72. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The expression, which eminently discloses the intimacies of colonisation, civilisation, and Christianisation, 
comes from the French la mission civilisatrice, a turn of phrase which from the 1830s onwards became increasingly 
common stock within the lingo of French high imperialism. 
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perceived similarities on the question of  the global but exclusionary distribution of  historical 
agency. 
 
The Geopolitical Imaginary of  Philosophies of  History 
What I propose in this thesis, then, is twofold. First, that what needs to be questioned is not 
a homogenous idea of  ‘the philosophy of  history’ but rather the differential afterlives of  
philosophies of  history. And second, that each of  these afterlives articulate and are articulated 
within geopolitical imaginaries both informed and formed by a colonial world order. Though 
I take from Michèle Le Dœuff the notion that the history of philosophy remains half untold 
if imaginaries and the images, tropes, similes, and allegories that they are populated by are 
omitted from this history proper, it is not precisely her concept of the philosophical imaginary 
that I draw upon.26 Rather, what I wish to emphasise is what scholars like Chenxi Tang have 
analysed in terms of the ‘geographical imagination of modernity’,27 and how this, properly 
speaking, should be understood to imply a specifically geopolitical imaginary.28 The term, as it 
figures in the subtitle to my thesis, is purposively double coded: at once philosophical 
imaginaries of the geopolitical, and what might be called the infra-philosophical imaginaries 
conditioned by a specific geo-political order. In the most straightforward sense, to speak of 
‘the geopolitical imaginary of German philosophies of history’ therefore implies two 
possible, not mutually exclusive interpretations: that of the ‘imaginary’ of a specific 
geopolitical order whose instantiation is either assumed or anticipated within the philosophy 
of history in question; and that of a specific geo-political situation that informs and influences 
the ‘imaginaries’ of philosophies of history. When weight is placed on the former, on 
imaginaries of the geopolitical, it becomes clear that part of the following interrogation is 
shaped by those conceptions (and counter-conceptions) of cosmopolitanism contextually 
circulating in philosophies of history. This part seeks to grasp how, as the planetary existence 
 
26 Le Dœuff ’s concept of  the philosophical imaginary is not confined to an imaginary in philosophy but 
considers an imaginary belonging to a specific and privileged social minority of  (primarily) male philosophers. 
It is the imaginary of  a learned public, that through the discipline of  the concept breaks with other imaginaries 
and, as a cultural product (produced and reproduced), is transmitted across different periods. She makes the 
case that the ‘philosophical image-album is a language as technical as our jargon’ and that the institution of  
subjectivity in language there has its own particularism in philosophy. The formation of  an educated subject in 
this sense is also a passage through a number of  classical images that one learns and is shaped by, just ‘as one 
learns Latin in a Cicero constituted as a reference work, because desire structures itself  into the desire to 
philosophise’. Michèle Le Dœuff, The Philosophical Imaginary, trans. Colin Gordon (London and New York, 
Contiuum, 1989), 173 and 18. 
27 Chenxi Tang, The Geographic Imagination of Modernity: Geography, Literature, and Philosophy in German Romanticism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). For more discussion of this text, see Chapter One of this thesis. 
28 In this sense, the idea of a geopolitical imaginary owes as much to Achille Mbembe – who in On the Postcolony  
drew on Cornelius Castoriadis’ L’institution imaginaire de la société to analyse the effects and afterlives of the colonial 
imaginary of Africa instituted in modern political thought – as it does to Le Dœuff. Achille Mbembe, On the 
Postcolony, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of  California Press, 2001).   
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of the human species was constructed as an object of contemplation, philosophical 
cosmopolitanisms expressed the attempt to reckon with this planetarity from the standpoint 
of possible political and juridical communities. When weight is placed on the latter, on the 
imaginary conditioned by a specific geopolitical order, emphasis is concomitantly placed on 
how philosophy as a practice is situated within a wider social and political field than what has 
typically been the case.29 As a task to be assumed, bringing to the forefront this latter sense 
of  a geopolitical imaginary amounts to something like what Spivak has called the ab-use of  
the European enlightenment: ‘to bequeath a geography to it’.30 This twofold sense of a 
geopolitical imaginary of philosophies of history is well-captured by Eduardo Mendieta, in 
his evocation of Enrique Dussel’s critique of the persistent blindness of European 
philosophy as to the significance of its own locus of enunciation: 
 
Every theory, whether consciously or unconsciously, is determined by a spatial imaginary. This spatial 
imaginary operates at both macro and microlevels. […] In Dussel’s language, every philosophy 
participates in a geopolitical locus, not only in the sense that philosophy is determined by its place of 
enunciation, but also in the sense that philosophy also projects a certain image of the planet, the 
ecumene, and the polis as the space of what is the civilised, or the place of civilisation, which may or 
may not be besieged by the barbarians. Philosophy enacts an act of spatialisation at the very same time 
that it is spatialised by its locus of enunciation.31  
 
The duality of  determination by and projection of  a geopolitical imaginary is central to both 
the construction and the critique of  Eurocentrism in philosophies of  history. As what J.M. 
Blaut has called ‘the coloniser’s model of the world’, Eurocentrism consolidates the 
imaginary of an exceptional European civilisation that came to possess historical priority 
over all other sites of political organisation, cultural production, and religious and social life.32 
Thereby, the singularity of Europe as the originary territory of modernity is proclaimed while 
the material conditions for the rise of European powers are occluded. It is precisely because, 
as Matthieu Renault remarks, ‘the colonial imperialist order was never just a (geo)political 
order but also and inextricably an epistemic order, an order of knowledge’,33 that it is 
necessary to return to ’the very construction of the global Eurocentric order, as a dual, 
(geo)political and epistemic order, before the colonialism of the nineteenth and twentieth 
 
29 Two such exceptions to this are Matthieu Renault, L’Amérique de John Locke: L’expansion coloniale de la philosophie 
européenne (Paris: Édition Amsterdam, 2014), and Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
30 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, An Aesthetic Education in the Age of Globalisation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 20. 
31 Eduardo Mendieta, Global Fragments: Globalizations, Latinamericanisms, and Critical Theory (New York: SUNY 
Press, 2007), 85. 
32 James M. Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York: 
The Guilford Press, 1993). 
33 Renault, L’Amérique de John Locke, 12 (my translation). 
  11 
centuries’.34 What this means, is that even the history of philosophy, has to be thought 
through both the territorialisations it has produced and its own territoriality.  
 
The Territoriality of  German Philosophies of  History 
Kant, Hegel and the Humboldt brothers alike can of  course be considered German writers 
in a fairly straightforward sense since, aside from Kant’s early treatises in Latin, Alexander 
von Humboldt’s French diaries and Wilhelm von Humboldt’s occasional English essays, their 
written language was German. However, since Germany did not become a nation-state until 
1871, they were, more accurately, Prussians within the Holy Roman Empire of  the German 
Nation. Of  Germany as a political unit within the post-Westphalian European order, the 
jurist and natural law theorist Samuel von Pufendorf  wrote, in a highly controversial passage 
of  his The Present State of  Germany (1667), that it ‘is an irregular body, and like some misshapen 
monster [monstro simile] […] not now so much as a Limited Kingdom […] nor is it a Body or 
System knit and united in a League, but something that fluctuates between these two’.35 
Between kingdom and league, it was no less irregular in the latter days of  the Holy Roman 
Empire, whose dissolution in 1806 punctuates the period covered by the texts considered 
here. Few of  the constituent municipal states had any direct colonial possessions overseas, 
and those colonisation projects that were undertaken were small in scope, short lived, and 
of  negligible economic significance when compared to those of  the Spanish, Portuguese, 
Dutch, British, and French empires. In the seventh and eighteenth century, this paucity was 
at least partly reflective of  the minor status of  the German states within European power-
politics of  the period. Not until after Otto von Bismarck’s unification of  these states did 
German colonialism develop, properly speaking, in the midst of  intra-European political 
conflicts that played out on a global scale, the fierce hunt for natural resources, and the 
emerging social Darwinism characteristic of  the period of  high Imperialism.36 This is one of  
the purported reasons why Said did not explicitly engage with either German philosophy or 
Orientalism within his study. The rules of  representation which he attempted to map, related 
primarily to North Africa and the Middle East, while German orientalist had been largely 
 
34 Ibid., 15 (my translation). 
35 Samuel von Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, trans. Edmund Bohun (1696), ed. Micheal J. Seidler 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 173. This piece has a fascinating history, as Pufendorf wrote it as a 
fictionalised piece of travel literature published under the pseudonym of Severinus de Monzambano, an Italian 
character writing to his equally fictional brother Laelius to recount his historically informed analysis of the state 
of constitutional law within the Holy Roman Empire, or, as Pufendorf called it, ‘imperii Germanici’. A variant of 
this quotation and an analysis of the ways in which it reflects how nation-building happened within a state-
territory complex, see Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2013), 314–15. 
36 Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History, trans. Sorcha O’Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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enthralled by South and Southeast Asia, with Sanskrit as the primary linguistic point of  
reference.37 But, more importantly, if  Said had placed German Orientalism to one side, it 
was because the relation between academic discourse and the form of  colonial rule which 
made use of  the ‘knowledge of  populations’ did not and could not match up in the same 
way as was the case with either the British Empire or the second French Empire, the focal 
points of  his analysis. German orientalists may have shared the authoritative demeanour of  
their French and British colleagues in the face of  oriental culture, but, wrote Said,  
 
at no time in German scholarship during the first two-thirds of  the nineteenth century could a close 
partnership have developed between Orientalists and a protracted, sustained national interest in the 
Orient. There was nothing in Germany to correspond to the Anglo-French presence in India, the 
Levant, North Africa. Moreover, the German Orient was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a 
classical, Orient[.]38 
 
And yet, of  course, colonial imaginaries had pervaded the German-speaking regions before 
unification. Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, against the notion of  a monstrous and 
irregular body of  German states, fantasies of  ‘the (fictitious) colonial Empire served as a 
screen onto which ideas about national unity and national greatness could be projected’.39 To 
this effect, Susanne Zantop has argued that a both racialised and gendered vision of  the 
nation was, in this period, constructed from the standpoint of  the colonial peripheries.40 And 
while the idea of  overseas territories may have sustained and consolidated nationalist identity 
construction in Europe within this period, the epistemic effects of  colonisation themselves 
certainly did not flow within strictly delineated national bounds. That is to say, before the 
rise to prominence of  the various national-institutional orientalist schools, the production 
and distribution of  so-called discovery literatures in the course of  the eighteenth century was 
trans-European, and the German speaking territories saw as much of  an increase in these 
forms of  writings as did the other intellectual centres across the European continent. To 
understand the colonial traces upon the geographical imaginaries of  philosophies of  history 
from this period, is to understand the geographical as also, in some sense, geo-political, and 
that is the impetus that subtended the manner in which the philosophies of  history analysed 




37 Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
38 Said, Orientalism, 19. 
39 Conrad, German Colonialism, 17. 
40 Susanne Zantop, Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870 (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 32. 
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Temporalities and Territories  
What I explore in the construction of each of the three critical models, then, are the different 
manners in which historical temporalities have been territorialised within philosophies of 
history; specifically, according to notions of races, cultures, and peoples. Temporality is here 
understood as the broadly phenomenological notion of  a constitutive interrelation and 
differentiation between past, present, and future that, in philosophies of  history, comes to 
be imbricated within causal webs of  significance. Territory is here understood as an 
ineluctable part of  the conceptual vocabulary of  modern political geographies in two senses. 
First, as the historically specific form of  bounded space which, in relation to the state, carries 
juridical, economic, and political connotations; and, second, as the different forms of  
territorialisation through which historical differences have been bounded and bound to 
specific groups. That historical dynamism was viewed as intimately bound up with state 
actors and that the idea of  world history that emerged was that of  the history of  European 
states, makes the state-form an unavoidable part of  these philosophies of  history, without 
necessarily defining their ultimate horizon.41  
 There are few places within the history of  philosophy where the profound tensions 
between universality and globality are as clearly articulated as within those late eighteenth-
century and early nineteenth-century philosophies wherein conceptions of  universal world 
history totalised history itself  with respect to its beginnings, ends, and global expanse. In 
what follows, ‘temporality’ and ‘territory’ form the dual key through which the unicity and 
divergences within the field in question are articulated: each philosophy of  history 
understood as a specific configuration of  the two. The point of  departure for the 
construction of  the critical models is the genealogy of  the eighteenth-century trope that 
travel across the globe was analogous to travel backwards in time. By outlining the emergence 
of  this idea, an idea caught up in a definite geopolitical imaginary, I show how it reflects 
views of socio-political, cultural, and racial differences that are deeply intertwined with the 
temporalisation of geographical space and the territorialisation of historical difference.42 To 
show how each philosophy of history emerges out of, or sets itself apart from, this imaginary 
is therefore also an attempt to place the history of philosophy in relation to histories of 
colonisation and imperialism. Following Renault, I take it to be the case that: 
 
41 This is also the point of origin of the idea of peoples without history, an idea inextricable from that of peoples 
without states since the historicity of a people is presumed to only be assumed at the point at which it shapes 
itself into a civil whole. See Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982). 
42 Fabian, Time and the Other. 
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To return the colony and empire to their rightful places within the history of political philosophy, when, 
more often than not, political philosophy is conceived of as a philosophy of the (European) state, is not 
to replace one problematic with another. Rather, it means that their intertwinements, the transmission 
between them and their fusions over the past five centuries should be thought.43 
 
One crucial aspect of  such an exercise of  relocation within this thesis is the insistence that 
the concepts of  humankind and humanity – concepts that, in many instances, sustain the 
universalism of  Enlightenment philosophies – must be read in light of  how the constructions 
of  global taxonomies of  the Earth’s populations stood in relation to colonial and imperial 
projects. Within the analyses here undertaken, this problematic also inscribes an ineluctably 
confrontation with the constitution of  the modern concept of  race. It is, as Justin E.H. Smith 
and many others have noted, difficult to write the history of  race because it, as an object, 
‘does not exist in a robust scientific or metaphysical way’.44 Rather, it is a both tenacious and 
powerful illusion, whose entire history is composed of  a grand and miserable mixture of  
natural scientific and political concepts to such a degree that few other illusions better attests 
to the difficulty of  disentangling the former from the latter.45 In order to begin to understand 
what has spurred and sustained this illusion, socio-historical factors such as early modern 
colonial projects, the conquest of  the Americas, and the rise and consolidation of  the 
modern institution of  slavery are as integral to its history as are mutations within scientific 
conceptions of  humankind.46 While it is not the primary aim of  this thesis to trace the 
genealogies of  the modern concept of  race, its articulation within different philosophies of  
history also cannot be disregarded. Within each of  the philosophies of  history in question 
here, their functional conception of  race and its efficaciousness will be interrogated. 
 
Kantian, Hegelian, and Humboldtian Models 
Why then these three models? And, perhaps most pressingly, why Kant, Hegel, the 
Humboldts but no Marx? This is a pressing question since, if  one of  the senses in which the 
philosophy of  history lives on is as an object of  critique, then it does so in a complicated 
manner. The target of  critiques of  the philosophy of  history is not only explicit theories of  
 
43 Renault, L’Amérique de John Locke, 21 (my translation). 
44 Justin E.H. Smith, Nature, Human Nature and Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015), 68. 
45 Denise Ferreira da Silva, ‘Notes for a Critique of the “Metaphysics of Race”’, Theory, Culture and Society 28, 
no.1 (2011) 138–48. See also Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global History of Race (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007). 
46 Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999). For an impressive overview of a 
range of different historical forms racism in the West, see Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to 
the Twentieth Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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historical development – with modernisation theory as the paradigmatic example after 
formal decolonisation – but also the pervasive implicit assumptions about the appropriate 
paths of  ‘emancipation’ and ‘liberation’. From this perspective, postcolonial critique can be 
seen as a historically situated strategy for how to politically, ethically, and theoretically eschew 
unilinear and monolithic teleologies of  emancipation. It is no surprise, then, that one of  the 
primary theoretical antagonisms on the question of  history at a global scale largely came to 
be expressed in the confrontation of  Marxism (or at least, a certain Marxism) and 
postcolonial critique, as is clear from both Robert Young’s White Mythologies (1990) and 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe (2000).47 These works raised the issue of  the 
epistemological and political limits of  Marxism for the project of  writing the history of  
modernity from the perspective of  former colonies. For this reason, Marx and the contested 
heritage of  Marxism sits on the horizon – even if  not in the body of  the studies presented 
here. There is, however, good reason to upset the trinitarianism of  critical theory, and 
reconsider the heritage of  the Enlightenment from the standpoint not only of  Kant, Hegel 
and Marx but also from that of  Kant, Hegel and the Humboldts. While the centripetal force 
of  Kantian cosmopolitanism keeps the idea alive, and the Hegelian critique of  Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy has become something of  a rite of  passage for much critical 
theory, the inclusion of  Humboldtian Bildungsphilosophie allows for the cogency of  and 
inherited tensions within the concept of  culture to today be addressed in a way that would 
not otherwise have been the case. Notably, what the Humboldtian model adds is the 
perspective of  a critique of  Eurocentrism in the philosophy of  history articulated at its very 
founding moment. 
 
47 Young, White Mythologies; and Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. As Vivek Chibber’s Postcolonial Theory and the 
Spectre of Capital attested to, the questions raised in these debates have neither entirely left us nor been resolved. 
Indeed, the polemic Chibber therein carried out against the Subaltern Studies Group can be read as an 
elaboration and reiteration of points already articulated in the first rounds, especially by Aijaz Ahmad’s In Theory: 
Classes, Nations, Literatures and later in Benita Parry’s Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique. There were more 
actors and positions in this debate than can be done justice to here, but the most fundamental and substantial 
questions largely converged on the relation between something like a ‘globalised’ postcolonial condition of 
temporal hybridity and the inscription or subsumption of narratives of colonisation and decolonisation within 
global capitalist social relations. One question raised was, in other words, that of whether and to what extent 
postcolonial theory was able to articulate and account for how the past and present of colonial rule and 
domination in (ex)colony and metropole alike, was bound up with the history of capitalism and its globalisation. 
Where notably Marxist critics of the term called for a return to the notion of ‘third world-ism’ and for a stronger 
understanding of what makes and shapes a sense of community that can gives rise to political resistance – in 
place of notions like hybridity – others instead emphasised the need for more hybridity and a proliferation of 
historically nuanced theories in allegiance with postcolonial critique that would eschew a monolithic orientation 
toward ‘the postcolonial’. A good critical summary of these theoretical tensions can be found in Stuart Hall, 
‘When was the Post-Colonial? Thinking at the Limit’, in The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, 
ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti (London: Routledge, 1996), 242–60. For the contemporary stakes of these 
debates see also Marie Louise Krogh, ‘Gridlock!: Review of The Debate on Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of 
Capital’, Radical Philosophy 2, no.1 (February 2018), 115–18. 
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 The thesis is therefore composed of  two unequally weighted halves, wherein an 
inverted ratio of  historical exposition to systematic analysis largely prevails. Part One draws 
on and problematises accounts of  the emergence of  philosophies of  history, to make the 
case for a greater acknowledgement of  the importance of  colonial projects for the 
conceptual shape and formation of  these philosophies. Since this argument navigates a 
complex field of  epistemic and socio-political conditions, this first part tends toward 
historical contextualisation and methodological clarification. In contrast, the arguments 
presented in Part Two, which constitutes the bulk of  the thesis, rest largely on textual exegesis 
and conceptual analysis, in a philosophical critique that aims to fold the historico-
epistemological background of  Part One into the construction of  the three models. By 
homing in on the German context and on the writings of  Kant, Hegel, and the Humboldt 
brothers, it aims to examine how their respective philosophies of  history are inscribed within 
and depart from the mapped epistemic field and subsequently represent different conceptual 
trajectories departing from this site. Of  course, these three models are related through their 
historical context and their philosophical vocabularies, bound together by shared 
presuppositions as well as by active differentiations within the varied landscape of  Kantian 
and post-Kantian philosophy; in many ways, the Humboldt brothers and Hegel jointly 
articulated their work on the basis of  Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy. Although 
in most accounts of  this period of  German philosophy, the relations between Kant’s and 
Hegel’s philosophies – with Fichte, Schelling and the early Romantics acting as intermediaries 
– by far tends to overshadow the relation of  either Kant or Hegel to the Humboldts,48 the 
minutae of  immanent connections and conceptual transmutations that can be spelled out in 
this regard are for the most part well documented and therefore not of  principal concern 
here. Because the arguments within each critical model are largely self-contained, the 
movement of  Part Two is not so much accumulative as it is reflective and comparative, with 
the Hegelian and the Humboldtian models understood as responses to a Kantian paradigm 
operative within conceptions of  cosmopolitanism and the philosophy of  history. 
 Today, the concept of history in the collective singular is implicit, even if negatively so, 
in those many discourse that attempt to reckon with the threat of species extinction and the 
 
48 This is the case for some of the most thorough Anglophone studies of the period, which hardly mention 
either of the Humboldts. See, for instance, Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). An exception to this tendency is Michael Forster’s work on 
the legacy of Herder’s philosophy of language within German idealism, which to the contrary largely downplays 
the significance of Kantian insights. See Michael N. Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and Michael N. Forster, German Philosophies of Language: From 
Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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already tendential destruction of the conditions of the reproduction of human life on the 
planet. What is needed and what I here have begun to construct, is the perspective from 
which it can become possible to recognise and think through, within the different 
genealogical linages for this concept, the geopolitical imaginaries that these philosophies of 
history both are inscribed within and project.  
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One is a primarily contextualising methodological discussion of  what is to be 
counted among the ‘circumstances’ for the emergence of  philosophies of  history in the 
eighteenth century. Therein, I discuss first Ernst Cassirer’s account of  the construction of  
history as an object of  knowledge in The Philosophy of  the Enlightenment (1939). Following this, 
I turn to Bertrand Binoche’s more recent Les trois sources des philosophies de l’histoire (1994), 
which probes the tensions within and contradictions between French, Scottish, and German 
philosophical discourses on history in the late eighteenth century – between sketches of  
scientific and moral progress within a tableau historique, natural histories of  man and civil 
society, and historicisations of  Leibniz’s theodicy. While valuable insights are drawn from the 
perceptive analysis within these and related works, the overarching purposes of  the chapter 
is to problematise their shared occlusion of  the wider colonial context for knowledge 
formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Following the cues of  Michèle Duchet’s 
under-appreciated work Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières (1973) and Mary Louise 
Pratt’s now-canonical work Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (1992), I argue that 
one way to remedy such an occlusion is to interrogate the variety of  sources which presented 
the ‘rest’ of  the world’s population to European scholars and philosophers. Doing so, I 
suggest, would enable contemporary scholarship on this period to better counter the 
widespread injunction to disregard racism and Eurocentrism within the philosophical canon 
as merely the expressions of  a transmission from so-called ‘travel literature’. 
 Chapter Two concretises the proposal to take seriously the extent to which missionary 
relations, travelogues, and reports from colonial administrators informed the geography of  
philosophical imaginaries and functioned as conduits between geo-political and epistemic 
conditions in knowledge formation. It does so through a reconstructive analysis of  the long 
introduction to Joseph-François Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages amériquains comparées aux moeurs 
des premiers temps (1724), a proto-ethnographic study written after a nearly six year-long 
mission (1712–17) among the Iroquois at Kahnawake, in the French settlement of  Sault 
Saint-Louis. Although this work is but one among an overwhelming number of  source 
materials used within philosophical histories, I argue that its significance lies in the manner 
in which it paradigmatically inaugurated a regime of  comparability through which a shift 
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from the seventeenth-century view of  ‘savages’ as exemplars of  ‘natural man’ to that of  
‘primitive man’ could be effected. The exposition of  this chapter aims to show how the 
triangulation between ‘moderns’, ‘ancients’, and ‘savages’ – a triangulation that would 
subtend the co-constitution of  philosophical anthropologies that emphasised the dynamic 
and malleable character of  human nature and ‘philosophical’ histories’ of  civil society, 
civilisation, or humankind – was articulated with hitherto incomparable clarity by Lafitau, 
such that this work is emblematic of  the way in which difference came to be translated into 
temporal distance, as the horizon of  history was extended across the globe. A brief  reception 
history of  this work in eighteenth-century France, Germany, and Scotland concludes this 
chapter and Part One as a whole. 
 Chapter Three demonstrates the interpenetration of  Kant’s conceptualisation of  
universal history and cosmopolitanism with those parts of  his oeuvre which, after Robert B. 
Louden’s revivification of  the term, have come to be known as his ‘impure’ philosophy, 
notably the writings on race and the lectures on physical geography, pragmatic anthropology, 
and pedagogy. While Kant arguably constitutes the most well-mined reference for writings 
on cosmopolitanism and political universalisms, the ascendance of  recent scholarship that 
has brought into focus considerations of  Kant’s equally ground-breaking but more troubling 
role in the constitution of  a scientific discourse on race, has raised a number of  questions as 
to the relationship between these two aspects of  his authorship. My intervention into the 
debates foregrounds the importance of  education and educability to Kant’s philosophy of  
history. The concept of  humankind is central to Kant’s conception of  universal history; 
however, while the whole of  the species is here at issue, one of  its parts is placed at the 
spearhead of  progression in the development of  moral predispositions. As such, the 
question of  an educative relation that cuts across the whole of  the species forcefully imposes 
itself. Through a diachronic reading of  Kant’s preoccupation with the importance of  
(self)discipline to the assumption of  enlightened reason, I argue that what is problematic in 
Kant’s concept of  history is that it rests on a racial and geographic fixation of  the relation 
between educators and educated (in the areas of  culture, civility, and morality) which should 
today be called into question when we consider the idea of  progress toward a ‘cosmopolitan 
end’. While the chapter neither questions the idea that Kant, over the course of  his life, might 
have changed his position on a great deal of  things, nor that a sensitivity to such changes are 
not welcome in reconstructive readings in the history of  philosophy, it is also meant as a 
challenge to the persistent drive to exonerate the late Kant from the faults of  the younger 
on these issues – a drive which seem suspiciously tinged with a reluctance to fully assess the 
extent to which the perceived depth of  a contradiction between universalism and racism 
might, in fact, cover over a racist universalism. 
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 Chapter Four examines the grounds for the critique of  cosmopolitanism which Hegel 
articulates in Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right through the concept of  philosophical world 
history. As later Hegelianisms would also come to do, it is the abstract ideality of  
cosmopolitanism which Hegel critiques, in the endeavour to instead comprehend the real 
conditions of  possibility for the actualisation of  freedom. The centrality of  Hegel’s 
philosophy of  history to the very construction of  the concept of  Eurocentrism as it is used 
today, orients the exegetical work of  this chapter as it traces the dialectal interpenetration of  
multiple geographic, socio-political, and, finally, geo-political conditions within his concept 
of  world history. As is the case for Kant, this chapter is less concerned with exonerating 
Hegel from the charge of  Eurocentrism and more concerned with locating precisely wherein 
the problem of  Eurocentrism lies within Hegel’s writings. While the most blatant aspect may 
be the re-articulation of  the projection of  temporal distance onto nationalised difference (as 
addressed in Part One), within Hegel’s account of  the differentiation between spirit and 
nature, the argument presented here is that what is still more significant is that Hegel – and 
with him a whole lineage of  Hegelianisms – assumes and returns to its own presupposition 
of  a (paradoxical) absolute standpoint of  judgement and of  the enunciation of  absolute 
universality.   
 Chapter Five turns to the Humboldt brothers, critically reconstructing the concept of  
an ‘alternative cosmopolitanism’ and its attendant alternative philosophy of  history in their 
works. By engaging the intellectual trajectories of  both brothers, the articulation  of  an 
implicit critique of  the ‘epistemology of  ignorance’ attributed to Kantian universalism can 
be discerned and The rationale for considering the genealogical roots of  an alternative 
cosmopolitanism as traceable not to one or the other but to both Humboldt brothers is 
therefore provided through a broader set of  reflections on what it means to read their works 
as part of  a shared oeuvre, shaped by something like a joint research programme. Such a 
programme, this chapter argues, was premised on the necessity of  multiple forms of  
translation within scientific inquires and on the onto-epistemological primacy of  interaction 
and dynamism. The specificity of  the conception of  a cosmopolitan ideal constructed 
therein, as seen against other cultural cosmopolitanisms, is located in the linguistic 
schematism which Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of  language introduces into the very 
concept of  culture. The tensions within this philosophy of  language are probed in regard to 
two (related) problematics: that of  a tendency toward cultural essentialism in a conception 
of  cultures as closed totalities; and that of  a tendential racialisation of  language itself, which 
displaces but does not expel the concept of  race which haunts Kantian cosmopolitanism. As 
a counter to these tendencies, a practical-political imperative is excavated from Alexander 
von Humboldt’s meta-political writings on colonial modernity and the politics of  racial 
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difference. Such writings demonstrate, through their explicit commitment to the abolition of  
slavery, that if  the ideal for an alternative cosmopolitanism with a positive valuation of  
cultural-difference is not to run aground on the impotence of  its own incapacity to fathom 
the significance of  real power-differentials, this aspect must be considered as important to it 
as the philosophy of  language and culture within which it is conceptually articulated. 
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According to Strabo’s Geographica (c.20AD), the first terrestrial globe had been constructed 
by Crates of  Mallus around 150BC. Thereon, the oikouménē, the known or inhabited world 
of  Europe, Libya (North Africa), and Asia was portrayed on the upper quarter of  a spherical 






Figure 1: The Globe of  Crate of  Mallus, from Ravenstein, E.G. (1911), 
‘Map § History of  Cartography’, in Hugh Chisholm, Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 17 (eleventh edition), Cambridge University Press, 635. 
Source: wiki-sources. 
 
Medieval European manuscripts depicting the world on mappae mundi, however, focused 
exclusively on the known world, typically with Jerusalem placed at the Christian religious 
centre of  a circular map, with Asia placed on the top half  (often with east, ‘oriens’ inscribed 
above it) and Europa and Africa on both the left and right on the bottom half  (often with 
west, ‘occidens’ inscribed below them).50 As such, these maps seem to have foregone explicit 
globular references, while retaining the tripartite division of  the oikouménē, in outline largely 
identical to that found in the Greek and Roman sources which, more often than not, 
informed their construction.51 A biblical division of  humankind into three distinct families 
 
49 For a figuration of the globe to have any usefulness as a depiction of the known inhabited world, Straboe 
suggests that it should be no smaller than ten feet in diameter. See Strabo, The Geography of Strabo, trans. Duane 
W. Roller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 134. 
50 Rodney W. Shirley, The Mapping of the World: Early Printed World Maps 1472–1700 (New Holland Publishers, 
London 1984), xx–xi. 
51 So-called T–O maps, such as the one shown above, are sometimes counted as a subgenre of the mappae mundi 
and sometimes, because of their less detailed character, their own genre. The distinction is not of great 
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with genealogical linages from the three sons of  Noah was inscribed upon several of  these 




Figure 2: T–O Map from Isidore of  Seville’s 
Etymologiae (ca. 600–25, printed 1472). The three 
continents are identified as populated by the 
descendants of  Noah’s three sons, Shem, Japheth and 







Cartographic references to the shape of  the Earth on world maps did not gain prominence 
until the rediscovery of  Ptolemy’s Geographia (c.150 AD) and its translation into Latin 
between 1404–06, a methodological event often taken to be of  comparable importance to 
the introduction of  printmaking in Europe in the fifteenth century.52 The method for map 
projection based on 
the concepts of  
latitude and longitude 
found in Ptolemy’s 
work increasingly 
gained influence as 
prints (first from 
woodcuts and later 
from metal etchings) 
ensured that the same 
map could be widely 
and simultaneously distributed, received, and contemplated. The depiction of  landmasses 
based on mathematical calculations, rather than on their importance in terms of  trade or 
politico-religious influence, changed the face of  world representations.53 Cartographies 
 
importance here, as the absent relation to a globular shape is comparable between the two. 
52 The first edition of Ptolemy’s Geographia with printed maps was produced in Bologna in 1477. Shirley, The 
Mapping of the World, xviii. 
53 One weakness of Ptolemy’s use of mathematical coordinates was that it did not permit the delineation of 
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ordered in terms of  longitude and latitude, literally inscribed the shape of  the Earth onto 
each map produced. 
 
Figures 3 and 4: In Abraham Ortelius’ Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (1606 edition), the Ptolemean conception of  the 
world is neatly depicted, both in relation to the extent of  the oikouménē of  late Greco-Roman antiquity and 












Taken together, the mathematisation of  cartographic practices and the wider distribution of  each 
individual map conditioned both the generalisation and the standardisation of  world maps across 
Europe.54 It standardised them as far as was possible, at a time when the extent of  known coastlines 
was constantly being adjusted, as territorial claims and trade interests drove the quest for uncharted 
land forward during the next several hundred years. When Louis Antoine Bougainville, who led the 
first French circumnavigation of  the Earth between 1766–69, reflected upon the impact of  oceanic 
exploration, he characterised it as ‘one of  the distinctive characters of  this century which soon will 
come to an end: to it posterity will owe the knowledge – or at least the great advancement of  
knowledge – of  the figure of  the Earth and of  almost all the countries which make up its surface’.55 
As whole continents gradually made their appearance on maps of  the world, the skewed ratio of  
known to unknown world described by Straboe was reversed. And between the earlier maps of  the 
known world and maps of  the whole world, lies the complex history of  exploration, colonisation, 
exploitation and European empire formations.
 
shorelines with a specificity necessary for actual navigation. Portolan charts were the other prominent 
cartographic tool in the ‘age of discovery’ and the combination of the two map types became current towards 
the middle of the fifteenth century. David Buisseret, ‘Europeans Plot the Wider World, 1500–1750’, in Geography 
and Ethnography: Perceptions of the World in Pre-Modern Societies, ed. Kurt A. Raaflaub and Richard J. A. Talbert 
(Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2010), 333. 
54 Jerry Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 153–61. 
55 Louis Antonine de Bougainville, quoted in Sergio Moravia ‘Philosophie et geographie a la fin du XVIIIe 
siecle’, in Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 57 (1967), 946 (my translation). Bourgainville’s travelogue 
was published in 1771 as Voyage autour du monde. In 1772 Denis Diderot wrote Supplément au voyage de Bougainville 
as an accompaniment to Bourgainville’s journal, although it wasn’t published until 1796. 
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Que la connaissance du passé fasse partie intégrante d’un présent, c’est un problème qui nous concerne aussi et exige un 
élucidation du rapport entre nos modes de pensée et ceux dont nous entendons parler. Autrement dit, il n’y a pas 
d’historiographie sans philosophie de l’histoire – explicite ou caché. 
 
Michel de Certeau, L’écriture de l’histoire, 197556 
 
Between 1519–22, within the initial period of  European oceanic explorations and territorial 
conquest, the first successful voyage to circumnavigate the Earth practically established a 
sphericity which had long since been assumed in most astronomical models of  the known 
universe.57 In the service of  the Spanish Crown and in the hope of  finding a Western passage 
to the spice-rich Maluku Islands, what has since become known as Magellan’s expedition 
emblematically illustrates the many and complex factors surrounding the process wherein 
the geographic space of  the world known to European cosmographers and cartographers, 
came to be extended around the globe.58 In the ensuing continuous adjustment of  the ratio 
between known and unknown worlds, the emergence of  a sense of  the world as globe 
occurred at the intersections of  political-economic interests and mathematical innovations;59 
with increasing frequency, this world came to be cartographically represented as a bounded 
 
56 Michel de Certeau, L’écriture de l’histoire (Paris, Gallimard, 1975), 147. 
57 In Cleomedes’ On the Circular Motion of Celestial Bodies (written between the first century BC and second century 
AD), Eratosthenes of Cyrene is credited with having calculated the circumference of the earth. His estimates, 
produced as early as 240BC, are, when compared to today’s understanding and depending on interpretations of 
the measuring units, only about 15% larger than the actual circumference of the earth. It is not until much later, 
in the seventeenth century, that the more proper figuration of the Earth as an ellipsoid figure begins to make 
an appearance, as in Isaac Newton’s Principia. 
58 As is well known, this expedition was undertaken by Ferdinand Magellan in 1519 and completed by Juan 
Sebastián in 1522 under the commission of Charles I of Spain (later Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire). 
But the first person to circumnavigate the globe might actually have been Magellan’s slave servant Enrique of 
Malacca, who, by the time the expedition reached the Philippines, would have travelled the entire circumference 
of the world within his lifetime. 
59 Stuart Elden, ‘Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of the world’, Transactions of  
the Institute of  British Geographers 30, no.1 (2005), 11–12. 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
CONQUESTS OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD 
 28 
space on which imperial powers inscribed their claims.60 Simultaneously, the mosaic of  
fragmentary descriptions of  humankind inhabiting all parts of  this globe was gradually 
pieced together, categorised, and organised until a corresponding sense that a 
‘comprehensive map of humankind’61 could and eventually would be overlaid upon the 
bounded space chartered by geographers and navigators. For the construction of  historical 
time during the eighteenth century both of  these registers were central. In different ways, 
such a construction forms the central object in Part One of  this thesis. 
 In Chapter One, the broad argument is made that the eighteenth-century 
conceptualisation of  historical time took place within a geopolitical imaginary largely 
structured by the colonialist projects of  the age, thus requiring a more through interrogation 
of  the importance of  travel literature to the emergence of  history as an object of  knowledge. 
More precisely, what is examined is the emergence of philosophical histories of  mankind, civil 
society, and reason. Despite the significant differences between these different 
conceptualisations of  history across European Enlightenments, the fact of  colonisation 
stands as their shared, joint condition. Temporally, these forms of  philosophical history all 
extended their scope to the beginning of  history. Spatially, they were concerned (or, at least, 
had self-conceptions of  being so concerned) with all of  the populations of  the globe. To 
that effect, these histories were reliant on a wealth of  materials today known as ‘discovery–’ 
or ‘travel literature’. What I will argue is that through these materials, the philosophies of  
history in question can be recognised as much more explicitly linked to the colonial and 
imperial becoming-global of  the world than has otherwise often been the case. Furthermore, 
it is argued that these very materials need to be considered more carefully, if  we are to fully 
appreciate the co-constitution of  philosophical anthropologies that emphasised the dynamic 
and malleable character of  human nature and philosophical histories in which historical 
distance was projected onto peoples across the globe. In Chapter Two, this point is 
concretised in the analysis of  Joseph-François Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages amériquains comparées 
aux moeurs des premieres temps (1724) and its reception. Today, Lafitau’s work is most often 
found cited in histories of anthropology and ethnology.62 What I will interrogate here is 
 
60 For the theory and history of cartography included in the above preamble, I have drawn in particular on 
Brotton, Trading Territories. 
61 Immanuel Kant, ‘Mr. Immanuel Kant's announcement of the programme of his lectures for the winter 
semester 1765–1766’, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, trans. and ed. David Walford with Ralf Meerbote 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 299. 
62 On this point, see the classical study in the history of  anthropology, Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Philadelphia, 1964, 114, 131–43. Other anglophone studies which discuss 
the importance of  Lafitau include Anthony Pagden, The Fall of  Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins 
of  Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), and Anthony Pagden, European 
Encounters with the New World (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1993). 
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instead its more subterraneous, philosophical reception across the European 
Enlightenment.63 Immediately striking, is the comparative aim so plainly stated in its title (The 
Customs of the Savage Americans Compared with the Customs of the First Times) which marks it as 
one of the earliest systematic studies of socio-political and cultural differences coded in terms 
of historical distance. 
 
I. The Circumstances of Philosophical Histories 
In Reinhart Koselleck’s account of the emergence the modern concept of history, as history 
in the collective singular, this emergence is tracked through shifts in the ‘semantic field’ of  
philosophical and, especially, political terminologies. At a meta-level, these changes were also 
tracked in emergent conceptualisations of  history itself, in regard to which Koselleck noted 
three significant shifts: the move from ‘historia naturalis’ to ‘Naturgeschichte’; from ‘historia sacra’ 
to ‘Heilsgeschichte’; and from ‘historia universalis’ to ‘Weltgeschichte’.64 For the latter of  these, of  
greatest interest to the project at hand, it is central that, as he noted in Futures Past, ‘[t]he 
geographical opening up of  the globe brought to light various but coexisting cultural levels 
which were, through the process of  synchronous comparison, then ordered diachronically’.65 
On this point, Chenxi Tang has written an extensive account of  how the ‘discovery of  
historical time was accompanied by the discovery of  geographical space’ such that ‘the 
historicisation of  society and knowledge went hand in hand with what can be called the 
geographisiation thereof ’.66 And yet, the importance of  how and through which channels 
this ‘opening up’ found a place among philosophical discourses on history has, as yet, only 
be explored by a few.67 
 Such an oversight is the glaring omission in Ernst Cassirer’s otherwise magistral The 
Philosophy of  the Enlightenment. Cassirer knew how to play the double genitive in ‘The Conquest 
 
63 The reception of  Lafitau in relation to philosophy has been partially discussed by Michèle Duchet in her 
cross-reading of  ethnological and historiographical texts in Michèle Duchet, Le Partage des savoirs: Discours 
historique et discours ethnologique (Paris: La découverte, 1985). 
64 Koselleck’s account can be found in the substantial entry on the emergence and determinations of the modern 
concept of history, and on how ‘history’ came to be a ‘fundamental concept’, in the dictionary of the 
fundamental political and historical concepts of European (but especially German) modernity, Geschichtlisches 
Grundbegriffe, and in various other articles. For an English-language translation of the section discussed here, see 
Appendix One of this thesis. 
65 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 238. 
66 Tang, The Geographical Imagination of Modernity, 3. 
67 I would not have been able to write this chapter were it not for Micèle Duchet, Anthropologie et Histoire au siècle 
des lumières: Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvétius, Diderot (Paris: Librairie Albin Michel, 1995). Although its focus is 
the French colonial world and in particular the function of conceptions of savagery within the historical 
anthropologies of the philosophes, its careful mapping of the differences between different forms of travel 
literature and the conditions of their reception in learned circles was an invaluable starting-point for the work 
undertaken in this thesis with respect to the idea of a ‘geopolitical imaginary’. 
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of  the Historical World’, his 1932 intervention into the intellectual history of  the 
Enlightenment period.68 Following Wilhelm Dilthey’s 1901 essay ‘The Eighteenth Century 
and the Historical World’, which had opened with the assertion that the ‘Enlightenment of  
the eighteenth century […] produced a new conception of  history’,69 Cassirer argued both 
that ‘the world of  historical phenomena had to be conquered and conceptually established 
in one and the same process of  thought’70 and, in turn, that a proper conquest of  the 
historical world would end up overturning, even conquering, certain central principles of  
Enlightenment thought, its universalism irreparably transformed by the discovery of  the 
historicity of  knowledge and society.71 What does not make an appearance in Cassirer’s play 
on conquest, is how the term itself  might inscribe the colonial and imperial context that 
coloured those preoccupation with human differences which, today, more clearly stands out 
as one of  the conditions to which especially endeavours to write a history of  mankind as a 
whole responded. Instead, Cassirer’s portrait of  enlightenment philosophy, building on 
Dilthey’s works, sets off  from the geological challenges to the biblical determination of  the 
age of  the world and the growing interest in the historicity of  the bible itself.72 The aim of  
this study was to chart how the eighteenth century came to found a critical philosophy of  
history, one which ‘inquires concerning the ‘“conditions of  possibility” of  history, just as it 
inquires concerning the conditions of  possibility of  natural science’.73 For both Dilthey and 
Cassirer, mid-eighteenth century Europe, in particular, is vindicated as the site where history 
 
68 As a whole, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment can in many ways be understood as the endeavour to account 
for the epistemic conditions of possibility for the emergence of Kantianism. This is no doubt the reason why 
Foucault, in a little-known review of the first French translation of this book, approximates Cassirer’s neo-
Kantian portrait of pre-Kantian enlightenment philosophies to his own project. See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy 
of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 197–233. Michel Foucault, ‘Une histoire restée muette,’ La Quinzaine littéraire 8, no.3–4 
(July 1966) 3-4, reproduced in Dits et écrits I (1954-69), ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 
2007), 545–49.  
69 Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘The Eighteenth Century and The Historical World’ (1901), trans. Patricia van der Tuyl, in 
Selected Works vol.IV, ed. Rudolf A. Makkeel and Frithjof Rodi (Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 325.  
70 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 200. 
71 This is argued in relation to Johann Gottfried von Herder in particular. See, ibid., 230–33. The claim itself and 
its place within a broader argument against a conception of Enlightenment philosophies as fundamentally 
ahistorical is not dissimilar to one made in more extended form in the equally seminal work by Friedrich 
Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1936). 
72 Cassirer emphasizes that it is in Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise that we find the origins of the idea of the 
historicity of the bible, remarking that he was ‘the first to develop it with sober precision and clarity’. Cassirer, 
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 185. 
73 In this way quite explicitly portraying his Neo-Kantian inflection. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 
197. Where Dilthey sets out to demonstrate the variety of historical works undertaken in the 18th century along 
with their points of convergence and their limitations, Cassirer much more forcefully attempt to delineate an, if 
not homogenous, then at least cohesive ‘form of thought’ [Denkform, translated as ‘mind’] characterised above 
all by Encyclopaedist’s opposition of a dynamic ‘ésprit systematique’ to that of a perceived static ‘ésprit de systeme’, 
Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 8. 
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emerged as a field of  knowledge proper, a vindication which could be based primarily on the 
early attempts to define historical, opposed to natural-scientific, facts, on the establishment 
of  parameters for the critique of  source materials, and on the reverberations from debates 
on natural law. 
 In a recent study by Bertrand Binoche, these are also among the factors considered of  
importance to the emergence of  more narrowly defined projects for ‘philosophical histories’ 
– which we might understand in distinction to the more immediately recognisable ‘historical’ 
works such as Edward Gibbon’s 1776–89 The History of  the Decline and Fall of  the Roman Empire. 
‘Philosophical histories’, for Binoche, names distinct but conceptually interrelated 
philosophic-historical narratives, retrospectively defined as the ‘three sources of   
philosophies of  history’:74 German theodicies of  history, French historical tableaus, and 
Scottish natural histories of  society. In this work, Binoche asks how we might think the joint 
appearance of  Isaak Iselin’s Über die Geschichte der Menscheit (1764), the first proper theodicy 
of  history; of  the first registered use of  the phrase ‘la philosophie de l’histoire’ in 1765 by 
Voltaire; and of  Adam Ferguson’s publication of  the first great ‘natural history’ of  society 
An Essay on the History of  Civil Society (1767). In their own ways, each of  these works can be 
considered to express the infusion of  developmental structures into the understanding of  
human nature across the European continent: in the German Aufklärung, the French 
Lumières, and the Scottish Enlightenment. For much of  intellectual history today, the porosity 
which the transmission of  knowledge in the Enlightenment period tends to lend to national 
designators, means that a focus on translation and intellectual cross-pollination has stepped 
to the fore. While sensitive to this aspect, Binoche nonetheless emphasises the distinct 
conceptualisations of  reason and experience circulating within more proximate milieus and 
their importance for the specificity of  each approach. The ‘German’ theodicy of  history, 
‘French’ historical tableaux, and ‘Scottish’ natural history are taken to exemplify differing but 
contemporaneous modalities of  philosophical investigation which, in response to both 
philosophical and political conditions of  the age, constructs the concept of  history as their 
essential object. To counter any overarching narratives, in the style of  Karl Löwith’s 
secularisation thesis, of  how historical facts in the context of  an either German, French, or 
Scottish Enlightenment came to be considered as endowed with meaning and direction, 
Binoche proposes that we consider their joint but distinct emergence simply as the result of  
their circumstances.75 This emphasis on circumstance functions to underscore that – since the 
circumstances surrounding each variation of  what might now be called a ‘philosophical 
 
74 Bertrand Binoche, Les trois sources des philosophies de l’histoire, 1764–1798 (Paris: Editions Hermann, 2013). 
75 Ibid., 6. 
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history’ are not the same, whether in Germany, France, or Scotland – we cannot assume the 
conceptions of  historical facts themselves, let alone the relation between meaning and fact, 
to be identical across these three instances. This is an important measure against unruly 
comparisons, which might too quickly reduce the intra-European comparativist endeavour 
to the identification of  similar conceptual operations. One underlying aim of  Les trois sources 
is thus to open the way precisely for a comparative history of  philosophy, understood as a 
rigorous framework in which to read the relations between primarily nationally determined 
intra-European philosophical movements and their individual thinkers. Perceptively, 
Binoche’s reads each of  the three ‘moments’ as distinct responses to a set of  largely shared 
conceptual limitations, organised around a structural opposition between two pairs: on the 
one side, rationality and genesis and, on the other, history and experience. To illustrate this 
figure and thereby consider the conceptual choices which on this account underpins the 
construction of  history as an object of  knowledge (in an approach that remains quite 
germane to that of  Cassirer), the famous methodological comments which prefaced Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s ‘Second Discourse’ (1754) forms an illuminating counterpoint. In regard 
to the question as to the ‘origin of  inequality among mankind’, Rousseau writes: 
 
Let us therefore begin by setting aside all the facts, for they do not affect the question. The Inquiries 
that may be pursued regarding this Subject ought not be taken for historical truths, but only for 
hypothetical and conditional reasonings; better suited to elucidate the Nature of  things than to show 
their genuine origin, and comparable to those our Physicists daily make regarding the formation of  the 
World.76 
 
The value of  this passage lies in its crystalline expression of  an opposition between two 
unequally weighted modes of  argumentation. To propose an answer to the question 
motivating the discourse, regarding the ‘origins’ and ‘foundations’ of  inequality among men, 
Rousseau calls for all fact to be swept aside and promotes the advantages of  reasoning 
according to the laws of  a rationally established ‘state of  nature’. Such an analysis, he 
maintains, must move beyond the domain of  experience into the semi-inductive space of  
rational speculation from effects. With no perceptible logic or structure, history is thought 
to provide little more than illustrative examples of  a reasoned argument whose central tenets 
are grounded in the immutability of  nature. The ensuing delineation between a form of  
reasoning that operates by way of  hypothetical and conditional constructs over and against 
an exposition of  historical truths, gives an emblematic image of  the most prevalent 
 
76 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men or Second 
Discourse’ (1754), in Rousseau: The Discourses and other early political writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 132. 
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conception of  history at this point: essentially nothing more than a compilation of  facts.77 
From a view internal to philosophical works, it is out of  a generalised adherence to this 
divide, between the rational and logically stringent account of  the origins of  society and the 
labyrinthine or chaotic history of  this same society, that ‘history’ as a meaningfully structured 
field also came into being.78 Guided by the overarching theme of  whether an immanently 
determinable course could be read out of  historical facts, especially if  recourse to divine 
intervention as the central explanatory factor was excluded, the ways of  aligning meaning 
and fact in the knowledge of  history became crucial from about the mid-eighteenth century 
onwards, both for the selection of  materials to be included in historical works and the 
organisation of  internal relations within a written form, as the many references, across bodies 
of  work, to ‘guiding threads’, ‘organising ideas’, and ‘leading motifs’ attest to. 
 By now, this condensed and tendentially caricatured conceptual narrative will be 
familiar to most, as are the habitual stops along the road of  the intellectual landscape of  the 
period, typically traced out, as does Binoche, between three national contexts – a 
triangulation to which a detour through Italy and the singularity of  Giambattista Vico is 
occasionally added.79 To add some depth to this image, it might be insisted that there is also 
a journey that navigates three forms of  discourse: the philosopher’s philosophy of  history, 
the universal histories of  historians, and the philosophies of  history implicit within works 
that attempted to determine the laws of  social and political transformation. It is implied, but 
not developed further by Binoche, that each of  these ‘moments’ formed a condition for the 
development of  philosophies of  history proper, in the nineteenth century, we might say, as 
important circumstances for their construction. That is, rather than take the various attempts 
at ‘philosophical history’ as essentially Christian eschatological narratives translated into 
intra-worldly schemas of  progression through the ages (what Löwith called the translation 
of  Heilgeschichte into Weltgeschichte, world history as a history of  salvation), we might attempt 
to read them as the distinct responses to more localised transformations, both in the political 
conditions of  the age and in conceptualisations of  nature, experience and knowledge.  
 
77 In the passage immediately preceding the here quoted passage, it is especially the biblical narrative which is 
recounted as ‘historical’. For a brief overview of a preceding dominance of an ‘exemplary theory of history’ see 
George H. Nadel, ‘Philosophy of History before Historicism’, in Studies in the Philosophy of History, ed. George H. 
Nadel, Harper and Row, New York, 1965. 
78 The pre-history of this divide goes back to Francis Bacon at least. 
79 Some studies simply forego the Italian peninsula and Giambattista Vico’s work. This isolation is often justified 
by way of reference to the relative obscurity of Vico’s works within his own lifetime, an assertion that more 
recently has been a topic of some discussion (especially as regards his influence on Montesquieu). See Gustavo 
Costa, ‘Vico’s Global Reception: Europe, Latin America and Asia’ in Eighteenth-Century Studies 44, no.4 (2011), 
538–41. 
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  This conception of  the circumstances for philosophical practice is useful in that it 
introduces considerable nuance into our account. This can be seen, in Binoche’s study, in 
that the issue of  secularisation is pluralised through geographical and discursive 
contextualisations; secularisation is read as co-constitutive, not, as in Löwith, as a singular 
determinant of  attempts to produce a ‘philosophical’ history. However, given the specificity 
of the question of history, namely of  how it, even under many different names and in 
different discourses, became such a concern for a number of  thinkers at this point in time 
might there not be some conditions of  the age that dislocate or globalise the otherwise 
localising effects of  a focus on ‘circumstances’? What for instance, would it look like if  we, 
across the intra-European sources for the philosophy of  history, looked not just to intra-
European cross-pollinations, transmissions and translations (that of  course always run the 
risk of  becoming misunderstandings) but also to the colonies and the ways in which 
knowledge of  Europe’s ‘outside’ worked its way into these philosophical histories? What if, 
in other words, the way in which the world of  the Enlightenment became global was 
considered a shared circumstance for their development? 
 Such a shared circumstance might constrain in specific and various ways, but it would in 
each case be hard to avoid some consideration of  the imperialist and colonial projects which 
underpinned it. Of  course, to account for the internal limits given in the transmission 
between philosophical works is complicated enough. These complications are further 
compounded, and shot immanently though with fraught questions, if  the account is to 
consider the wider socio-political circumstances of  a specific area and extend the scope to a 
variety of  territorial and imperialist trade projects. One conceptually generative way of  
broaching these topics is through the prism of  travel literature and its reception. That is, 
through an interrogation of  the construction of  the geopolitical imaginaries of  colonialist 
projects. 
 
II. Travel Literature and Philosophical History  
‘Travel literature’ as such constitutes an expansive literary category, devoid of  any formally 
defined intra-textual characteristics.80 In contrast to the travel narrative, paradigmatically 
structured according to the model of  departure, adventure, and return, travel literature is 
typically considered to name, in Joan-Pau Rubiés’ words, ‘that varied body of  writing which, 
 
80 There is a vast amount of contemporary scholarship on travel literature in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Among those that have been most fruitful for the present analysis are Sophie Linon-Chipon’s Gallia 
Orientalis: Voyages aux Indes orientales 1529–1722 (Paris: Press de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003); Sylvie 
Requemora-Gros, Voguer vers la modernité: les voyage à travers les genres au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Presses de l’Université 
de Paris-Sorbonne, 2012); and, in an anglophone context, Joan-Pau Rubiés, Travellers and Cosmographers: Studies 
in the History of Early Modern Travel and Ethnology (Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate/Variorum, 2007). 
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whether its principal purpose is practical or fictional, takes travel as an essential condition 
for its production’.81 More a meta-genre than a genre, it also entails no exclusive reference to 
the texts produced in the contexts of  imperialist and colonial European exploration. These 
types of  texts, which proliferated from the late fifteenth century onwards, might be 
delineated more precisely through the notion of  a ‘literature of  discovery and expansion’, 
for which the term ‘discovery literature’ in what follows will largely function as the 
metonym.82 This is of  course a contentious term, in that it places these writings firmly within 
the dynamics of  the subjectivity for whom ‘discoveries’ could count as such. This 
construction of  European explorers as the subjects of  world-knowledge, was greatly 
challenged by Edmundo O’Gorman’s The Invention of  America from 1961, which instead 
argued instead that the ‘philosophical conquest of  America’ could be said to constitute an 
invention proper, as part of  the great transformation of  European geographical-, historical-, 
and geo-political imaginaries and systems of  knowledge, in the wake of  the first waves of  
trans-Atlantic colonisation.83 There are two main reasons why the term is here retained: one 
internal to these texts themselves, and one pertaining to their reception and later 
operationalisation within conceptualisations of  humankind and the human species. First, to 
address these writings with a terminology attuned to a dual perspective wherein the traveller 
and those he (or, rarely, she) met could be figured in terms, say, of  ‘encounters’, would to a 
large extent belie both the tone and self-conceptions of  works wherein the observation of  
novelty was central – ‘discovery’, in a sense, was their aim. Second, the importance of  those 
texts that today might be called ‘proto-ethnological’ for the taxonomical projects of  the 
eighteenth century retains the sense that their value lies in the addition of  new empirical 
descriptions of  the world. 
 As either instances of  or source materials for what in retrospect are often considered 
early works in ethnography, anthropology, and geography, there can be little doubt about the 
importance of  these relays from travels over land and sea, regardless of  the specific trade, 
scientific, or expansionist purposes of  the expedition itself. Indeed, if, like Steven Shapin 
writes, it ‘is difficult to imagine what early modern natural history or natural philosophy 
would look like without that component contributed by travellers, navigators, merchant-
 
81 Joan-Pau Rubiés, ‘Travel Writing as a Genre: Facts, Fictions and the Invention of a Scientific Discourse in 
Early Modern Europe’ in Journeys: International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing 1, no.1 (2000), 6. 
82 Ibid., 7. A subgenre within ‘travel writings’ broadly construed is that set produced on intra-European Grand 
Tours. I will not discuss those here, although it would be interesting to compare how mechanisms of exotisation 
also might be at work in the emerging ‘national’ consciousnesses. 
83 Edmundo O’Gorman, The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the 
Meaning of Its History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961, revised and extended edition), 4. 
 36 
traders, soldiers, and adventurers’,84 much the same could easily be said for the ‘human 
sciences’ whose eighteenth-century emergence Michel Foucault traced in Les mots et les choses.85 
Between an emerging sense that travel itself  might constitute a central part of  much scientific 
research and a dramatic increase in publications from a commercially-driven book market,86 
the conditions throughout the eighteen century were near perfect for these accounts of  
foreign parts of  the world to make their way into fiction, science, and philosophy alike. A 
philosopher could, much like Daniel Defoe’s ‘English Gentleman’, 
 
make a tour of  the world in books, he may make himself  master of  the geography of  the universe in 
the maps, atlases and measurements of  our mathematicians. He may travell by land with the historians, 
by sea with the navigators. He may go round the globe with Dampier and Rogers, and kno’ a thousand 
times more doing it than all those illiterate sailors.87 
 
It is for this same reason that philosophical imaginaries throughout the eighteenth century 
were informed by travelogues, memoirs, reports, and notes jotted down or carefully 
composed by travellers, explorers, navigators, traders, soldiers, and colonial administrators. 
More often than not, these types of  texts are at the root of  the many and various remarks 
about island dwellers, scathing or exoticising descriptions of  unfamiliar customs and 
derogatory comments on the mental capacities of  ‘other’ human races than ‘white 
Europeans’. These frequently contain a litany of  prejudices and turns of  phrases that spark 
embarrassment or anger in today’s readers. And yet, as Ann Talbot remarks, the extent of  
discovery literature’s contribution to Enlightenment philosophy is still ‘largely unexplored, 
underestimated or misunderstood’.88 Perhaps this is not entirely surprising, since it is only 
within the last three decades or so years that the discipline of  philosophy itself  has begun to 
take on board re-considerations of  Enlightenment racism and justifications of  slavery and 
of  colonial rule by European imperial powers within canonical texts of  especially political 
 
84 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 245. 
85 Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 137–76 and 314–55. 
86 According to Mechthild Raabe’s Leser und Lektüre im 18. Jahrhunderte, there was a great upsurge in especially 
geography books between 1760–89. And out of the quarter of a million books at German book fairs at the end 
of the century, more than two-thirds were published after 1750. Mechthild Raabe, quoted in Tang, The 
Geographical Imagination of Modernity, 261, n.56. 
87 Daniel Defoe, quoted in Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), 1. 
88 Ann Talbot, ‘The Great Ocean of Knowledge’: The Influence of Travel Writing on the Work of John Locke (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), 2. We might add that this is perhaps more so the case in anglophone contexts since a number of important 
works which did take on the question of how to read the relation of Enlightenment philosophy to colonial 
ideology through a focus on the explicitly political and economic idea of conquest and exploitation were 
published in Italian and French contexts in the 1970s. In 1971 works of considerable importance to these 
questions were published in France and Italy: Duchet’s Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières and Gliozzi, 
Adam et le nouveau monde. 
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philosophy.89 When considering the disciplinary recalcitrance toward thinking the overlaps 
between histories of  colonisation and the history of  philosophy, we might ask whether such 
a recalcitrance reflects a problem specific to the interplays between philosophy, the history 
of  colonisation and racial ideology, or if  it is symptomatic of  a wider problematic regarding 
the configuration between ‘philosophy’ and ‘history’ as such? In either instance, the 
assumption of  a relative autonomy of  philosophical works from their historical conditions 
(an assumption which seems to form a condition for a continued engagement with these 
works beyond a ‘merely historical’ interest) complicates the issue at hand. What I here 
propose is that questioning the ‘geopolitical imaginary’ is one way to probe the meaning of  
the relative without completely dispensing with the notion of  autonomy. To do so, I focus on 
those source materials that mark a clear point of  reference for the co-articulation of  
knowledge production and philosophising as a practice situated within a wider social and 
political field, one in which colonisation and imperial expansionist projects must be 
considered as integral parts of  the historical fabric and political projects of  the period in 
question.  
 The work of  excavating and assessing the deeper influence and importance of  
discovery literature upon knowledge formations has largely been delegated to either 
eighteenth century intellectual history or postcolonial studies.90 In contrast to the relative 
scarcity of  philosophical works, much has been produced in the context of  literary studies 
on the mechanisms of  ‘othering’ and the hierarchisation of  cultural and socio-political 
differences in early modern scientific discourse, at least since the 1978 publication of  Edward 
Said’s Orientalism. To focus on the proliferation of  travel writings across the European 
continent in the eighteenth century and on their transposition into philosophical works, is 
therefore one way to bring together works from ‘colonial discourse studies’ and what might 
be considered more traditional works in of  genre ‘history of  philosophy’. In this regard, 
Mary Louise Pratt’s 1992 Imperial Eyes, a discipline-defining work, holds a central place. With 
a focus on different exemplary texts, Pratt argued that European travel and exploration 
writings constituted one of  the primary sites for attempts to come to grips with a global 
 
89 I am thinking here especially of the work done by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze and Robert Bernasconi. Other 
works include Marc Crépon, Les géographies de l’esprit: Enquête sur la caractérisation des peuples de Leibniz à Hegel, (Paris: 
Bibliothéque Philosophique Payot, Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1996). For a discussion of Eze and Bernasconi, 
see Chapter Three of this thesis. 
90 In the anglophone tradition of intellectual history, Pagden’s The Fall of Natural Man should be included among 
the most important works on the early conceptualisation of the relation between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ world 
and the emergence of ethnology prefiguring the period in question. On questions of theology and secularisation 
in relation to perceptions of cultural difference, it would be necessary to include Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth 
Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); and on the formation of the social 
sciences, Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
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horizon, thereby functioning as a mediator between intra-European intellectual milieus and 
what she called colonial ‘contact zones’.91 Travel writings produced, in other words, ‘the rest 
of  the world for [a] European readership’ in imaginaries conditioned by colonial relations. 
In this way they functioned, we might add, as interfaces between geo-political conditions and 
knowledge productions of  the age.92 In a period where the delineations between geography, 
natural history, ethnographic, and historical studies were only at the brink of  solidifying, 
Pratt’s focus was on the role played by natural history as a crucible wherein a knowledge of  
nature with a global scope was formed. In particular, the transformations of  taxonomical 
practice and systematic classifications which followed in the wake of  Carl Linné’s 1735 
publication of  Systema Naturae hold a central place in this account. Namely, with the 
introduction of  botanists and herborisers as standard figures on board vessels and in the 
contact zones, as they travelled to foreign parts of  the world in order to collect and add 
materials and specimens to the evolving systematisation of  organic life.93 Not only did 
discovery literature inform natural historical studies as source materials, the ‘impact of  
natural history’ exerted an equally strong influence upon the style in which the texts from 
various expeditions were written. With the globalisation of  taxonomical botanical surveys, 
Pratt considered ‘how natural history provided means for narrating inland travel and 
exploration aimed not at the discovery of  trade routes, but at territorial surveillance, 
appropriation of  resources, and administrative control’.94 
 At the same time, beyond Pratt’s explicit focus, demands of  scientificity also imposed 
certain limitations on the ways in which both observations and their notation was carried 
out, reflective of  an emerging conception of  ‘travel as science.’95 Ostensibly, some 
fortification against the possibility of  unreliable sources and inaccurate descriptions tainting 
the philosophical and scientific works which might use them were needed, not only in a 
 
91 The term ‘contact zone’ was introduced in Mary Louise Pratt, ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’, Profession (1991), 
33–40; and developed in Pratt, Imperial Eyes. It was meant, in part, as a counter to the idea of ‘community’ and 
of linguistic communities in particular. For a summary of some of the critiques of the central historical and 
conceptual nodal points of Imperial Eyes, such as ‘the Linnaean watershed’, ‘the contact zone’ and 
‘transculturation’ see Claire Lindsay, ‘Beyond Imperial Eyes’, in Postcolonial Travel Writing: Critical Explorations, ed. 
Justin D. Edwards and Rune Graulund (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002), 17–35. 
92 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 3 and 15. 
93 Ibid., 28. Pratt’s account is heavily informed by Foucault’s study of Linné in Les mots et les choses. 
94 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 38. 
95 This phrasing is a translation of Sergio Moravia’s in ‘Philosophie et geographie a la fin du XVIIIe siecle’. See, 
also, Sergio Moravia, ‘The Enlightenment and The Sciences of Man’, in History of Science 18, no.4 (1980), 247–
68. In both papers, Moravia has argued that the demand for scientificity should be thought as having exerted 
pressure upon the expeditions themselves and, in reverse, the ways in which the expeditions informed the 
formation of the sciences in Europe. A similar claim is made by Rubiés, although he displaces it chronologically 
onto the seventeenth century. See Joan-Pau Rubiés, ‘Instructions for Travellers: Teaching the Eye to See’, History 
and Anthropology 9 (1996), 139–90. 
  39 
natural historical context. The comparative studies and constructions of  classificatory 
schemas of  laws, customs, and manners just as acutely posed the epistemological problem 
of  how to determine the veracity of  accounts from travels to parts of  the world well beyond 
familiar terrains of  experience. One solution to this problem was to tie the notion of  
credibility closely to that of  the character of  the traveller. In this manner, accounts could be 
dismissed due to lack of  education, the colour of  the traveller’s skin, their religion or other 
traits presumed to be ‘character defining’.96 This is the view reflected in Rousseau’s ‘Second 
Discourse’. Just as it was the case for historical writings, discovery literature is cautiously 
approached by Rousseau, his lament over the credibility of  travel accounts is written into a 
reflection over the type of  character typically in a position to write them:  
 
[T]here are scarcely more than four sorts of  men who make extended voyages: Sailors, Merchants, 
Soldiers, and Missionaries. Now it is scarcely to be expected that the first three Classes would provide 
good Observers, and as for those of  the fourth, even if  they are not subject to the prejudices of  station 
as are all the others, one has to be believe that, absorbed by the sublime vocation that calls them, they 
would not readily engage in inquiries that appear to be a matters of  pure curiosity and would distract 
them from the labours to which they have dedicated themselves.97  
 
This problem of  verification returns, equally, at the level of  the form of  the text; that is, in 
regard to their systematicity. This can be seen, as the following chapter shall consider greater 
detail, in the example of  Lafitau whose work has often described as ‘photo-ethnological’, 
especially because of  the way in which it is organised into specific analytical units: marriage, 
warfare, religion, medicinal practices, etc. The criteria of  systematicity figures in a certain 
taxonomical impulse, its division of  the study of  peoples and their laws, customs, and 
manners, and the ways in which these came to be classified and set in relation to each other. 
While the work of  philosophical histories may, in part, have adopted such descriptions, 
further organising their materials in a frame that allowed for customs and manners to be 
placed in relations across ‘peoples’, there was also the sense that discovery literature itself  
was already doing this work. Such is the view expressed by the Jean-François de La Pérouse, 
a French naval officer whose 1785 expedition eventually was lost at sea, when he in one of  
his reports back noted that ‘[w]hen modern navigators describe the mores of  newly 
discovered peoples, their soul objective is the completion of  the history of  man’.98 They 
brought the colonial contact zone home in their writing which, as the following chapter will 
aim to show, already coded their subjects in terms of  historical distance. 
 
96 For the many varieties of discreditation see Michèle Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières, 65–
136. 
97 Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality’, 209. 
98 Jean-François de Galaup, comte de La Pérouse, quoted in Moravia, ‘Philosophie et geographie a la fin du 
XVIIIe siecle’, 966 (my translation).  
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 In a sense, the conditions for this operation is already inscribed within Pratt’s use of  
the concept of  the ‘contact zone’, as it is delineates the social spaces of  imperial and colonial 
encounters, the point ‘where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-
present, the point where their trajectories now intersect’, more often in the context of  
conflict, coercion, inequality, and racial violence.99 This ‘co-presence’ of  the contact zone can 
be understood as another name for what Johannes Fabian called the ‘coeval’, in an equally 
canonical critique of  the techniques and terminologies that produce an effect of  temporal 
distance between anthropologists and their subjects of  study, that of  Time and the Other 
(1983).100 In a sense, the ‘denial of  coevalness’ is in part what Chapter Two maps. But while 
his study primarily takes structural anthropology of  the 1950s and 1960s as a frame of  
reference and an object of  critique, the discussion here is situated squarely within the history 
of  philosophy. The denial of  coevalness of  which Fabian writes is part and parcel of  this 
history, in that the prominent temporal ordering within these philosophical histories 
instantiate precisely this phenomenon.101 What will be traced, then, is the emergence and 
proliferation of  a conception that in a French context is almost perfectly crystallised in J.M. 
Dégerando’s 1800 exclamation that ‘[t]he philosophical traveller, sailing to the ends of  the 
Earth, is in fact travelling in time; he is exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage 
of  an age’.102  
 With this trope, a generalised sense of  progression through the ages is considered not 
only to run across linear time but equally to involve the coding of  different globally distributed 
cultural and socio-political forms of  organisation into an often explicitly racialised 
spatialisation of  this same temporal distance. While the peak of  these philosophies might 
stem from the years either side of  1800, its context and emergence trace a history that is 
longer, one in which exploration and an emerging comparativist scientific paradigm hold 
central positions. The first systematic written instantiation on all accounts seems to have 
been a work published in 1724, Lafitau’s aforementioned Moeurs des sauvages amériquains. The 
focus on this work is an attempt to narrate the distances and proximities between the colonial 
contact zone and the philosophies of  history that conceived of  their European present as 
the pinnacle within a history of  humanity.
 
99 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 8. 
100 Fabian, Time and the Other, 31.  
101 To my knowledge, the closest to the intellectual history side of what I am attempting to do here is Alfonso 
M. Iacono, ‘The American Indians and the Ancients of Europe: The Idea of Comparison and the Construction 
of Historical Time in the 18th Century’, in European Images of the Americas and the Classical Tradition vol. I, ed. 
Wolfgang Haase and Meyer Reinhold (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 658–81. 
102 J.M. Dégerando, quoted in Fabian, Time and the Other, 8. 
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In 1724, seven years back from a nearly six year-long mission (1712–17) among the Iroquois 
at Kahnawake (the Iroquoian place name which refers to the nearby rapids) in the French 
settlement of Sault Saint-Louis, the Jesuit missionary Joseph-François Lafitau (1681–1746) 
published his two-volume work Moeurs des sauvages amériquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers 
temps.103 Judged by its structure and aim, as they are laid out in the opening chapter, this work 
far from constitutes a travel narrative. The volumes are thematically divided and, with one eye 
turned to ‘the ancients’ and one to ‘the savage Americans’, cover topics such as religion and 
governance, the traditional occupations of men and women, warfare, marriage rituals, 
education, games, and several other social practices. These are all considered as aspects of a 
polyvalent conception of moeurs, translated into English as ‘customs’ in the title, but 
throughout the work just as often and alternately signifying ‘manners’, ‘beliefs’, ‘rites’ and, 
with an anachronistic stretch, ‘forms of social organisation’.104 Framed accordingly, Lafitau’s 
 
103 Joseph-François Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps (Paris: Saugrain 
l’aîné, 1724); hencefore, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains. The English translation from 1974/77 is, to date, also the 
most extended critical edition in any language and contains one of the most thoroughgoing introductions to the 
work. Stretching over a hundred pages and accompanied by various other front matter, the introduction 
provides substantial contextualisation and analysis of the work, while also accounting for sources within it and 
the subsequent histories of its various editions and translations. However, because this translations was 
conducted on the basis of the ethnographic after-life of the work, rather than in regard to the intellectual 
landscape of the period in which it was written, ‘sauvages américains’ was transated therein into ‘American Indians’, 
thereby somewhat occluding the centrality of the category of the ‘savage’, which held such and important and 
contentious place in political philosophy. Since it is this latter context that I am concerned with here, I follow 
Lafitau’s terminology when moving internally to his text, as he both inherits and displaces the figure of the 
‘savage’, just as I have retained the original title of the work. When this is not the case, I have used the term 
‘First Nations’ when the scope is restricted to the areas of modern-day Canada and ‘Amerindian populations’ 
when the reference is to the indigenous populations of both North and South America. See Customs of the 
American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times, trans. and ed. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L. 
Moore (Toronto: The Champlain Society, vol.I 1974, vol.II, 1977). 
104 Moeurs is notoriously hard to translate. An overview of the different options, from ‘ways of mankind’, 
‘folkways’, ‘manners’, ‘mores’ ‘habits’, and ‘customary ways’ in English to the German ‘Sitte’ can be found in 
the introduction by W.N. Fenton and E.L. Moore, ‘Introduction’, ibid., vol. I. (1974), lxviii. See also Barbara 
Cassin, Marc Crépon, and François Prost, ‘Morals / Ethics’, in Dictionary of Untranslatables, ed. Barbara Cassin, 
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focus on moeurs significantly expanded the scope of previous comparativist analyses of 
Amerindian populations, by Bartolomé Las Casas, José de Acosta, and several others, which 
had tended to concentrate almost exclusively on religion and religious practices.105 
 Part of the continued historical importance of this work stems from the many sources 
and materials gathered therein, in comments and readjustments of older accounts 
descriptions of Frist Nations.106 Since he both helped extend and systematise a tradition of 
taxonomical attempts at describing the characteristic behaviours of societies that were 
foreign to European readers, it is not too much of an exaggeration to state, as Chenxi Tang 
has done, that Lafitau might be said to have ‘inaugurated a new era in the topical and 
systematic treatment of customs and manners, to the same extent as Linné’s classificatory 
system did in natural history’.107 Completely forgone in Moeurs des sauvages amériquains is the 
heroism of stories detailing perilous outbound journeys and safe returns, in which 
descriptions of curious behaviours and foreign customs appear strewn about within an 
account of the journey itself. Moreover, if a distance is crossed within the arc of this work, 
it initially seems temporal rather than spatial in nature, a function of the juxtaposition of 
customs so plainly stated in its title; the encounters with First Nations in the French colony 
Nouvelle France (areas that largely overlap with modern-day Canada) are taken by Lafitau as 
an occasion to gain knowledge of the origins of all mankind. In an elaborate comparative 
framework, he constructs the cohesion of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ worlds through extended 
and thematically organised comparisons between the living ‘customs’ of the ‘savage 
Americans’ and the vestiges of those of the ancients’.  
 With this in mind, what follows treats Moeurs des sauvages amériquains not as a travel 
narrative but as a part of the category of discovery literature, defined by its relation to 
European colonial and imperial projects. As Moeurs des sauvages amériquains most certainly was, 
this ensured that the circumstances of its production were deeply embedded in the 
overlapping histories of French colonial occupation of territories of North America and the 
 
trans. Steven Rendall, et al. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 694–97. 
105 On comparativism in travel literature on Amerindian populations predating Lafitau’s work, see Pagden, The 
Fall of Natural Man. 
106 The patchwork of knowledge that Lafitau draws on in his descriptive work, from the moment of the first 
discoveries of the Americas up until his present, is made apparent by the editorial work of Fenton and Moore, 
since Lafitau himself often leaves his sources implicit. The most important of these, other than those already 
mentioned, include Marc Lescarbot’s Histoire de la Nouvelle France (1609), the Jesuit François du Creux’s Historia 
Canadensis (1664), and José de Acostas The Natural and Mortal History of the Indies (1590). 
107 Tang, The Geographic Imagination of Modernity, 162. It is, however, necessary to add a caveat to Tang’s claim. 
While Linné gained a troupe of followers in his wake, in the form of botanists who travelled around the world 
to gather specimens for the mapping of nature, no such movement took shape around Lafitau. The way in 
which he can be said to have ‘inaugurate’ an era works through much more subterranean influences, for reasons 
I shall address in what follows. 
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callings of missionaries to convert the native populations. Understading it in this way situates 
Moeurs des sauvages amériquains squarely among those works which, in the two centuries after 
the first European conquests in the Americas, struggled to make sense of both the continents 
as landmasses unmentioned by the bible and of the genealogical disturbances that the 
Amerindian populations caused within the linages of Adam. Like many of these works, it 
was also written in the context of a specific form of proselytisation. It shares the complicated 
and sometimes contradictory place which the transmissions sent back by members of 
Christian orders occupied among travel relations of the period, both in terms of their 
production and reception.108 Dismissed or discredited by some on account of the religious 
zeal of their writers, these works at the same time gave an often unprecedented access to 
local languages, facilitated by the extended periods their authors spent carrying out missions 
abroad.109 Such was the case for Lafitau’s principal tutor at Sault Saint-Louis, Father Julien 
Garnier, who, by 1712, , had lived most of his life in the missions of Nouvelle France and 
spoke several native languages, among those Algonquian, Huron, and the five dialects of 
Iroquois proper.110 In the opening passages, Lafitau places an emphasis on the debt owed to 
Garnier’s knowledge, describing their conversations as the primary source for many an 
observation regarding the ways of the ‘savage Americans’. The quality of these observations, 
their detail, and even their later ethnological import is at the crux of why Lafitau’s work came 
to be praised by ethnologists and even today can be cited favourably.111 However, when the 
ethnological content of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains is marshalled outside the context of its 
own explicitly Christian and religiously interested arguments, there is also a question as to 
how a decoupling of interested investment in theological discussions (to be left aside) and 
 
108 For an overview of the receptions of different kinds of travel literature in France in the eighteenth century, 
Michèle Duchet’s analysis of the sources of information available is impeccably thorough. See Duchet, 
Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières, 65–136. For the specificities regarding the reception of missionary 
relations see Michael Sievernich, ‘Comparing Ancient and Native Customs: Joseph-François Lafitau and the 
»savages amériquians«’ in European Missions in Contact Zones: Transformation through Interaction in a (Post-)Colonial 
World, ed. Judith Becker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 195. 
109 Many of the first dictionaries of Amerindian languages were gathered by missionaries who often were at the 
origins of standardisations as well as transmissions of linguistic structures. For a classical overview of their 
import see Geoffroy Atkinson, Les relation de voyages du XViie siècle et l’évolution des idées: Contribution á l’étude de la 
formation de l’esprit du VIIIe siècle (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Éduoard Champion, 1924). A recent discussion of the 
distinctions between missionary linguistics and colonial linguistics can be found in Thomas Stolz and Ingo H. 
Warnke, ‘From Missionary Linguistics to Colonial Linguistics’ in Colonialism and Missionary Linguistics, ed. Klaus 
Zimmermann and Birte Kellermeier-Rehbein (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 3–26. 
110 Fenton and Moore, ‘Introduction’, xxxiii. 
111 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Arnold van Gennep, author of Rites de passages, reintroduced 
Lafitau into the history of modern ethnography in the article ‘Contributions à l’histoire de la méthode 
ethnographique’ in Revue de l'histoire des religions 67 (1913), 320–38. The destruction of the forms of life encounter 
in the Americas was already well on its way at the time of Lafitau’s arrival. Nonetheless, like other so-called 
‘proto-ethnographic’ travel accounts, in some instances it stands as one of only few testimonies to aspects of 
Amerindian life destroyed through colonisation. 
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observation (to be employed in a new argumentative context) could be achieved. In this 
sense, even a fragmentary overview of its afterlife needs a certain regard for the 
intertwinements of economic projects and civilisational missions as well as the tensions 
between eighteenth-century atheist and religious agendas. All of these would come to be 
important factors in the philosophical take up of the work, or the lack thereof, as the 
following pages attest to. In the first comprehensive study of Lafitau, Kaspar Kälin 
articulated the peculiarity of this work thus: 
 
To acknowledge Lafitau’s importance for the philosophy of history and cultural history, we must first 
point out that his work, of course, does not contain any discussion of any kind about these fields. 
Consequently, what we would like to demonstrate is that the ideas he discussed contributed to, or, at 
least, could have contributed to the formation of these new sciences. For the philosophy of history, 
Lafitau – with Giambattista Vico – created the foundations. He taught how to look at the material object 
of history, the human being, in a truly historical way, not only as he is in the West, but how he lives in 
relationships, in this place and in that time, in set conditions and in certain circumstances.112 
 
The appeal of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains to an investigation into philosophies of history 
lies in an estimate of the sense in which they can be considered to echo, reproduce, or 
displace the ideas expressed in this work, particularly with regard to its comparative modus. 
In varied ways and with different inflections, a certain reception of the work is inscribed and 
cited within several of the central philosophical histories, broadly conceived. For instance, 
where Voltaire has only scorn and satire to spare for Lafitau, he is cited favourably by several 
of the Scottish natural historians and especially in Herder’s writings.113 Beyond a reception 
history, however, the ensuing chapters makes the case for the importance of discovery 
literature as what introduced the global horizon in relation to which European philosophies 
of history came into being. In this regard, the focus on Lafitau hinges on two factors whereby 
we might consider his work to be paradigmatic of an emergent generalised sense of historical 
progression through the ages. Such ‘progression’ was considered not only as extending across 
linear time, but also as recoding globally distributed cultural and socio-political forms of 
organisation into a spatialisation of this temporal distance. The first of these two factors, 
found in the attempt to establish ‘a science of the manners and customs of different 
peoples’,114 renders their objects comparable by abstracting them from their historical 
specificities – particularly, as the expressions of an extra-historical force (this force, as 
demonstrated below, for Lafitau is always and ultimately one of divine character). The second 
 
112 Kaspar Kälin, Indianer und Urvölker nach Jos. Fr. Lafitau (1681–1746) (Freiburg, Switzerland: Paulusdruckerei, 
1943), 120 (my translation). 
113 For an overview of the eighteenth-century translations of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains into Dutch and 
German, see Fenton and Moore, ‘Introduction, xxi. 
114 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 27. 
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draws a division between the historical and the non-historical by reference to scriptural 
techniques, where writing determines where history is illuminated or in the shadows. The 
aim of this chapter is therefore to introduce the work and its central concepts, such that it 
might allow us to later discern the operative links in philosophies of history; not only of a 
dyad formed of anthropological and historical discourses, but more specifically of a 
triangulation between anthropology, ethnology and history. This can be read out of the way 
in which the prevalent manner of defining savagery by negative, comparative traits is 
displaced by Lafitau. Depending on the ideological inclination of the writer, these traits 
alternately worked either by depreciation (in an emphasis on people ‘without writing, without 
religion and without order’) or appreciation (in an emphasis on people ‘without masters without 
vices and without individual property’),115 and were employed in the service of a philosophical 
anthropology where the figure of ‘natural man’ opposed that of ‘political’, ‘socialised’, or 
‘civilised’ man. The idea of the ‘savage’ as a historical stage that ‘Europeans’ had surpassed 
but that was not a mere negation of their current traits is embroiled in the codification of the 
‘thick’ ethnological descriptions provided by Lafitau, both by him and within philosophical 
histories. 
 
I. Moeurs in Comparison 
Strategically, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains both echoed and intervened in the ongoing 
debates over ‘natural religion’ and the affiliated arguments for and against ‘natural law’ and 
‘natural rights’ that played out in a field defined as much by colonialism and increasing 
encounters with different forms of social organisation as by the intra-European political 
upheavals and anxious attempts to legitimise and define political sovereignty. As it attempts 
to overcome the seeming impossibility of realigning scripture with the disturbances caused 
by ‘ancients’ and ‘savages’ alike, it gives a clear image of the distorting operations that 
rendered what was foreign to European history familiar by assigning it a place of arrested 
origin. Not only that, it also afforded an image of how, at the point where history came to 
be understood as both narration and process, a ‘distance is taken in relation to history [the 
discipline] in the name of a philosophy of history, which gives privilege to the immemorial and 
wipes away the movement which changes, transforms, and alters human practices’.116 
 The official and overarching purpose of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains was to counter 
challenges to Christianity based on the perceived atheism of the inhabitants of the American 
continents. Its specific aim corresponds neatly to this agenda, as the main thesis concerns 
 
115 Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières, 11. 
116 Duchet, Le Partage des savoirs, 32 (my translation). 
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the doctrine of primitive monotheism and the assertion that an originary and true religion, 
Christianity, was at the root of all religious expressions.117 To this end, Lafitau marshals his 
comparative ‘system’ in order to demonstrate the derivative character of pagan gods and 
goddesses, all retraceable to Adam and Eve:118 ‘It is easy to conceive, in this system, how this 
religion, having been given to our first fathers, must have passed from generation to 
generation as a kind of heritage common to all and thus spread everywhere.’119 In this regard, 
it is telling that of the thirteen chapters devoted to various instantiations of the multivalent 
term moeurs, the chapter on religion takes up almost 450 pages, against the 100 spent on 
political formations and rule, and a meagre 26 on peace negotiations and trade encounters 
between tribes.120 No names are explicitly mentioned, but as an intervention into religious 
and theological disputes, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains would have to run counter to the 
assertions of Protestant sceptics like Pierre Bayle, who held that religious beliefs were a 
question of mere conventionality.121 In the combat with atheism and Protestantism alike, the 
Iroquois appear to Lafitau as ‘the last keepers of a natural religion, older than Moses, older 
than even the Deluge, which was given to man by God and which came to perfection in 
Christianity’.122 As might be gathered from the above, Lafitau’s claims often rest entirely on 
dogma. Perhaps the most important of these is the monogenist premise that subtends the 
work but which is never argued for as such.123 The unitary and Asiatic origins of all of 
mankind, including the First Nations, is presupposed and the theological stakes play out 
within a land-based trans-migrationist theory of how the Earth was populated after the great 
flood. When Lafitau is evoked as a liminal figure, writing at a threshold between science and 
dogma, it is more on account of the potential harboured in his comparative method than 
 
117Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 29 and 31. 
118 This was a modification of a proposition by Pierre-Daniel Huet who, on all accounts, was among the most 
influential thinkers for Lafitau. In Demonstratio evangelica (1679), Huet had proposed that all pagan Gods and 
Goddesses might be traced back to Moses and Zipporah. See Fenton and Moore, ‘Introduction’, lxxvii; and 
Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 183. 
119 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 35. 
120 For this brevity, Lafitau gives as a reason the many already existing descriptions of the topic, emphasising 
that he has treated it here only to the extent that a comparison of the calumet with Mercury’s wand would allow 
him an occasion for binding two customs together. 
121 Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 201–05. 
122 Gilbert Chinard, L’Amérique et le rêve exotique dans la littérature française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siecle (Paris: 
Librairie E. Droz, 1934), 318 (my translation). 
123 The terms ‘polygenism’ and ‘monogenism’ used to designate opposite views on the ancestral origins of 
humankind appear for the first time in 1857 in the context of the anthropological school of Philadelphia. As 
competing theories however, the two go back much further. While the monogenist position is typically bound 
to the Mosaic conception of the unity of the human ‘races’ at their origin, polygenism has been traced back to 
the period between the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Gliozzi, Adam et le nouveau monde, and Silvia Sebastiani, 
‘Race and National Character in eighteenth century Scotland: The Polygenetic Discourse of Kames and 
Pinkerton’ in Cromohs 8 (2003), 1–14. 
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because of the specific uses to which he put it.124 Methodology, much more than the concrete 
hypotheses or aims of the work, is what accounts for the singular place of Moeurs des sauvages 
amériquains within histories of anthropological and ethnological theories. 
 Although, from time to time, the work is mentioned as being at the origin of the 
alignment of ‘savages’ and ‘ancients’ within eighteenth-century developmental theories of 
humanity, Lafitau was neither the only nor the first to draw analogies between First Nations 
and ancient paganisms.125 From surveys of the types of travel literature published at the time, 
it is clear that several authors employed it as an explicatory mechanism when attempting to 
render what seemed foreign recognisable to a European readership. In 1700, fellow Jesuit 
Nöel Alexandre published Conformité des céremonies chinoises avec l’idolatrie greque et romain, and, 
four years later, M. De la Créquinière’s Conformité des coutumes des Indiens Orientaux, avec des Juifs 
et des autres Peuples de l’Antiquité made claims similar to those of Lafitau, going so far as to 
underline that the primary function of understanding the rituals of First Nations was to 
‘justify what is reported to us by the Ancients and to clarify Antiquity’.126 Of the more 
commonly known works, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s comparisons of early Greek and 
Inca fables and mythology in ‘On the Origin of Fables’ proceeding in a formally related vain, 
if ultimately with a different aim.127 In this essay, written earlier but only published in 1724,128 
Fontenelle brought ‘the first men’ and ‘the American barbarians’129 into a comparative space 
via reference to ‘an astonishing conformity between the fables of the Americans and those 
of the Greeks.130 But where Fontenelle’s account makes for a brief and evocative text, one 
 
124 This is the case in David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, ‘The Savage Smith and the Temporal Walls of 
Capitalism’, in Classical Theory in International Relations, ed. Beate Jahn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 127. Fenton and Moore also count him as a scientist on account of his character, ‘his ‘erudition, his 
curiosity, his powers of observation, his ingenuity, his energy, his sincerity, his caution’. Fenton and Moore, 
‘Introduction’, lxxix. 
125 The cultures and practices of First Nations were often compared with those considered to be at the origins 
of the ‘civilised’ world. Going back further, Marc Lescarbot had also compared the practices of the First Nations 
to those to Classical Antiquity and Acosta compared the sacrifices of the Inca to those of the ancient Hebrews. 
Of Acosta, who was demonstrably an influence upon Lafitau, Pagden writes that he believed ‘that the history 
of the ‘real’ but remote Indian could illuminate the historical process itself and that by studying a seemingly 
alien society his European readers might come to understand something about the natural behaviour of all 
human communities, including their own’. Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 150. 
126 On this point see chapter eight of Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 295–394. 
For the citation of Créquinière, see ibid., 346. 
127 Neither Fontenelle nor Lafitau appear to distinguish sharply between ‘myth’ and ‘fable’. 
128 The essay by Fontenelle, ‘De l’origine des fables’ was on all account written at least thirty years before its 
publication. See the 1932 critical edition of Fontenelle’s work (Paris: Libraries Felix Alcan, 1932), where J.R. 
Carré argues that it is likely to have been written before 1680. 
129 Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, ‘De l'origine des fables’, in Oeuvres de Fontenelle T.4 (Paris: Salmon, Libraire-
Éditeur, 1825), 298. 
130 Ibid., 305 (my translation). The main example for Fontenelle is the recurring motif of great mean as the sons 
of the sun in both the Greek myth of Orpheus and in the Inca myths of the founders of their empire Manco 
Cápac. 
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completely reliant on secondary sources, Lafitau’s spans two volumes, continually measures 
previous descriptions of the ‘customs’ of the Americans against his own field observations 
among the Iroquois and constructs a largely systematic edifice of ‘mutually illuminating’ 
comparisons between ‘savage Americans’ and those ancient times of which no proximately 
recorded written account exist.131 In the plan of the work, the method is described as follows: 
 
I have not limited myself to learning the characteristics of the Indians and informing myself about their 
customs and practices, I have sought in these practices and customs, vestiges of the most remote 
antiquity. I have read carefully [the works] of the earliest writers who treated the customs, laws and 
usage of the peoples whom they had knowledge. I have made a comparison of these customs with each 
other. I confess that, if the ancient authors have given me information on which to base happy 
conjectures about the Indians, the customs of the Indians have given me information on the basis of 
which I can understand more easily and explain more readily many things in ancient authors. […] Some  
of my conjectures may appear light in themselves, but, perhaps, taken all together, they will make a 
whole, the parts of which will be held together by the connections obtaining between them.132  
 
This is the oscillating movement at the heart of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains. The problem 
of the lack in sources is to be ameliorated by observations of living exemplars and, inversely, 
fragments from antiquity are set to help illuminate the meaning of seemingly strange customs 
in the ‘new world’. The explicitness with which the comprehensive systematisation of 
comparisons is operationalised into a method servicing ethnological and theological ends 
caused one commentator to name ‘comparison’ and the act of rendering comparable ‘la seule 
raison du text’.133 It embodies a form of reasoning by comparison. It is this fact which later 
prompted Jean-Marie Goulemot to describe Moeurs des sauvages amériquains as a ‘voyage in 
time’, a jump to the origins of ‘civilised man’ in ‘ancient man’ mediated through the figure of 
the ‘savage american’.134 Perhaps, more precisely, the effect of the comparative modus which 
drives the work is time annulled and time traversed. And, ultimately, terrains as well as times, 
territories as well as temporalities, are all side-lined in the construction of comparative space.  
 What, then, is being compared? The key terms structuring the comparison are ‘savage 
Americans’ and ‘ancients’, with their mutually illuminative relation established through the 
mediation of the moeurs or customs. That the range of phenomena gathered under the term 
moeurs does not escape Lafitau’s attention: the ‘matter of customs’, he writes, ‘is a vast one, 
 
131 This is what retrospectively eared Lafitau the title as a ‘founder of comparative ethnology’, despite the fact 
that he does not appear to have been widely read among the nineteen century founders of modern-day ethnology 
in either in France, the UK, or the US. 
132 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 27. 
133 Michèle Duchet, ‘Discours ethnologique et discours historique: le texte de Lafitau’ in Studies on Voltaire and 
the Eighteenth Century 152–53 (1976), 607. 
134 Jean-Marie Goulemot, ‘Questions de terrains et d’arpentage: des récits de voyage, da la pratique de l’histoire 
et de l’ethnologie’ in Apprendre à porter sa vue au loin: hommage à Michèle Duchet, ed. Sylviane Albertan-Coppola, 
(Paris: ENS Éditions, 2009), 97. 
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comprising everything within its scope, which includes many incongruous things with very 
little relationship between them. That is why it has been difficult to assemble them under a 
single point of view’.135 This, nonetheless, is what he attempts; the polyvalence and the 
ambiguity of moeurs is, in fact, crucial to its unity. It is what the work relies on in order to 
replace a narrative that intermittently lists instances of observed curiosities with a ‘system’ of 
comparisons. Reading the work today, it is hardly possible not to notice how both of these 
figures, ‘savages’ and ‘ancients’ alike, are themselves constructed; gaining consistency 
precisely in comparison, collaged together from fragmentary observations or interrogations 
of documents, they are discursive constructs. In a short chapter on the idea or character of 
savage people in general, Lafitau denies the contention that this descriptor should signify a 
people ‘without letters, science, apparent laws, without temples, without regular worship and 
lacking the things most necessary for life’, but also counters it with the similarly general 
assumption of a people ‘physically of a good constitution, strong and skilful’ with a spirit 
generally characterised as ‘well-tempered, proud and with good minds, quick perceptions, 
admirable memories’.136 While the larger part of Lafitau’s ‘fieldwork observations’ regard the 
Iroquois in particular, it was on his own account possible to affirm ‘that the customs of the 
savages in general are rather similar to theirs’137 and he could, therefore, include any other 
supporting evidence which came from American nations. The Huron, Iroquois, Algonquins, 
and several other peoples in this manner recede from specificity to make up a figure 
comparable to that of an ancient ‘barbarian’ – itself a patchwork of Phoenicians, Pelasgians, 
Thracians, Hellenians, Lycians, and Scythians, occasionally added to are the Iberians or 
Gauls. These ‘ancients’, at home in les premiers temps, figure the populations of an age which 
Christian chronologists periodised as the first of the world,138 although the category here is 
employed with very porous boundaries. The sources which Lafitau rely on in characterising 
this period are all at a remove from the actual time in question and there is a certain 
promiscuous frivolity in the temporal and spatial reach they is supposed to cover. Included 
in the frame of reference are the dynasties of early China and Egypt, the Persians, the East 
Indians, the Gauls and the Celts, the Barbarians which first inhabited Greece, the Greeks of 
the Golden Age, and, even, some centuries of classical Rome. In relation to a gentile 
chronology, the closest we are given to a specific demarcation comes from a reference to the 
Olympiads and the times before the Greeks reckoned their chronologies by reference to 
 
135 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 36. 
136 Ibid., 36, 89, 90. 
137 Ibid., 41. 
138 In this, Lafitau’s use of ‘les premiers temps’ is on all accounts derived from Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s in 
Discourse on Universal History, although it in some instances strays from his use. 
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them (that is, before 776 BC), as Lafitau writes: ‘we do not find any definite periods in 
antiquity before the Olympiads. All the periods until then are times of obscurity’.139 
Metaphors of obscurity and illumination in this manner govern the way Lafitau approaches 
the historical truthfulness of his account. In lieu of sources written contemporaneously with 
the ‘ancients’, the ‘savages’ stand as the living instantiation that might illuminate us on the 
matters of their social organisation and their religious beliefs and practices. And in regard to 
the conjunctures regarding how the Americas were populated, the comparison functions to 
replace verifiable knowledge, for ‘[h]istory was plunged in this obscurity at the time America, 
supposing it to be as ancient as that, could have been peopled’.140 What unites the figures of 
‘the savage Americans’ and ‘the ancients’, before the comparison brings them into fuller 
proximity with one another, is a negatively trait: the perceived lack of writing and scriptural 
techniques through which an archive, a source of historical narratives, could be established. 
It is the lack of written sources which promotes customs to the status of witness. By virtue 
of their ‘having been passed from generation to generation as a kind of heritage common to 
all’,141 customs are perceived to reveal their own history, or more precisely put, they retain a 
certain immutability within a framework that otherwise presumes historical development, 
such that they can be traced across the centuries. Without using the words, Lafitau seems to 
have considered the Americans as peoples without history, and therefore comparable to the 
forefathers of the European populations:  
 
A comparison of the customs or folkways of the nation could lead us to a knowledge unique in itself, 
but, among these customs, there were universal patterns which, in spite of their distance from each 
other and slight means of communication, the fathers of the people kept alive without alteration and 
transmitted to their children.142 
 
II. A Subterraneous Afterlife: The French Philosophical Reception of  Moeurs 
Contrary to what might have been expected, the explicit influence of Lafitau upon the 
emerging philosophical histories is most difficult to establish in his native French context. In 
Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert’s Encyclopaedia, he is referenced for an earlier 
pamphlet on the discover of the Ginseng plant in America,143 but gets mentioned neither in 
 
139 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 46. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 35. 
142 Ibid., 54. 
143 Louis de Jaucourt, ‘Gin-seng’, in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une Société 
de Gens de lettres, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, in ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, ed. Robert 
Morrissey (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2008), available from: http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (last 
accessed 29 November 2020). For an overview of this aspect of Lafitau’s writings, see Christopher M. Parson, 
‘The Natural History of Colonial Science: Joseph-François Lafitau’s Discovery of Ginseng and Its Afterlives’, 
in William and Mary Quarterly 73, no.1 (January 2016), 37–72, especially 66 on the inscription of his research 
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the entry on the ‘philosophy of the Canadians’, nor on ‘the savages’ (instead, Pierre François 
Xavier de Charlevoix’s travel journals are quoted as the source for several of these entries). 
The seemingly small impact made by Moeurs des sauvages amériquains can be accounted for by 
several factors: while comparative studies of religion and of its expressions in rites and myths 
may not have been as systematically carried out as it was by Lafitau, it did not as such present 
a new topic, nor did the report on America as such. Published after several accounts from 
the French colony had already found a place in scholarly libraries – perhaps most notably 
Marc Lescarbot’s Histoire de Nouvelle France (1609) and Gabriel Sagard’s L’hisoire du Canada 
(1636)144 – it is quite possible that it ‘mattered little that previous writers of travel books 
laboured with poor skill and without any method, Lafitau’s Moeurs was tagged as another 
travel book, and the savants had heard it all’.145 Moreover, being a Jesuit would not have 
gained Lafitau many favours at a moment where questions as to the place of the clergy within 
society was at the point of erupting into outright contestation. As Michèle Duchet notes, 
Catholicism, like the colour of one’s skin, a sub-par education, and a ‘too interested’ agenda 
were among the generally acceptable reasons one might give to disregard a source as 
unreliable.146 Of the philosophes, then, it seems that only Baron d’Holbach and Voltaire can be 
shown with any certainty to have read the Moeurs des sauvages amériquains. For the purpose 
here, the latter is the most interesting case as well as the most symptomatic in relation to the 
above causes of disregard. 
 Voltaire engages directly with Moeurs des sauvages amériquains in his La Philosophie de 
l'histoire (1765), where the tone of this his assessment reveals a barely disguised dismissal. As 
much as the information and descriptions of customs in the chapter ‘Of Savages’ seems likely 
to have been lifted from Lafitau, it is in the succeeding chapter ‘Of America’ that he pits an 
ironic anti-biblical argument for the polygenetic origins of the various ‘races’ against the 
monogenetic premise shared by Lafitau. With reference to what he call’s Laftitau’s ‘History 
of America’, Voltaire makes a mockery of Lafitau’s use of the analogical reasoning, noting 
how he, 
 
makes the Americans descend from the ancient Greeks, for which opinion he assigns the following 
reason. The Greeks had their fables, the Americans have also fables; the first Greeks went a hunting, 
the Americans also hunt; the first Greeks had oracles, the Americans have foreseers; there were dances 
 
within the Encyclopaedia. 
144 First edition Le grand voyage au pays des Hurons published in 1632. 
145 Fenton and Moore, ‘Introduction’, lxxxvi. 
146 Specifically, Duchet quotes a passage from Cornelius de Pauw where Lafitau is derided for being unreliable 
on account of writing ‘only to defend an already settled thesis’. Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières, 
101. 
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performed at the feasts of the Greeks, the American’s dance. It must be allowed that these are very 
convincing reasons.147 
 
In line with the many instances that exclaim that he will not ‘engage this seeming 
contradiction with the bible’, Voltaire vows to ‘respect everything that is divine’ and that he, 
not wanting to ‘judge God’, will ‘confine [himself] to mere history’.148 This tongue-in-cheek 
remark is best read as part of the general critique of Christian universal histories in The 
Philosophy of History, which, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, was in particular 
aim at Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History.149 Rather than a history a single chosen people, 
Voltaire’s ‘universal history’ consists in the collection of particular histories of the various 
‘human races’, their characteristics, the climatic and geographic conditions under which they 
live and their own relation to history – in short, measured in terms of their use of scriptural 
techniques. In the oft-cited opening line, a hint is given both to the aim and the self-perceived 
method of the work: ‘You wish that ancient history had been written by philosophers, 
because you are desirous of reading it as a philosopher.’150 Unfortunately, we are led to 
understand, this has not been the case and ‘philosophy of history’ in this context above all 
means critical history; this not to the full extent of nineteenth-century notions of the critique 
of sources, of course, but nonetheless as part of the project of discerning possible distortions 
introduced by the reproduction of ancient histories and travel narratives alike.151 It did not, 
as with later connotations of the term ‘philosophy of history’, mean an account of history 
with a view to its direction or principles of movement, nor is there much of a sense in this 
work that various ‘stages’ of development could lead of from one another or be read out of 
the plurality of the nations and ‘races’ populating the world.  
 For the early outlines of such an account, and an explicit comparison made between 
‘ancients’ and ‘savages’, it is of more use to turn to Montesquieu’s L’éspirt des lois (1748) and 
perhaps even more pertinently, Turgot’s lecture notes on the progress of ‘l’ésprit humain’ 
(1750) and outlines for a discourse on universal history (1751). In Montesquieu’s case, some 
 
147 Voltaire, The Philosophy of History, trans. unknown (Glasgow: Robert Urie, 1766), 38. He also makes a note 
casting ridicule on the idea that the colour of a child’s skin could be determined by the imagination of the 
mother, an expression of her fondness for the particular colour in question. This notion is found in Lafitau’s 
work as well as in several others, including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Nicolas Malebranche. 
148 Voltaire, The Philosophy of History, 88, 172, passim. 
149 Jerome Rosenthal, ‘Voltaire’s Philosophy of History’, Journal of the History of Ideas 16, no. 2. (April 1955), 151–
78. 
150 Voltaire, The Philosophy of History, 1. 
151 Of the ancient Greek and Roman sources, he writes: ‘we are pestered with ancient histories […] the offspring 
of this kind of erudition must be error’, Voltaire, The Philosophy of History, 64. And later, specifically in relation 
to miracles and the critique of fables, in which much is owed to Fontenelle: ‘ancient history resembles the history 
of the cabbage, which was larger than a house and of the pot, bigger than a church, in which it was to be boiled.’ 
Ibid., 145. 
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thematics in The Spirit of the Laws, like the matters of diplomacy among the Iroquois and 
Huron and the question of property right as it arises in relation to the distribution of a hunt, 
had been explained in greatest detail by Lafitau. The work, however, does not appear to have 
been in Montesquieu’s own library and, in Muriel Dodds’ study of the sources uses for its 
composition, it also does not appear among those mentioned in relation to North America.152  
 Much the same goes for Turgot, especially in ‘A Philosophical Review of the 
Successive Advances of the Human Mind’ (in which we find the famous statement ‘historical 
times cannot be traced further back than the invention of writing’),153 and in the ‘Plan for 
Two Discourses on Universal History’ which gave some methodological reflections and the 
outlines for a universal history that was never to be fully written. On account of both these 
works, and their function as commentaries upon and modifications of Boussuet’s universal 
history, Turgot has often been considered to stand at a midway point between attempts to 
reconcile, on the one side, biblical chronology and providentially-ordained histories of 
worldly empires in the tradition of Christian universal historians with, on the other, the 
histories of progress read out of changes in forms of social organisation and trade-patterns.154 
Lafitau’s influence on both these works are hard to determine with any certainty, although 
that does not mean that there is no subterraneous connection. The measure of distance in 
space and time is clearly mapped out in these texts and allotted to chronology and geography 
as the two pillars of history, but Turgot is primarily interested in the differences that emerge 
in the ‘course of time’, and in attempts to decipher what has caused some peoples to 
‘stagnate’ as hunters or herdsmen, gaps that were taken as testimony to the different paths 
of progress. And, just as it was for Lafitau, the initial and originary state of ‘barbarism’ is 
taken to be one of uniformity such that the inequality of nations was the ‘product of the 
progress of the universal history of man’.155 It is in this context that the comparison between 
‘savage Americans’ and ‘ancients’ come to the fore, as he notes how ‘our ancestors and the 
Pelasgians who proceeded the Greeks were like the savages of America’,156 thereafter making 
the larger exclamation that: 
 
 
152 Muriel Dodds, Les récits de voyages: sources de L'esprit des lois de Montesquieu (Paris: H. Champion, 1929). 
153 Turgot, ‘A philosophical review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind’ in Turgot on Progress, Sociology 
and Economics: Three Major Texts, trans. and ed. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
65. 
154 As does George Canguilhem in his brief mention of Turgot in ‘The decline of the idea of progress’, trans. 
David Macey in Economy and Society 27, no.2 and 3 (May 1998), 314. 
155 See Ronald Meek, ‘Introduction’, in Turgot on Progress, 8–12. 
156 Turgot, ‘A philosophical review’ 89. Pierre Vidal-Naquet has written an illuminating piece on the 
historiographic landslide whereby it became known that the Greeks had also been savages. See Pierre Vidal-
Naquet, ‘Les jeunes. Le cru, l' enfant grec et le cuit’, in Faire de l'histoire: Nouveaux objets, tome III, ed. Jacques le 
Goff and Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, l974), l37–68. 
 54 
A glance over the Earth puts before our eyes, even today, the whole history of the human race, showing 
us traces of all the steps and monuments of all the stages through which it has passed from the 
barbarism, still in existence, of American peoples to the civilisations of the most enlightened nations of 
Europe’.157 
 
III. ‘Rude’ and ‘Polished’, Far and Near : Lafitau in the Scottish Enlightenment  
If Moeurs des sauvages amériquains in appears to have been disregarded or overlooked in the 
French context, a somewhat different reception awaited it across the Channel. Along with 
Charlevoix’s L'Histoire et description générale de la Nouvelle-France (1747) and Cadwallader 
Colden’s The History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America 
(1727), it became a staple reference in the mid-eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment.158 
Not only was it taken up within the pervasive mirror-dynamics whereby the virtues or vices 
of ‘civilised life’ were estimated in comparisons with ‘noble’ or ‘ignoble’ savages, it also seems 
to have explicitly provided a systematised vindication to John Locke’s earlier conjectural 
claim that ‘in the beginning, all the world was America’.159 Among the several texts which use 
‘savage Americans’ to figure a legitimate image of an origin in time before written sources 
could provide testimony, Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) and 
William Robertson’s The History of America (1777) do so explicitly with reference to Lafitau.160  
 The comparisons which in Moeurs des sauvages amériquains was meant to establish the 
actual filiation of the ‘savage Americans’ from the ‘Ancients’ plays a crucial if somewhat 
displaced role in this regard. The difference in social customs that the work so amply testifies 
to (and attempts to render familiar) gains significance for Ferguson and Robertson in two 
ways: as the demonstration of a cultural, political and economic divide to be explained at a 
philosophical level; and as the clue as to how such an elaboration could be structured in a 
developmental narrative, largely regardless of any interest in actual genetic bonds. This is not 
to say that Ferguson and Robertson didn’t take a stance on the contentious questions as to 
the unitary or multiple origins of the human species and the species-concept as such. Both 
 
157 Turgot, ‘Sketch of the Second Discourse’, in Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics, 89. 
158 Troy Bickham, ‘American Indians in the British Imperial Imagination 1707–1815’ in British North America in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Stephen Foster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 247. 
159 John Locke, quoted in Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, 57. 
160 It was in a letter to William Robertson that Edmund Burke wrote ‘But now the Great Map of Mankind is 
unroll’d at once; and there is no state or Gradation of barbarism, and no mode of refinement which we have 
not at the same instant under our View. The very different Civility of Europe and of China; the barbarism of 
Persia and of Abyssinia. The erratick manners of Tartary, and of Arabia. The Savage State of North America, 
and of New Zealand’. Edmund Burke, quoted in Robert Launay, Savages, Romans, Despots: Thinking about Others 
from Montaigne to Herder, (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2018) 1. There is good reason to believe that also 
Smith was influenced by Lafitau. Among the student reports from the 1762–63 course on jurisprudence, a 
reference is made to Charlevoix and la Fulage – the latter of whom seem to have been Lafitau. See Meek, Social 
Science and the Ignoble Savage, 121. A later article on Smith and Lafitau which draws heavily on Meek is Blaney and 
Inayatullah, ‘The Savage Smith and the Temporal Walls of Capitalism’. 
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appear, contrary to Hume’s polygenism, to have held monogenist positions, but the question 
of the species is not at the forefront of their work. When Robertson could consider the 
‘savage Americans’ missing pieces in a puzzle and exclaim that they ‘fill up a considerable 
chasm in the history of the human species’ and thereby ‘completed the history of the human 
mind’,161 he had already bound the oneness of ‘history’ to the oneness of ‘man’. The 
comparative operations were more explicitly used as a means to approach the historical 
origins of civil and commercial society, in a cross-temporal epistemic triangulation, primarily 
between the American ‘savages’, the Hellenic ‘barbarians’ and European civil societies. But, 
if the ‘savage Americans’ in this way could be considered to shed light on a previously 
obscure past, this view also entailed a number of questions. Following a recent work by Silvia 
Sebastiani, the problem for Ferguson and for the Scottish natural historians more broadly 
conceived, can be summarised as that of the limits to progress.162 It is the problem, in other 
words, of the rhythms and paces of both historical development as well as what was 
perceived as stasis and stagnation. Both Ferguson’s formulation of this problem and his 
response to it is articulated in the Essay through four concepts: ‘the savage’ and ‘the barbarian’ 
which on account of different relations to property make up different groups within the 
wider category of ‘rude nations’, which in turn gains its meaning proper in opposition to the 
civilised ‘polished nations’. These concepts are, in the Essay as in the works of several other 
authors from this same period, intimately bound up with the now infamous ‘four-stage 
theory’ in which the steps of socio-economic development are delineated in the succession 
of four relatively neat categories, each defined by a dominant mode of social subsistence: 
‘hunting’, ‘pasturage’, ‘agriculture’, and ‘commerce’.163 Each step taken both to inhere in the 
present, synchronously, and to represent a past stage of development, diachronously. The 
pairing of space and time which the trajectory of this ‘geography of enlightenment’ and 
civilisation enacts, ‘contrasted modern civilisation with early savages stages, and polite 
Europe with the barbarous nature of rest of the world – including the southern and eastern 
European regions’.164 But the divide between ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’ or ‘savage’ and ‘polished’, 
in Ferguson’s terms, was also inscribed within the parameters of the Scottish national context 
itself.  
 
161 William Robertson, quoted in Fenton and Moore, ‘Introduction’, cv. 
162 Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, 10. One of the primary references on the radicalisation of difference in 
Sebastiani’s intellectual history is precisely Robertson’s The History of America. 
163 The ‘four-stage theory’ is most often allotted its place of origin somewhere between Turgot and Smith. It is 
Meeks’ claim that the image of the ‘ignoble’ savage played a determining role in some of the main traits of the 
four-stage theory. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage.  
164 Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, 170. On the differentiation of north-west Europe from the south and 
especially the east, Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment 
(Standford: Stanford University Press, 1994), especially, 284–331. 
 56 
 When Ferguson wrote and published the Essay, the political climates across Scotland 
were still marked by the English and Scottish Union of Parliaments in 1707. Putting an end 
to its history of political independence, this agreement effectively turned the Scottish territory 
into a periphery governed from London, an event whose effects can be read as much in the 
fields of political and economic theory as in those of strategic manoeuvres on the part of 
side-lined Royalties and the eruptions of outright political resistance. Adam Smith’s theory 
of progress, for instance, is only the most famous among a number of distinct reflections on 
the national gains and losses to be negotiated, as it balances out a loss of political autonomy 
with a gain in economic advancements. Several Scottish theories of the historical 
development of law, society, and economics fulfilled a double function similar to Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations (1776), offering both the terms in which to analyse the current socio-political 
landscape and a prognosis to help navigate within it. Inscribed within these works are 
therefore also the tensions between Highlanders and Lowlanders, typically framed in terms 
of conflicts of interest between primarily urban and ‘modern’ Lowlanders, generally 
favourable inclined toward England, and the more rural and ‘traditional’ Highlanders, still in 
support of the now Catholic and deposed House of Stuart. With the complete annexation 
and the establishment of Great Britain, these simmering conflicts were famously ignited, 
culminating four decades after the Union of Parliaments, in the definitive defeat of the 
primarily Highlander Jacobite rebellion, gathered around ‘the young pretender’ Prince 
Charles Edward Stuart, at the battle of Culloden in 1746. This background of political 
conflict between Scots and Scots feed into the categories of the historical schemas proposed 
by the Scottish Enlightenment writers, who were aligned almost exclusively on the side of 
well-educated and relatively well-to-do Lowlanders.165 In their particular terminology, ‘civil 
society’ is most often understood in opposition to historical stages in which no formal 
government has been instituted and in some cases comes to function explicitly as a synonym 
for the political and juridical institutions which make up a state. Fania Oz-Salzberger has 
rightly emphasised that, on the topic of civil society, the Scottish Enlightenment ‘did not 
speak in one voice’, as tensions and theoretical differences mark endeavours to theorise both 
the emergence and fundamental elements of civil society.166 However, the term ‘civil’ also 
pitted, in a generalised manner, the educated, the well-mannered and the refined against the 
unpolished and the ‘raw’ or the ‘rude’, in a way that played up perceived differences between 
 
165 Fania Oz-Salzberger, ‘Introduction’, in Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), vii–xvi. 
166 Oz-Salzberger moreover places an emphasis on the complicated afterlife of the concept of ‘civil society’ in 
its German translations. See Fania Oz-Salzberger, ‘The Civic Discourse and the Hazards of Translation: 
Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society in Germany’, in Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in 
Eighteenth Century Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1995), 138–66. 
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the characteristics of Lowlanders in opposition to those of the Highlanders.167 In this way, 
the conditions of the Highlanders, with traditions bound up in clan-structures, largely 
became affiliated with those of ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’, both ancient and across the 
Atlantic. In the discussion of either the corruptive or beneficial effects of commercial and 
civil society upon individual character traits, Ferguson’s Essay can be counted among the 
more ambivalent assessments. Alongside a subtle but persistent insistence upon the 
historicity of virtues relative to different forms of social and political organisation and a 
warning against tendencies of societies to judge others by standards foreign to them, the 
Essay also expresses an allegiance to republican civic virtues. This allegiance demands a 
perpetual re-evaluation of the possibly corrupting effects of highly commercial societies: the 
becoming ‘effeminate, mercenary, and sensual’ of man.168 In this context, ‘savages’ both near 
and far appear to have offered a counter-image to a moral threat considered pervasive within 
civilised societies, as traits corresponding to those found in Lafitau’s first and most general 
characteristic of the ‘savage American’ as ‘physically of a good constitution, strong and 
skilful’,169 ‘well-tempered, proud and with good minds, quick perceptions, admirable 
memories’170 is seen to be shared with those of the Spartans, and, ultimately, also brought to 
proximity with those of Scottish highland militias. 
 
IV. The Songs of  Savages: Baumgarten’s and Herder’s Lafitau 
Much as it was the case in the Scottish reception of Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, its 
translation into German was also a transposition out of the context of generalised anti-
ecclesiastic and anti-Jesuit polemics that had dominated its French reception.171 As Andreas 
Motsch notes, the largely Protestant paradigm of the Enlightenment in Germany made for a 
much more explicitly positive reception-context for Lafitau’s work:  
 
What influenced readers outside of  France in the eighteenth century was neither the anti-Jesuit polemic 
 
167 On the context and background for the jurisprudential and ethical role played by the term ‘civil’ in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, see Fania Oz-Salzberger, ‘Civil Society in the Scottish Enlightenment’ in Civil Society - 
History and Possibilities, ed. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, 
64. 
168 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 189 
and 237. The gendering of civic virtues and the play between masculinity and femininity in the conception of 
‘savages’ as ‘manly’ is striking in the Essay but not part of what I will discuss here.  
169 Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, vol.1, 89. 
170 Ibid., 90. 
171 For the first half  of  this account of  the reception of  Lafitau in Germany which centres of  Jacob Baumgarten, 
I have drawn extensively from Andreas Motsch, ‘La réception des Moeurs de Joseph-François Lafitau en France 
et en Allemange au XVIII siècle ou Comment faire de Lafitau en éclaireur allemeand’ in Représentation, métissage 
et povoir: La dynamite coloniale des échanges entre Autochtones, Européens et Canadiens XVI-XX siècles, ed. Alain Beaulieu 
and Stéphanie Chaffray, (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2012), 175–202. 
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nor even principally the ethnographical aspects of  the text, but rather its quality as observer and 
historian of  religion and non-religious human customs [moeurs] and their evolution. In this regard, it 
mattered little or not at all, that the author himself  had been anchored within a theocentric vision of  
the world.172  
 
Similarly to how Louis-Armand de Lom d’Arce, baron the Lahontan personally found refuge 
in Hanover and had been defended by Leibniz after his 1703 publication of  the hugely 
popular and hugely derided Dialogues Curieux entire l’Auteur et un Sauvage de bons sens qui a voyagé, 
Lafitau’s text found a home in Halle, centrum for the Prussian pietist Enlightenment.173 A 
full translation of  Moeurs des sauvages amériquains, including illustrations but omitting the title 
page and name of  its author, was published as part of  an encyclopaedic compilation of  texts 
on the Americas titled Algemeine Geschichte der Länder und Völker von America. This work, in 
which Lafitau is only named in the preface, was compiled by the translator and statesman 
Johann Friedrich Schröter and the theologian Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten the older brother 
of  Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Baumgarten the older was both immensely preoccupied 
with the current attempts to write universal world histories and a prolific translator and 
introducer of  these texts. The project of  translating one of  the first attempts to unify the 
histories of  Western Europe with those of  other known cultures of  the world (Georges Sand 
et al.’s 66 volumes An Universal history, from the earliest account of  time, 1744–59) was undertaken 
by him under the title of  Überstzung der Algemeinen Welthistorie die in England durch eine Gesellschaft 
von gelehrten ausgefertigt worden. What is striking about the inclusion of  Moeurs des sauvages 
amériquains in the compilation of  texts on the Americas is that it effectively serves as the 
introduction to pre-colonial America, as offering a view onto peoples as yet untouched by 
either civilisation or colonisation. 
 
The reading and the writing of  history was in effect at the heart of  Lafitau’s project, just as it was at the 
heart of  Baumgarten’s. Though the terms employed are not absolutely identical, the principles and the 
primary lines of  interrogation overlap in the most striking manner. The two determining elements of  
Baumgarten’s historical thought were a conception of  history as the manifestation of  divine Providence 
and the rational interrogation of  this same history according to the principles established by Wolff, such 
as that of  non-contradiction. To reconcile the principles of  religion with those of  rationalism is then 
an objective to which both authors are wedded: history as the manifestation of  divine providence is one 
of  the principles they share, just as the idea of  developing a rational interrogation of  history.174  
 
An altogether different reception of  Moeurs des sauvages amériquains is however also to be found 
in this German context. In an undated fragment written by Johann Gottfried Herder, 
 
172 Ibid., 185 (my translation). 
173 See Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 
24–31. 
174 Motsch, ‘La réception des Moeurs’, 198–99 (my translation). 
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‘Fragment über die beste Leitung eines jungen Genies zu den Schätzen der Dichtkunst’,175 
Herder describes Moeurs des sauvages amériquains as ‘a compendium of  the ethics and poetics 
of  the savages [Wilden]’,176 and in this same capacity drew on the materials gathered by 
Lafitau for a collection of  folk-songs (Volksleider) from around the world. That Herder herein 
emphasised a common authenticity of  expression between the songs of  the Iroquois and 
those of  ancient Celts, similarities between the ‘bard of  Ossian’,177 the old Germanic tribes 
and the ‘savages Americans’, is what leads John Zammito to conclude that Herder shared 
with Lafitau the notion that, 
 
synchronic dispersal of  cultural levels […] mirrored faithfully the diachronic evolution of  human 
cultural levels, so that the juxtaposition of  the ‘primitives’ (Hottentots and Hurons) with 
contemporary Europeans told the same story of  human ‘civilisation’ that could be constructed 
from the sequence of  historical cultures from the ancient Fertile Cresent to the siècle des 
lummiéres.178 
 
This is surely a tendency within Herder’s philosophy of history, but another and equally 
important lineage springs from Herder’s appreciation of the carefulness with which Lafitau 
attempted to reconstruct the worlds of meaning and emotion particular to the Iroquois. What 
is most interesting in this German reception history, and what is of  consequence to what 
follows, is the split which the reception introduces: between the construction of  overarching 
teleologies and the immanentisation of  teleologies to individual peoples. This divide can be 
discerned in the two primary points of  reception: between Baumgarten and Herder, different 
trajectories open. 
 
175 In Kälin’s study of Lafitau, the connection to Herder is especially central. See Kälin, Indianer und Urvölker. 
176 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Fragment über die beste Leitung eines jungen Genies zu den Schätzen der 
Dichtkunst”, in Sämtliche Werke vol.9, ed. Bernhard Suphan (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877–1909, reprinted 
Hildesheim: Olm, 1967), 542 (my translation). 
177 It is of course one of the great ironies of history that this work, taken as the authentic expression of ancient 
virtues of Caledonian heroes, was principally composed by James Macpherson (1736–96). For a reading of this 
poem as a narrative of counter-modernity, see Silvia Sebastiani, ‘Barbarism and Republicanism’ in Scottish 
Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume I: Morals, Politics, Art, Religion, ed. Aaron Garrett and James A. Harris 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 323–60. 
178 John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 236. 







THREE CRITICAL MODELS 
  63 
 
 Der Mensch kann nur Mensch werden durch Erziehung.  
 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy, 1803179  
 
‘Travel’, wrote Immanuel Kant in the introduction to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View (1798),180 ‘belongs to the means of broadening the range of anthropology, even if it is 
only the reading of travel books [Reisebeschreibungen].’181 Famously rarely leaving Königsberg, 
Kant, who lectured and published on anthropology and geography alike, was an avid reader 
of precisely such books.182 The extent of his appetite for the genre was significant enough 
for Johann Georg Hamann to teasingly reveal his knowledge of this fact in an early letter: 
‘Since you have read so many travel descriptions [Reisebeschreibungen], I do not know if thereby, 
you have become credulous or incredulous.’183 Half in jest, Hamann transformed the 
commonplace eighteenth-century issue of the dubious epistemic status of travel literature 
itself into a question of its ambiguous effect upon readers, asking whether such readings 
foster healthy scepticism or fortify gullible dispositions.  
 When today a reference is made to travel literature within the history of philosophy it 
is most often the second half of this dichotomy, the problem of gullibility, that is invoked – 
this especially if the purpose is to parcel out bigotry and leave the philosophical skeleton 
intact.184 Within Kant studies, this has often meant that travel literature comes to be 
 
179 AA IX:443. 
180 Henceforth, Anthropology. 
181 APPV, 232 [VII:120]. 
182 In a footnote to the above remark, Kant emphasises that since Königsberg is both at the centre of Prussia 
and a centre for maritime commerce, a plurality of languages and customs pass through it such that one might 
still learn a great deal about human difference without ever leaving the city. 
183 Johann Georg Hamann letter to Kant 27 July 1759, quoted in William E. Stewart, Die Reisebeschreibung und ihre 
Theorie im Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978), 182 (my translation). 
184 This is especially prevalent in the form of reconstructive readings in which Kant’s racist biases do not in 
themselves constitute a problem to understandings of his concept of cosmopolitanism; as long as an argument 
for cosmopolitanism which does not include these biases can be constructed on the basis of the Kantian 
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considered as the site for a concatenation of a historically-specific set of presuppositions 
about non-Europeans, which may or may not be reflected in the dispositions of Kant the 
person but which need not be considered for their conceptual significance, either to Kant’s 
philosophy or within Kantian philosophy. In this chapter, I question such a separation, 
emphasising instead the degree to which Kant championed the critical use of travel literature. 
I do so in order to follow the traces of travel literature within Kant’s philosophy of history 
and thereby provide a new interpretation of the highly contested relation between, on the 
one hand, his writings on universal world history and cosmopolitanism and, on the other, 
those on universal natural history and the concept of race. 
 Kant’s philosophy of history, in which the idea of a cosmopolitan world order was 
central to the full realisation of the predispositions of human reason, is inscribed not only in 
the most central texts on the topic of history: the essay ‘Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Aim’ (1784),185 the 1785 two-part review of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas 
for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity, §83–84 in the Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), 
‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ (1795),186 and The Conflict of the Faculties 
(1798), but also, importantly, in the concluding remarks to Anthropology. This connection to 
the Anthropology and to what Robert Louden has called the ‘impure ethics’ – in which what is 
at stake is the efficaciousness of  moral judgements among empirically existing human beings 
– is of  more than simply passing significance. It is so, the following argues, since race for 
Kant is one among many factors that, from the perspective of impure ethics, might either 
obstruct or improve the capacity of human agents to act according to reason and assume 
their nature as rational beings.187 This means that although the concept of race that Kant 
developed in key essays188 might, strictly speaking, belong to a purely physical anthropology 
(something we today would understand as closer to the anatomical study of the human 
 
assumptions. These reconstructions – insofar as they see no need to even mention or critically engage the 
question of racism – are what Robert Bernasconi has referred to as the ‘streamlined version of the history of 
philosophy’. Robert Bernasconi, ‘Introduction’ in Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy, ed. Robert Bernasconi 
with Sybol Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 2. 
185 Henceforth, ‘Idea for a Universal History’. 
186 Henceforth, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’. 
187 In Kant’s Impure Ethics, Louden identifies what he calls Kant’s ‘impure ethics’ out of  a number of  different 
texts in which Kant addresses not the pure but the empirical study of  human nature. Therein, he identifies four 
major ‘fields of  impurity’ – education, anthropology, history, and art and religion, – of  which I will address the 
first three in what follows. Curiously, while Louden is eminently capable of  drawing out the problematic 
inscription of  the concept of  race within these fields of  impurity, he nevertheless backtracks considerably when 
it comes to the question of  what this inscription means to Kant’s moral universalism which, for Louden, remains 
untouched. See Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
27–30 and 104. 
188 Specifically, ‘Of the different races of human beings’ (1775), ‘Determination of the concept of a human race’ 
(1785) and ‘On the use of  teleological principles in philosophy’ (1788). 
  65 
body),189 its function as one of the schemas which mediates between the level of the human 
species and that of the individual human being also comes to bear on pragmatic anthropology 
and thereby on the philosophy of history. What this chapter demonstrates is that Kant 
considered there to be a natural-historical differential within the educability of  human beings 
and that this differential translates into a fixation of  the relation between populations of  
‘educators’ and ‘educated’ in the processual perfection of  the species as a whole which forms 
the heart of  Kant’s of universal world history. In foregrounding the significance of  
pedagogy, education, and ideas of  (self-)formation for Kant’s conception of  the human 
species, it thereby becomes clear how the temporalisation of  geographically-distributed 
difference (the object of  study in the preceding chapter) within Kant’s philosophy of  history 
is both reproduced and rendered dynamic within the idea of  the continued education of  
humankind as a whole.190 
 
189 This early proximity of anthropology to anatomy and its relation to Kant’s anthropology is account for in 
Claude Blanckaert, ‘L’Anthropologie en France, le mot et l’histoire (XVIe–XIXe siècles)’, in Bulletins et Mémoires de 
la Société d’anthropologie de Paris 1, no.3–4 (1989), 13–43. 
190 One translational question that arises from working with the English editions of Kant’s writings on this topic 
asks: How is it possible to signify, that various German terms for ‘all of man’ potentially denote different forms 
of community: logical, natural historical, moral, political, or world historical? Kant refers alternately and in 
different texts to Menschengattung, Menschengeschlecht, Menschheit, and, finally, also at points to Menschlichkeit. I have 
at points decided to break with the standard translation, to maintain consistency within the terminology 
throughout this thesis. Out of the four terms, it is particularly Menschengeschlecht that poses a translational 
problem, since no obvious candidate for the translation of Geschlecht exists in English. Presumably because this 
term carries connotations of hereditary lineages, the standard translation in the Cambridge editions has been 
‘human race’ (this is the case, for instance, in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’). However, in light of the fact that Kant 
has a specific concept of a Menschenrace (a human race), this to me appears to be an unfortunate choice. 
Moreover, while Geschlecht of course implies a natural historical linage, Kant never uses this term in his texts on 
the natural-historical determination of the concept of the human species and the concept of a human race. 
When Menschengeschlecht is used, I believe we should rather hear the connotations of peerage, dynasties, families, 
and kinship within the term, such that the generational aspect of it is not limited to its natural historical sense 
but includes the political and social significance of family lines. This insight is supported by the fact that when Kant 
uses Menschengeschlecht, in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’, The Conflict of the Faculties, Anthropology, and the Critique of 
Practical Reason, it is with reference to the political and moral community of man. What other term might we 
then use in the translation? By process of elimination, we can note that since Kant employs Gattung for both 
logical and natural historical species, Menschengattung is best translated by ‘human species’, while ‘human race’ is 
best reserved for the actual natural historical concept of race. An objection to this choice has been raised by 
Stella Sandford, who has argued that to render the correspondences between the essays on race and the Critique 
of Pure Reason legible, Gattung should rather be translated as genus. However, I believe there may be further 
complications here, if the human being is considered not as a natural genus but as a rational species, indeed, the 
only rational species we have any knowledge of. For this reason, I have retained the use of ‘human species’. As 
for Menschheit and Menschlichkeit, these are best translated as ‘humanity’ (both where the ‘humanity’ as opposed 
to ‘animality’ of someone is at stake and where it is a question of ‘humanity as a whole’) since Kant uses 
Menschlichkeit as a direct translation of the Latin humanitas in The Metaphysics of Morals §34 VI:456. This leaves only 
the option of translating Menschengeschlecht as ‘humankind’. This is not perfect, but it has the advantage that ‘kind’ 
etymologically links with ‘kin’ and thus implies a sense of family and tribal relations, as well as bearing a trace 
of Middle English that contains a reference to sexed differences are also present in the German Geschlecht. I will 
throughout this piece be translating: Menschengattung as ‘human species’; Menschengeschlecht as ‘humankind’; 
Menchheit as well as Menschlichkeit as ‘humanity’; and Menschenrace as (a) ‘human race’. On the difficulties of 
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 By bringing to the forefront the assumption of  inequality inscribed within the 
educative relation and the function of  this relation within Kant’s philosophy of  history, this 
chapter also places recent debates as to the significance of  Kant’s writings on race for his 
political and moral philosophy under a new light, particularly in regard to his views on the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of  imperialism and colonialism, and goes beyond the lacuna located 
between the natural and the moral significance of  Kant’s texts on race that these debates 
seem trapped within. One of  the most authoritative voices in these debates is Pauline 
Kleingeld, who has convincingly shown that while Kant may have defended arguments 
supporting slavery and colonisation throughout much of  his life, he can reasonably be said 
to have had ‘second thoughts’, at least on the legitimacy of  settler colonialism, since he 
condemns this form of  colonisation as a violation of  cosmopolitan right in both ‘Toward 
Perpetual Peace’ and The Metaphysics of  Morals (1797).191 Furthermore, Kleingeld has also 
argued that Kant must have had comparable ‘second thoughts’ on the moral and intellectual 
significance of  his natural historical concept of  race.192 These latter claims, however, are less 
convincing, I argue, precisely because the stability of  a racialised differentiation between 
educators and educated signals otherwise. What can be said to have changed is merely Kant’s 
view on the legitimate means for the promulgation of  such an education. From this 
perspective, the nexus between Kant’s racism and his concept of  race is expressed not only 
in relation to the brute domination of  slavery and colonial exploitation but also in the 
ideological conception of  an educative function which can be fulfilled by softer powers, one 
that fundamentally assumes a relation of  inequality up until the point where those who are 
to be educated can be said to assume their own maturity (Mündigkeit). This goes to the core 
of  Kant’s philosophy of  history in which the institution of  cosmopolitanism is premised on 
a passage through the state-form, and in which white Western European nations, as the 
generators of  the socio-political models appropriate to the full realisation of  the 
predispositions of  the human species, form the privileged locus for historical dynamism. The 
education of  the ‘rest’ of  humanity that follows might employ a variety of  means but the 
aim remains that of  learning to adopt the ‘appropriate’ model.  
 To contextualise these arguments within contemporary discussions, the first section 
outlines aspects of  what it means to read Kant today from the standpoint of  the extended 
debate which his writings on race have spurred. Thereafter, sections two and three revisit 
 
translating Geschlecht, see Marc Crépon, ‘Geschlecht’, in Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. 
Barbara Cassin, trans. Steven Rendall, et al. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014) 394–96.  
191 Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism’ in Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical 
Perspectives, ed. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 43–67. 
192 Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’ in The Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 229 (October 2007), 
573–92. 
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Kant’s concept of  race, and the ways in which it broadly subtends the conception of  a 
hierarchical order within the human species, in light of  a textual and systematic account of  
the interrelation between physical geography, pragmatic anthropology, and pedagogy in his 
work. From this standpoint, a more specific focus on the education and educability of  the 
human species is introduced in sections four and five and clarified according to the 
terminological matrix formed between ‘education’ as alternately Erziehung and Ausbildung, 
‘formation’ as Bildung and ‘culture’ as Cultur within the Lectures on Pedagogy and in the 
Anthropology as well as within the Critique of  the Power of  Judgement. Finally, the treads are 
gathered in section six, which questions the function of  two ideas of  education in Kant’s 
philosophy of  history: that of  the self-education of  humankind and that of  an ‘education by 
nature’. 
 
I. Reading Kant Today: (Re)Placing Race in the History of  Philosophy 
Every so often, an interventionist reading of  the history of  philosophy is produced such that 
the field into which it intervenes is forced to reassess, discard, or defend its basic tenets. For 
Kant studies, broadly conceived, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s 1995 essay ‘The Color of  
Reason: The Idea of  “Race” in Kant’s Anthropology’ can be said to have constituted just 
such a reading as it forced a reckoning with Kant’s conception of  race, and particularly with 
its place and function within his critical system.193 In the decades that followed its publication, 
not only did the racially-charged, derogatory comments from Observations on the Feeling of  the 
Beautiful and Sublime (1764)194 become references for expositions of  Kant’s early, less than 
sound reasonings on ‘national characters’, but, more importantly, the image of  Kant the 
universalist moral philosopher came to be confronted with that of  Kant the theorist of  race. 
What Eze brought back to public memory was the fact that Kant had intervened into 
eighteenth-century debates on the possibility of  a systematic knowledge of  organised living 
beings, with the proposal that the already prevalent division of  the human species into four 
different races – ‘the whites, the yellow Indians, the Negroes and the copper-red Americans’ – could 
be scientifically grounded within a natural history of  humankind (encompassed within a 
 
193 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ‘The Color of Reason; The Idea of “Race” in Kant’s Anthropology’, in Postcolonial 
African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 103–40. Following Eze’s work, 
Bernasconi has been especially instrumental in pushing the question of race to the forefront of critical 
discussions of Kant’s work. See, in particular, Robert Bernasconi, ‘Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s 
Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race’, in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 11–
36; Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism’, in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, ed. Julie 
K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145–66; and, for a broader formulation 
of the philosophical, historiographical and notably pedagogical stakes of confronting Enlightenment racism, 
Robert Bernasconi, ‘Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up: The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study 
of the History of Philosophy’, in Radical Philosophy 1, no.117 (January/February 2003), 13–22. 
194 Henceforth, Observations. 
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physical and generative system of  nature as opposed to a merely synchronic classificatory 
system).195  
 At least three elements are required, if  we are to assess the significance of  Kant’s 
writings on race for the rest of  his philosophical project: one, an understanding of  Kant’s 
concept of  race as a natural historical category; two, an assessment of  the possible 
connections between this ‘scientific’ conception and the racist comments to be found in 
some of  Kant’s writings (especially in the lectures); and three, an interpretation of  the 
relation of  both of  these elements to the universalism of  the critical moral and political 
philosophy.196 Of  course, both deep methodological and political differences are revealed in 
 
195 Although Kant in his first essay on race does not exclude the possibility that there may be other races, these 
are the four for which he considered there to have been indisputable proof of their ‘unfailingly hereditary’ 
characteristics. The details of Kant’s theory of race will be elucidated at later stage in this chapter. Kant, DCHR, 
153. 
196 The primary focus of this chapter is the relation between Kant’s writings on race and those on history and, 
thereby, his moral and political philosophy. Central, therefore, is the question of how a moral whole could arise 
from nature. It is accordingly not the intention to construct an argument for the influence which Kant’s theory 
of race may (or may not) have had on critical philosophy considered more generally. However, if an argument 
for such an influence were to be constructed, it would benefit by building on the work of Jennifer Mensch who, 
in a highly innovative reading of both the three essays on race and Critique of Pure Reason, has suggested that 
Kant’s claim that the critical system be considered one of ‘the epigenesis of pure reason’ should be understood 
as more than a merely metaphorical appeal to the model of epigenetic organismic development. In Kant’s 
Organicism, Mensch argues that the ‘use of the organic model had a deep methodological impact when it came 
to the critical system; indeed the system itself was conceived as a result of this model as an organic unity whose 
telic course of development could be described as a natural history of reason’ (144). On such a reading, the 
objective validity of the categories of the understanding is grounded by how they originate in the germs and 
dispositions of reason and epigenetically develop therefrom. Such a reading places the writings on race – wherein 
Kant’s most extensive discussions of different models of organic development prior to those of Critique of the 
Power of Judgement are to be found – in closer proximity to the epistemological aspect of the critical writings than is 
often assumed. It does so, because Kant’s theory of race is where, prior to the Critique of the Power of Judgement, 
he most extensively reflects on the role of teleological reasoning and the use of the regulative ideas of purposive 
nature as well as where he proposes that by combining the perspectives of teleological and mechanistic causation 
the most scientifically fruitful approach to a natural history of the human species might account for its 
monogenetic unity (teleological) and environmentally occasioned racial permanence of difference (mechanistic). 
From the perspective onto Kant’s works constructed by Mensch, a number of questions can be raised as to 
how and to what degree such a natural-historical divide in the species of man also translates into judgments of 
moral and cognitive difference, thereby disturbing the universality of the Kantian transcendental framework. In 
other words, does this entail a racialised transcendental? And, if this is the case, in which sense and to what 
effect? While Mensch only partially pursues the attendant political and social questions, Stella Sandford, 
reviewing Kant’s Organicism, outlines how one might conclude that, ‘in some sense, the theory of race is absolutely 
central to the supposed unity of the critical philosophy’ (Sanford, Review: Kant’s Organicism, 169). Such a 
conclusion must then ask what it would mean for Kant studies today if this proximity reveals a motivational 
force, one that asks whether ‘the fundamental need of Kant’s eighteenth-century reason was to provide a theory 
of race that, for theological reasons, affirmed monogenesis while, simultaneously, for other (social? political? 
psychological? economic?) reasons affirming the unique permanence of skin colour among other physiological 
characteristics; that is, that affirmed the unity of the human species whilst also affirming the disunity of the 
“races”?’ (ibid., 170). It is in this vein that Sandford elsewhere explores the possible link between the critical 
writings and the writings on race, lending further strength to the argument that the theory of race is ‘the context 
in which the general problem of a natural system of nature and of the systematic unity of nature, beyond the 
aggregate of empirical knowledge, is first und fully addressed by Kant’ (Sandford, ‘Kant, Race, and Natural 
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the sometimes divergent views of  exactly how these three elements are to be configured, 
especially in regard to the importance attributed to observing systematic distinctions drawn 
by Kant himself. This issue, dealt with in more detail in the following sections, is non-trivial 
insofar as it concerns the determination of  whether and, if  so, how the theory of  race 
(wherein humankind and human races are the objects of  a natural historical science) affects 
Kant’s pure moral and political philosophy.197 
 Since Kant’s proposal for a division of  the human species into four races was paired 
with a number of  assertions about an innate lack of  industriousness in some non-white races 
and a general inferiority in the areas of  art and science in all non-white races, his conception 
of  race seems to stand in unbearable tension with his moral and political universalism.198 As 
Kleingeld put it, one of  the central questions following the reassessment of  Kant’s texts on 
race has therefore been whether we are today better off  regarding him as an ‘inconsistent 
moral universalist’ or as a ‘consistent inegalitarian’?199 Perhaps predictably, this formulation 
both diagnosed and enforced a structural divide between accusers and defenders of  Kant 
within the field of  interpretation, a divide which was then largely carried over into ensuing 
 
History’, 964). In this latter article, Sandford is however also adamant that the first set of questions to be asked 
cannot be whether Kant’s critical philosophy as such is crypto-racist or even crypto-racialised, but rather how 
and in what manner the problem ‘of the unity in diversity of the human species, which for Kant was solved 
with the determination of the concept of race and a theory of generation that depends on the principle of 
purposiveness’ (ibid., 952) informs the development of the critical philosophy. If the theory of race can be said 
to have informed the development of the critical philosophy, it cannot be dismissed as simply external to the 
critical project as such but becomes a problem to be engaged. See Jennifer Mensch, Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis 
and the Development of Critical Philosophy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Stella Sandford, 
‘Review: Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy’, in Critical Philosophy of Race 3, no. 1 
(2015), 167–70; and Stella Sandford, ‘Kant, Race, and Natural History’, in Philosophy and Social Criticism 44, no.9 
(2018), 950–77. 
197 It is interesting to note that although anthropology (physical and as empirical psychology) certainly is not a 
priori and therefore belongs to what Louden classifies as ‘impure’ philosophy, such a categorisation is harder to 
sustain for the philosophy of history as a whole and especially for an essay like ‘Idea for a Universal History’, 
which, as discussed below, is fundamentally concerned with the determination of an idea of reason. 
198 A good account of this tension can be found in McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 
42–68. 
199 Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’, 576. When the field is split in this manner, Charles W. Mills 
(along with Eze and Bernasconi) has typically been considered representative of the view of Kant as a ‘consistent 
inegalitarian’, arguing to the effect that Kant did not count all humans as fully human and that therefore not all 
humans would have been either subject to or included within the moral demands of the categorial imperative. 
For his most recent defence of this position see Charles W. Mills, ‘Kant and Race, Redux’, Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, vol.35, no.1–2, 2014, 125–57. In a more recent piece, Mills however also makes it clear that 
his critique of Kant was never against Kantianism in any straightforward manner. See Mills, ‘Radical Black 
Kantianism’ in Res Philosophica, vol.95, no.1 (January 2018), 1–33. For the view that Kant is best understood to 
have been an inconsistent moral universalist, Kleingeld, Louden, Thomas E. Hill and Bernard Boxill have all 
argued that while Kant in his pre-critical works expressed racist beliefs and while his theory of race might be 
regrettable, his moral philosophy as a whole also contains the universalist tenants necessary to counter these. 
See Thomas E. Hill and Bernard Boxill, ‘Kant and Race’, in Race and Racism, ed. Bernard Boxill (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 448–71, and Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 93–106.  
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stages of  these debates, in which the possibility of  a connection between changes within 
Kant’s views on the legitimacy of  colonisation and imperialism and a change within his 
conception of  racial difference were drawn to the forefront.200 In such debates it was again 
Kleingeld who first proposed that that Kant changed his position on race over the course of  
the 1790s such that, after 1792, he might well have retained the theory of  racial differentiation 
within the human species but to all effects and purposes jettisoned the idea of  a hierarchical 
order and, therefore, the practical-political significance of  such a differentiation. For better 
or, as I would argue, for worse, this is a claim which has to a large extent come to form a 
central issue around which much of  the debate turns and it is made on the basis of  two 
combined factors. First, that the frequency with which Kant makes reference to an explicitly 
racialised hierarchy subsides in his later years.201 Second, that although Kant gives no 
indication of  having changed his position on these matters, we might use his changed 
position on the moral permissibility of  colonisation and the practice of  slavery to track a 
shift in his conception of  the significance of  race.202 On Kleingeld’s account: 
 
Kant gave up the hierarchical view of  the races in the context of  his elaboration of  his political theory 
and theory of  right. The time when he changed his views on race falls within the period during which 
 
200 This is in a sense also the field into which this chapter falls. The literature here is still fairly modest and in a 
recent volume on Kant and colonialism, only two of the essays – Kleingeld’s ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on 
Colonialism’ and Lea Ypi’s ‘Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy of History’ – take into account 
Kant’s writings on race in relation to the question of colonialism while the rest largely isolate the question of 
race from that of colonialism. A modified version of Kleingeld’s argument therein has been proposed by Ian 
Storey who claims that Kant’s change of position on race, as detectable within his political philosophy, should 
be grounded in a fundamental methodology shift, such that a new account of strictly formal purposiveness 
would indicated a radically restricted scope of teleological judgements, in both world historical and natural 
historical contexts, from Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. Storey’s argument is initially convincing but as 
my discussion of §83-84 of CPJ will aim to show, ultimately questionable. See Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second 
Thoughts on Colonialism’, 43–67; Lea Ypi, ‘Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy of History’, in 
Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, ed. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 99–126; and Ian Storey, ‘Empire and Natural Order in Kant’s “Second Thoughts” on 
Race’, History of Political Thought 36, no.4 (winter 2015), 670–700. 
201 In what follows, I focus on how this plays out in the Anthropology. It is true that in his later years, Kant does 
not appear to have developed his concept of race further, nor to have elaborated what could ground a hierarchy 
amongst the human races in the same detail. Mark Larrimore, however, has pointed out that this might simply 
come down to the fact that he had no need to do so, since his older writings on race were republished in different 
forms in 1793, 1795, 1797, and 1799, just as the natural historical perspective which Kant had championed came 
to be developed by a number of other scholars, in particular Christoph Girtanner’s Über das kantische Prinzip für 
die Naturgeschichte (1796), a summary and elaboration of Kant’s three essays. See Mark Larrimore, ‘Antinomies 
of Race: Diversity and Destiny in Kant’, Patterns of Prejudice 42, no.4/5 (2008), 358. 
202 Where Kleingeld points to the fact that a change of mind on the importance of racial difference might be 
deduced from a demonstrative change in Kant’s political views, even if he ‘gives no indication of when or why 
he changed his views’, Storey instead proposes that such a changed might be grounded in a fundamental shift 
of methodology from Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards, such that a new account of strictly formal 
purposiveness would indicated a radically restricted scope of teleological judgements, in both world historical 
and natural historical contexts. Cf. Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’ and Storey, ‘Empire and 
Natural Order’. 
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his political theory and philosophy of  right underwent significant transformations, in the wake of  the 
French Revolution. Examples of  other important developments in Kant’s political theory around this 
time are his notion of  citizenship, his republicanism, and the concept of  cosmopolitan right. Kant was 
never generous in explaining to posterity the genesis or transformation of  his views, and thus we may 
never know the precise circumstances of  his change of  mind.203 
 
Kleingeld argues that Kant’s introduction of  cosmopolitan right in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ 
and The Metaphysics of  Morals reveals that he must have had ‘second thoughts’ on the idea of  
a racial hierarchy among human beings. In particular, she argues, this is so because Kant in 
these texts condemns what he calls ‘the inhospitable behaviour of  civilised, especially 
commercial, states in our part of  the world’ since ‘the injustice they show the visiting foreign 
lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifying 
lengths’ and likewise condemns the so called ‘sugar islands’ as ‘that place of  the cruellest and 
most calculated slavery’.204 That is, while Kant in ‘Idea for a Universal History’ may have 
implied an outright colonial or imperial course of  historical development with the remark 
that it is likely that ‘our part of  the world’ will ‘someday give the law to all the others’,205 
Kleingeld concludes that this no longer appears to be a plausible interpretation of  his 
philosophy of  history as it is articulated after 1792. This may be, but as Bernasconi has 
argued, the case made for a changed position on the idea of  a racialised hierarchy becomes 
rather thin when we consider the fact that Kant, in a 1792 lecture course on physical 
geography, both reasserted his idea of  a hierarchy among the races and critiqued what he called 
the ‘trade in Negroes’ as ‘morally reprehensible’.206  
 While Kant no doubt over the course of  his life changed his mind on a great deal of  
things and a sensitivity to such changes are welcome, the persistent drive to exonerate the 
later Kant from the faults of  the younger on these issues seem suspiciously tinged with a 
reluctance to fully assess the extent to which Kant’s conception of  the unity of  the human 
species also included the idea of  its racial differentiation. Another interpretational strategy 
might therefore be to eschew the premise of a straightforward divide between an inconsistent 
moral universalism and a consistent non-egalitarianism and instead inquire into the 
construction of Kant’s universalism itself, in order to pose the question of whether the 
perceived depth of a contradiction between universalism and racism might in fact cover over 
a racist universalism and this calls for rethinking the very concept of universality.207 This latter 
 
203 Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’, 584. 
204 TPP, 329–30 
205 IUH, 119. 
206 Bernasconi is referring to the course of 1792, of for which the student notes now referred to as the Dohna-
Wundlacken 2 give a detailed account. See Robert Bernasconi, ‘Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race’ in Reading Kant’s 
Geography, ed. Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 304. 
207 While this approach has had, unsurprisingly, hardly any traction within Kant studies, its history predates 
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approach forms part of a both more subtle and more difficult attempt to rethink modern 
political epistemologies and the conceptual conditions for emancipatory thought on a global 
scale and, as such, its stakes extend beyond a critical engagement with Kant’s political 
philosophy. A confrontation with Kant cannot, however, simply be disposed with since 
Kantian discourses of the universal form an unavoidable part of the landscape of 
contemporary political thought.  
 
II. Kant’s Concept of Race 
If, as Bernasconi has argued, the invention of  a concept coincides with that articulation and 
demarcation of  said concept which made it possible for others to subsequently debate and 
question its scientific status, then Kant might hold the very dubious honour of  having 
‘invented’ the modern and ‘scientific’ concept of  race.208 Such an argument is important since 
it challenges the claim that Kant’s casual racism is reducible to the expression of  a set of  
common prejudices that circulated at the time and is therefore irrelevant to the merits of  his 
broader philosophical project.209 This deferral to a set of  common prejudices is most often 
made with the proviso that Kant was merely relaying information to be found in the travel 
literature of  the age. But, not only was Kant himself  at several instances at pains to warn his 
readers (and students) not to uncritically assume the veracity of  the various reports from 
missionaries and explorers, he also, in his review of  Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History 
of Humanity, explicitly characterised the epistemological problem which contradictory 
accounts posed for attempts to form scientific arguments on their basis:  
 
[W]orking with a mass of  descriptions dealing with different lands, it is possible to prove, if  one cares 
to do so … that Americans and Negroes are relatively inferior races in their intellectual capacities, but 
on the other hand, according to reports just as plausible, that their natural potentialities are on the same 
level as those of  any other inhabitants of  the planet.210 
 
many of  the debates that that unfolded therein. For a broad outline of  this argument see Étienne Balibar, 
‘Racism as Universalism’, Masses, Classes, Ideas (trans. James Swenson), New York and London: Routledge, 1994, 
191–204; and Étienne Balibar, ‘Ontological Difference, Anthropological Difference, and Equal Liberty’, 
European Journal of Philosophy 28, no.1 (March 2020), 1–12. For two discussions which situate Balibar’s argument 
in relation to Kant’s conception of  cosmopolitanism, see James Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and 
Politics of  Democratic Universalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 68–76, and Todd Hedrick, ‘Race, 
Difference, and Anthropology in Kant’s Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy 46, no.2 (April 
2008), 245–68. 
208 Bernasconi makes this argument in accounting for Kant’s discussions of Carl von Linné’s logical system of 
nature and Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon’s natural history on his theoretical intervention into the emerging 
field of racial science, particularly as it influenced Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s theory of race. See Bernasconi, 
‘Who Invented the Concept of Race?’. 
209 This casual racism is most explicit in the early OFBS and in the lectures on physical geography from this 
same period (which were later included in the highly contested 1803 edition of the Physical Geography edited by 
Rink) but it continues in the lectures on anthropology well into the 1780s. 
210 Kant, RJGH, 139. 
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This simply illustrates that while Kant, out of  necessity, had to rely on the ‘mass of  
descriptions dealing with different lands’ for empirical knowledge of  regions outside the 
reach of  his immediate vicinity (like all practitioners of  Enlightenment natural philosophy 
preoccupied with the planetary perspective on human nature), he also advocated a cautionary 
and critical use of  such descriptions.211 That he further devoted significant parts of  both his 
writings and his lectures to developing the theoretical means with which to explain both the 
natural historical unity of  the human species and natural differentiations in this species and 
that he did so by way of  a concept of  race, means that we should at the very least interrogate 
the extent to which the casual racism is enabled, supported, or enforced by the pseudo-
scientific discourse of  race that he developed.212  
 At the heart of  such an inquiry lie three essays on the concept of  race, which Kant 
published between 1775 and 1788 as contributions to what he considered to be the still 
nascent construction of  a ‘system of  natural history’ and the generation of  organisms.213 
Their date of  publication – with the first essay published in the midst of  the ‘silent decade’, 
the second after the publication of  the Critique of  Pure Reason and the last in the same year as 
the Critique of  Practical Reason – makes it impossible to isolate, at least chronologically, the 
significance of  these texts to a set of  reflections carried out in a so-called ‘pre-critical’ period. 
 
211 I believe this perspective is significantly lacking in Werner Stark’s otherwise careful reading of a passage of 
the Physical Geography that, for Stark, only seemingly indicates Kant’s endorsement of a racial hierarchy. After 
comparing the different manuscripts and transcripts that Friedrich Theodor Rink may have used when 
compiling his 1802 edition of the Physical Geography with other extant manuscripts and transcripts, Stark 
concludes that when a passage comments on all the degrees of perfection to be found in humanity the ‘lowest 
of all is part of the American races’ then this ‘is to be understood primarily as a reflection of travel literature’ 
and that we therefore ‘can neither presume nor insinuate any pejorative intention’ (91). Overall, Stark’s 
‘dismantling’ of the case for taking serious not only the concept of race but also the racism of some of Kant’s 
writings clearly embodies what we might call the ‘philologists’ defence’ of Enlightenment racism, which consists 
in a number of avoidance strategies for excluding the significance of race to the history of philosophy. Such 
strategies proceed roughly as follows: i) blame the time (here the repetition of statements generally in circulation 
within travel literature) (91); ii) blame the distortions of an editor (here Rink) (96); iii) blame an earlier (less 
enlightened) philosopher who is merely being cited (here Hume) (92); iv) blame the translation (here German 
to English) and a lack of attention to the nuance (here between the natural and cultural connotations of Menscheit 
and Humanität) (93); and v) blame the interpretation (here the reader who misses the systematic distinction 
between anthropology and geography as the significant contextual divide through which Kant’s concept of race 
must be understood and who therefore has disqualified themselves from making assumptions about Kant’s 
position on race or the possible relations between his philosophy and his racism) (97). See Werner Stark, 
‘Historical and Philological References on the Question of a Possible Hierarchy of Human “Races,” “Peoples,” 
or “Populations” in Immanuel Kant: A Supplement’, in Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. Stuart Elden and Eduardo 
Mendieta (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 87–102. 
212 The point here is not that racism did not exist before the scientific concept of race but that this was a racism 
which was not sustained by a rigours system of classification and a scientific concept of race. Likewise, theories 
of hereditary differences and especially of the ‘purity of blood’ go back at least as far as the persecutions of Jews, 
Muslims, and others with ‘heretical’ ancestry in fifteenth century Spain. On this point see Bethencourt, Racisms. 
213 OUTP, 200. 
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Moreover, the centrality of  the arguments found therein to the development of  the regulative 
ideas of  natural purposes and a purposively organised ‘system of  nature’ also renders any 
such isolation untenable from a systematic perspective.214  
 In all three of  the essays, Kant followed what he called ‘Buffon’s rule’, arguing that all 
humans, despite synchronically notable and classifiable differences in their appearances, 
belong to one and the same line of  descent [phylum] since even members belonging to 
different classes of  physical appearance can produce fertile offspring.215 Races, in turn, names 
those classes defined by unfailingly hereditary characteristics that have developed over the 
course of  generations, under the prolonged influence of  different climatic conditions upon 
the original predispositions [Anlage] and germs [Keime] in the human phylum.216 Kant’s theory 
is that four basic climatic environments (cold and humid, cold and dry, hot and humid, hot 
and dry) would, as humans migrated to populate all of  the Earth, have activated a 
determinate ‘unfolding’ of  germs and predispositions that, once developed, settled each race 
into a form suited for the conditions of  life corresponding to the region of  the world 
dominated by this climate.217 What at first seems to be a merely mechanist account of  this 
activation, in the course of  Kant’s works on physical geography gradually develops into the 
conceptualisation of  purposive nature, which can be seen to have ‘willed’ ‘that human beings 
should populate the entire Earth. All animals have their special climates, but human beings 
are to be found everywhere. Human beings are not to stay in a small region, but to spread 
out across the entire Earth.’218 Where the first humans would have held the potential for all 
later developed racial characteristics, once a certain set of  germs settled into their form this 
form would consecutively have rendered dormant all other potentials. Unlike mere varieties in 
 
214 Sandford, ‘Kant, race, and natural history’. 
215 ODR, 84. 
216 DCHR, 155. In the first iterations of this theory, there is an operative distinction between germs [Keime] as 
the ground of a determinate ‘unfolding’ that effects the particular parts of an organism and natural 
predispositions [natürliche Anlage] as the ground of a determinate ‘unfolding’ of the relations between parts and 
their size. However, as Phillip Sloan has shown, when the question concerning the purposive development of 
organisms is taken up in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant, likely influenced by Blumenbach, no longer 
uses the term Keime and instead appears to have reconfigured his theory of race to centre on natürliche Anlage, 
which, in turn, takes on a more dynamic role within this theory. See Phillip Sloan, ‘Performing the Categories, 
Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant’s A Priori’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 40, no.2 (April 2002), 229–53. 
217 Extensive work has been done on the extent to which Kant relied on preformationist or epigenetic theories 
of organismic development and on the possible changes in his view – that is, if the full potential for development 
was inherent in the original predisposition or if the very potentiality for development may have changed over 
the course of several generations. See Immanuel Kant, Kant and The Concept Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings, 
trans. and ed. Jon M. Mikkelsen (New York: SUNY Press, 2013). On the shifts in Kant’s own position on 
preformation and epigenesis, see John H. Zammito, ‘Kant’s Persistent Ambivalence Towards Epigenesis, 1764–
1790’, in Understanding purpose: Kant and the philosophy of biology, ed. Philippe Huneman (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2007), 51–74. 
218 LA, Friedländer, 215. 
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the species (say, the synchronically notable and also classifiable differences in eye colour or 
hair colour) Kant therefore considered racial characteristics to persistently preserve 
themselves and to invariably ‘beget half-bread young in the mixing’.219 What is important to 
note here, is that as much as the concept of  race refers to a process of  differentiation from 
a common origin, what it truly names is the result and the arrestation of  this process, the 
fixation of  the species into four different races: ‘the whites, the yellow Indians, the Negroes and 
the copper-red Americans’.220 On Kant’s understanding then, racial characteristics, in these 
essays primarily skin colour, entailed a permanent fixture within each race. We might 
therefore ask if  it is only physiological and anatomical differences that are fixed in this 
manner?  
 Kleingeld points out that while the first two of  the three essays seem to focus almost 
exclusively on the ‘physical theory of  race’, the last of  them, ‘On the use of  teleological 
principles in philosophy’, in addition decidedly includes elements of  ‘moral characterisation’ 
that inscribed within the physical theory of  racial differences a schematism for a hierarchical 
order in the capacity to reason and assume moral agency.221 The central passage that supports 
this concerns the question of  trans-climate migration after the full development of  a certain 
set of  natural predispositions. Migration after the point of  full development, so Kant argued, 
is counter to the purposiveness of  nature. Is this not confirmed, he asks, by those cases 
 
where Indians or Negroes have attempted to expand into northern regions? – Those who were driven 
there have never been able to bring about in their progeny (such as the creole Negroes or the Indians 
called Gypsies), a sort that would be fit to be sedentary farmers or manual workers.222 
 
In other words, a sort that would have not only the outer and physical requisite to live in 
such a region but also the demeanour and character which suits the kind of  work required 
for the reproduction of  life in regions in question. In the footnote to this passage, Kant cites 
a famous anti-abolitionist text which, much like Hume’s, state that even freed black slaves 
seem to lack the incitement to ‘engage in a business which one could properly call labour’.223 
The conclusion Kant draws from these observations is that just as there are ‘externally 
visible’ differences in the development of  predispositions, so there might also be ‘inner 
predispositions’ which just as little as the external ones are transformed in the course of  
trans-climatic migrations.  
 
219 ODR, 85 and DCHR 149. 
220 While Kant does not exclude that there are other races these are the four for which Kant considers there to 
have been indisputable proof that their characteristics are ‘unfailingly hereditary’. DCHR, 153. 
221 Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’, 581. 




[I]n addition to the faculty to work, there is also an immediate drive to activity (especially to the sustained 
activity that one calls industry) which is independent of  all enticement and which is especially interwoven 
with certain natural predispositions; and that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of  this 
impetus into other climates and pass it onto their offspring than was needed for their preservation in 
their old motherland and had already received from nature.224 
 
In a similar manner, the interplay of  climatic conditioning and the fixation of  a certain 
developmental path of  natural predisposition is also mobilised to explain why the ‘copper-
red Indians’ are ‘too weak for labour, too indifferent for industry and incapable of  any culture 
[unfähig zu aller Cultur]’.225 Since, for Kant, all ‘experience’ pointed to the fact that the Americas 
had been populated through migration, he considered it plausible that the original 
predispositions of  these peoples first developed in a southern climate before developing in 
an opposite direction, following migration, ultimately rendering the American race unsuited to 
any existing climate. This is the explanation given for why their race ‘ranks far below even the 
Negro, who stands in the lowest of  all the other steps that we have named as differences of  
the races’.226 What it makes clear, is that a capability to enter into a process of  culturation 
and the faculty to work form part of  Kant’s conception of  racial difference, something that 
will, in turn, come to be of  significance to his understanding of  the capacity of  humans to 
act in accordance with reason. To better understand how this is so, we will however have to 
go further back, and considered some of  Kant’s earlier reflections on the unity and 
differentiation of  the human species, since the simple assumption of  a hierarchical order 
amongst human beings within Kant’s writings precedes his explicit theorisation of  the 
concept of  race. 
 
III. Terrestrial Humanity Before the Concept of Race 
Kant was as much a teacher as he was a writer and a public intellectual, and his lectures have 
in recent years become increasingly central to new interpretations of his work, with critical 
editions of student transcripts alongside Kant’s lecture notes and manuscripts making these 
materials more readily available. This has especially been true for the lectures on geography 
and anthropology, which, prior to Kant’s publication of the essays on race, was where he in 
distinct and yet related manners constructed ideas of the human species as an object of 
knowledge. Where physical geography merely included the study of humankind from the 
perspective of what nature makes of it, anthropology centred on the human being from the 
perspective of what humans as a freely acting beings make, can make, and ought to make of 
 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid., 211, [AA. VIII:176] (my emphasis). 
226 Ibid., 211. 
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themselves.227 What united these two fields and modes of  inquiry – physical geography and 
pragmatic anthropology – was less the subject or object on which they respectively turned 
and more the manner in which this knowledge was to be put to use. Together, physical 
geography and anthropology served as the propaedeutic to what Kant alternately called a 
pragmatic Kenntnis der Welt228 and pragmatic Weltkenntniß:229 a knowledge of  the world that 
was to provide the means for orienting oneself  prudently within it. It is a mode of  knowing 
both nature as a whole and the human being as a both natural and cultured being, that implies 
not only a theoretical acquaintance with these objects but also an understanding of  how to 
put such knowledge to use: 
 
Knowledge treated pragmatically is knowledge of  the world [Weltkenntniß] and helps to form or educate 
[bilden] a man of  the world [Weltmann]. As the world, we take (1) Nature, (2) human beings. One opposes 
these to each other, because the human being is the sole freely acting being on the Earth’s surface. 
Nature and freedom are opposed to each other. In physical geography we consider nature, but in 
anthropology the human being, or human nature in all its situations. These two sciences constitute 
cognition of  the world [die Weltkenntniß].230  
 
For these reasons, Kant emphasised that his courses were not meant to serve narrow 
academic ends but might more suitably be considered part of  an education for life. While 
the opposition between freedom and nature evoked here remains central, the mode of  its 
articulation is not static but constantly negotiated and interrogated, conceptualised and re-
conceptualised, both as it pragmatically relates to how humans are to orient themselves 
within a world and, as discussed below, as a theoretically-posed question of  the purposiveness 
(the capacity to act according to ends) of  nature itself  in part two of  CPJ, ‘The Critique of  
Teleological Judgement’. If, as Holly Wilson has remarked, the relationship between Kant’s 
 
227 APPV, 231 [AA: VII:119]. As Reinhard Brandt notes, this definition – especially the focus on what humans 
ought to make of  themselves – means that the thematic of  the anthropology borders on and overlaps with that 
of  the moral philosophy even if  it, as an empirical discipline, does not systematically belong to philosophy. That 
anthropology is pragmatic means that it does not do justice to the last part of  the definition which is properly 
speaking the concern of  pure moral philosophy. Reinhard Brandt, ‘The Guiding Idea of  Kant’s Anthropology 
and the Vocation of  the Human Being’, in Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 85. There has also been much debate over the systematic 
interrelation of the lectures on geography, those on anthropology and those on empirical psychology. Holly 
Wilson, who has argued that, for Kant, anthropology formed a part of a specifically cosmopolitan philosophy, has 
also helpfully suggested that a distinction can be made between the ‘origins’ of  the anthropology lectures and 
where they ‘arose’ from: ‘the anthropology lectures arose out of  the psychology lectures, but had their origin in 
the physical geography lectures. Kant’s banning of  psychology from metaphysics initiated the movement toward 
an independent series of  lectures on anthropology, but the intent and content of  the anthropology lectures 
finds its origin in the physical geography lectures, which were initially given fifteen years prior to the start of  the 
anthropology lectures.’ Holly L. Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning and Critical Significance 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 3. 
228 ODR, 97 [AA II:443] 
229 APPV, 97 [AA VII:231]. 
230 LA, Pillau, 261. 
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Anthropology and his philosophy of  history remains somewhat uninterrogated then, I would 
argue, the connection of  his lectures on physical geography and pedagogy to his philosophy 
of  history is almost entirely overlooked.231 The following discussion therefore serves two 
primary functions: first, it accounts for what respectively characterised the perspective of 
physical geography and of pragmatic anthropology onto human beings and, second, it 
reflects on the manner in which ideas of  a hierarchical order amongst humans were 
articulated prior to the development of  the concept of  race. Out of  this I argue that, from 
the very beginning, Kant’s conception of  terrestrial humankind included the idea of  an 
educative relation amongst the populations of  the Earth. 
 Through most of his extensive teaching career (totalling 49 semesters between 1757–
96) Kant offered a highly innovate lecture series on physical geography. As he understood it, 
physical geography was the descriptive and empirical science of  all the ‘natural characteristics 
of  the globe and what is found on its surface: the seas, dry land, mountains, rivers, the 
atmosphere, human beings, animals, plants, and minerals’.232 For all of  these courses, Kant 
had been granted exceptional permission to teach directly from his own manual; the book 
which was later gathered out of  his notes for these courses forms one of  the most porous 
texts in the Kantian corpus.233 Herein, reports from missionaries, travellers, and explorers are 
compiled alongside ancient and modern treaties on the Earth; with some of  the ethnocentric 
bigotry that is reproduced and sanctioned in these texts as common knowledge also 
occasionally commented on and evaluated with varying degrees of  critical sense. And, as 
Michèle Cohen-Halimi remarks, in this manner the Geography accommodates several 
discourses of  geographical science and continuously oscillates between an encyclopaedic 
endeavour to synoptically organise a view of  the whole of  knowledge of  terrestrial humanity 
and the emergent critical project that questions the authority of  tradition and that judiciously 
seeks to parcel out the assumed from the known.234 The purpose of  the geography lectures 
 
231 Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology, 41. A notable exception to this claim, which Wilson does not appear to 
have considered, is Raphaël Lagier’s detailed analysis of Kant’s conception of the human species and that 
concept of race, which considers the overlaps of racial knowledge, anthropology and history. See chapter three 
of Raphaël Lagier, Les races humaines selon Kant (Paris: PUF, 2004), 165–87. 
232 Kant, ‘Plan and Announcement of a Series of Lectures on Physical Geography’, in Kant: Natural Science, ed. 
Eric Watkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 388. 
233 Kant’s lectures on physical geography were first published in 1802 in a highly contested edition by Friedrich 
Theodore Rink. There has been much discussion of Rink’s editorial skills, or lack thereof, but in what follows I 
will not dwell extensively on what are primarily philological issues here. Werner Stark has demonstrated that for 
the latter half of the physical geography – which contains ‘Particular Observations Concerning What is Found 
on The Earth’ – Rink reproduced the lecture manuscripts from the first years in which Kant taught physical 
geography, supplementing these by inserting a reference to Christoph Girtanner’s Über das kantiche Prinzip für die 
Naturgeschicte. See Stark, ‘Historical and Philological References’. 
234 Michèle Cohen-Halimi, ‘Le Géographie de Königsberg’, in Kant, Géographie, trans. Michèle Cohen-Halimi, 
Max Marcuzzi, and Valérie Seroussi (Paris: Aubier, 1999), 14. 
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was therefore in part ‘to make a more certain knowledge of  believable travel accounts, and 
to make this into a legitimate academic course of  study’.235 
 Although Kant throughout his life stressed the difference between the description and 
the history of  nature and, in the first instance, characterised geography as a description 
‘according to space’, whereas natural history was a description ‘according to time’ or 
‘narratives’, each of  his distinctions are highly precarious.236 The descriptive science of  the 
planetary whole found in the Geography is itself  full of  histories, such that the relation of  
geography to (natural) history might best be described as is one of  mutual convergence and 
divergence. The two tend toward each other but are not strictly speaking overlapping: 
 
History and geography extend our knowledge in relation to time and space. History concerns the events 
that have taken place one after another in time. Geography concerns phenomena that occur 
simultaneously in space. The latter has several names, depending on the different objects with which it 
is concerned. As a result, it is variously called physical, mathematical, political, moral, theological, literary 
or mercantile geography. The history of  occurrences at different times, which is true history, is nothing 
other than a consecutive geography, and thus it is a great limitation on history if  one does not know 
where something happened, or what it was like. History is thus differentiated from geography only in 
relation to time and space.237 
 
A complete systematic knowledge of  geography is rendered possible and impossible by the 
inclusion of  history since Kant, as Max Marcuzzi notes, ‘posits that geography is susceptible 
of  achieving a systematic form insofar as its object is the entire Earth. Then, he affirms that 
it is only complete when it integrates becoming, and in moving into history, which is 
impossible: it is only complete (as a system) in moving into that which makes it impossible 
(as a system).’238 It is within this highly complex theoretical terrain that the first essay on race, 
which announced the 1775 lectures on physical geography, took shape. As objects of  physical 
geography, human beings are first and foremost terrestrial beings. They are one kind among 
the many forms of  life within the planetary whole and thus are considered in the light of  
their subjection to climatic environments and the conditions of  life imposed by the terrains 
they occupy. As described in the 1756 announcement of  the series, the aim of  lectures 
dedicated to the human species was to provide a view of  and compare the visible differences 
in shape and colour of  humans in various regions of  the Earth.239 This section of  physical 
geography, focused on the human species, was to be a physical anthropology, but a rigorous 
physical anthropology was, for Kant, possible only as a history of  nature. This meant that 
 
235 Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology, 9. 
236 PG, §3, 447.  
237 PG, §4, 448-449 (AA IX:161). 
238 Max Marcuzzi: ‘Writing Space Historical Narrative and Geographical Description in Kant’s Physical 
Geography’ in Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. S. Elden and E. Mendieta (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 120. 
239 Immanuel Kant, ‘Plan and Announcement of a Series of Lectures on Physical Geography’, 393. 
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the restriction to the perspective of  what nature makes of  the human already is tenuous 
within the Geography itself, as is clear from the fact that in later iterations of  the course 
elements of  ethnography or Völkerkunde informed the addition of  a moral and political 
geography of  terrestrial humankind. In the announcement of  his lectures during the winter 
semester of  1765–66, Kant emphasised that, 
 
[t]he consideration of  these things is at once very important and also highly stimulating as well. Unless 
these matters are considered, general judgements about man would scarcely be possible. The 
comparison of  human beings with each other, and the comparison of  man today with the moral state 
of  man in earlier times, furnishes us with a comprehensive map of  the human species.240  
 
For Kant the cartographer of  the human species, this map could not be drawn in a purely 
synchronic manner and history and geography should therefore be considered confluent in 
two senses. First epistemologically, because, without a foundation in geography written 
history becomes a narrative unmoored from what secures it as a true description of  changes 
over time, ‘little more than a fairy story’.241 Second, insofar as the composition of  the Earth 
affects the formation of  territorial divides, trade routes and national industry. The 
description of  those ‘reciprocal interactions of  moral and natural forces’ which establish the 
conditions of  ‘states and nations throughout the word’ is, properly speaking, the 
prefiguration of  important elements in what will eventually be named ‘universal world 
history’.242 That is to say, even if  in a systematic division physical geography was supposed 
to merely include the study of  humankind from the perspective of  what nature makes and 
had made of  it, another perspective soon grew out of  it which would come to form the 
centre of  pragmatic anthropology: that of  what humans as a freely acting beings make of  
themselves. History in turn forms the terrain on which these two sides cannot stringently be 
held apart. In this manner, the science of  what nature makes of  human beings,243 began to 
migrate into the science of  what human beings make of  themselves, and what they make of  
what nature has made of  them. Pragmatic anthropology and pedagogy quickly became its 
necessary supplements. 
 Reading his early lectures on physical geography alongside Observations, it is also clear 
that Kant took it as a given that some hierarchical order prevailed amongst the different 
 
240 Immanuel Kant, ‘M. Immanuel Kant’s announcement of the programme of his lectures for the winter 
semester 1765–1766’, 299. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 In the later essays on race as well as in the philosophy of history, this is expressed explicitly as a question 
concerning what purposive nature makes out of humans. Strictly speaking, Kant has not at this point articulated 
the idea of purposive nature, but we might of course ask if it is not in some sense inscribed within the idea of 
natural predispositions. 
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groups of  people populating the Earth. In the so-called Holstein diktat of  the lectures on 
physical geography from c.1757–59 – in which the first speculations as to the causes of  
difference in skin colour are also to be found – a section devoted to the different ‘innate’ 
characteristics of  humans across the planet expressly connects an idea of  a hierarchy 
amongst the populations of  the Earth with that of  an educative relation between them: 
  
The inhabitant of  the temperate zone, especially in its central part, is more beautiful in body, harder 
working, more witty, more moderate in his passions, and more sensible than any other kind of  people 
in the world. Consequently, these people have always taught [belehret] the rest [of  the world], and 
vanquished them by the use of  weapons.244 
 
In this early lecture note, the outlines of  a view wherein a climatic conditioning favoured one 
portion of  humanity over all others is inscribed. What is interesting in this and infrequently 
commented on is that the the view onto humankind which the lectures on physical geography 
afforded – one of  the human being as a rational animal and as having naturally-determined 
characteristics and capacities – is also to be found in the concluding sections of  Kant’s 
Universal Natural History and Theory of  the Heavens (1755). In the tradition of  Bernard le Bovier 
de Fontenelle’s Conversations on the Plurality of  Worlds, Kant therein proposed a speculative 
argument for the existence of  life on other planets and a number of  conjectures as to what 
would characterise the intellectual capacities and bodily shapes of  such lifeforms.245 The 
context for these speculations was a set of  claims about mechanical causation and the 
interrelations of  mind and matter. Their aim was to sketch what might reasonably be 
ventured about living beings on other planets, based on the placement of  these planets in 
the solar system and therefore on their distance to the heat of  the sun. The hierarchy amongst 
humans is here prefigured by one amongst the speculative class of  rational beings populating 
the solar system, a figure which Kant would repeatedly return to. Since the human being is 
that known factor against which Kant constructs the analogical reasonings which served to 
characterise other rational lifeforms, there is indeed a crypto-physical geography of  
humankind inscribed within this text and we find here the first hints of  what will later be 
explored in great depth first in the lectures on physical geography, then in those on 
 
244 This passage is also to be found in the latter half of Rinks’ edition of Kant’s Physical Geography. See PG, 577 
[AA XXIV: 97]. 
245 Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, trans. H.A. Hargreaves (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990). This work of popular philosophy from 1686 proposes ‘conjectures’ on the 
basis of natural scientific theories in much the same way as Kant would come to do. But where Fontenelle based 
his reasonings largely on Cartesian physics, the basis of Kant’s conjectures was Newtonian. Like Fontenelle, 
Kant draws a parallel between the validity of making claims about beings on other planets and claims about 
human being in regions of the world previously unknown to Europeans. The imaginary of space-voyage already 
at its points of inception deeply intertwined with that of colonisation. 
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anthropology, and on pedagogy; namely, the several layers to that task which a sensuous 
being endowed with reason is faced with in the constant struggle with and against its mere 
animal nature.  
 
Earth and perhaps also Mars (so that we are not deprived of  the miserable consolation of  having 
companions in misery) alone lie in the dangerous middle zone where the temptation of  sensual delights 
has a strong power to lead astray against the domination of  the spirit which, however, cannot not deny 
the capacity by which it is in a position to resist them if  it did not rather please its sluggishness to allow 
itself  to be carried away by them, where there is thus the dangerous mean between weakness and 
strength, where precisely the same advantages that raise him above the lower classes place him at a 
height from which he can sink infinitely far beneath them again.246 
 
What in this early cosmological speculation is a minor aside will become, in the philosophy 
of  history and in the theory of  education, a central issue, that is, the idea of  the capacity to 
learn being premised on a preliminary disciplining of  one’s natural inclinations. And while 
the concrete theory of  man and ‘the limitations that his ability to think rationally and the 
motion of  his body that obeys this ability would suffer as a result of  the constitution of  the 
matter to which he is bound and which is proportionate to the distance from the Sun’247 reads 
like a historical curiosity today, what remains interesting is how this theory mirrors Kant’s 
conception of  a hierarchical order wherein humankind occupies the middle tier as a class of  
more or less perfected beings with reason: 
 
Human nature, which occupies as it were the middle rung on the ladder of  beings, sees itself  as being 
between the two extreme limits of  perfection, equally distant from both ends. If  the idea [Vorstellung] 
of  the most sublime classes of  rational creatures that inhabit Jupiter or Saturn arouses their jealousy 
and humiliates them by the knowledge of  their own baseness, then they can be satisfied again and 
comforted by the sight of  the low stages on the planets Venus and Mercury, which are lowered far below 
the perfection of  human nature. What an amazing sight! On the one hand, we saw thinking creatures 
among whom a Greenlander or Hottentot would be Newton, on the other hand, those who would 
admire him as an ape.248 
 
Although Kant takes care to note that the moral implications and conclusions to be drawn 
from these claims should be considered no more than mere speculations, the theme which 
they announce – of  the human a being as one which struggles against its nature to be moral 
and which has a moral obligation to do so – reverberates both within the lectures on 
anthropology and pedagogy and within the philosophy of  history. Because humans have 
reason – and here it is worth stressing that both ‘the Greenlander’ and ‘Hottentot’ are 
included in this class – they have a moral obligation to live by the laws of  that reason. What 
 
246 UNHTH, 306. 
247 UNHTH, 306. 
248 Ibid., 301 [AA I:360]. 
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follows are questions as to whether some human beings naturally struggle more or less in this 
manner and whether the capacity to learn how to ‘resist’ temptation to mere sensuous 
satisfaction is distributed equally among all groups of  humankind. In Observations, Kant 
approvingly summarises a passage from David Hume’s ‘Of  National Characters’ discussing 
the inferiority of  the ‘Negroes of  Africa’, in a manner which indicates that it is precisely the 
capacity to resist ‘sluggishness’ and thereby to assume a form of  industriousness that Kant, 
at least in these early years, considers to have been differentially distributed. Hume’s 
argument, which concerned the insufficiency of  an exclusively climatological explanation for 
differences among humans, used the example of  black Africans removed from their countries 
and forced into slavery to underscore the persistence of  certain characteristics. ‘Mr. Hume’, 
writes Kant, 
 
challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a negro has demonstrated talents, and asserts that 
among the hundreds of  thousands of  blacks who have been transported elsewhere from their countries, 
although very many of  them have been set free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who 
has accomplished something great in art or science or shown any other praiseworthy quality, while 
among the whites there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary 
gifts earn respect in the world. So essential is the difference between these two human kinds, and it 
seems to be just as great with regard to the capacities of  mind as it is with respect to color.249  
 
The racism of  this passage is not just encapsulated in the callousness with which it 
instrumentalises the transatlantic slave trade for its argumentative purpose, but clearly also 
lies in the idea of  the difference in kind between those who categorically are or are not able 
to raise themselves above their given conditions and thereby demonstrate that, amongst their 
kind, some have ‘extraordinary gifts’. Such considerations become crucial if  we want to 
assess the highly contested inscription of  race within Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. 
 Every winter semester between 1772–96, Kant offered a lecture course on 
anthropology, understood as the systematically formulated doctrine of  the knowledge of  the 
human being. These lectures on pragmatic anthropology would have been as much of  a 
novelty to the students of  Königsberg as those on physical geography. In accordance with 
common lecturing practice of  the time, during the first years they were based primarily on a 
printed textbook, in this case the third part of  Alexander G. Baumgarten’s Metaphysica and, 
specifically, the chapter concerning ‘empirical psychology’. Initially, Kant used the Metaphysica 
to articulate his own theory of  the three principal faculties of  the human mind: cognition, 
the feeling of  pleasure and displeasure, and desire. By the mid-1770s, however, these lectures 
had expanded to include a second part focused on anthropological ‘characters’ whose 
content consisted of  materials previously included in the physical geography. Therein, the 
 
249 OFBS, 59 [2:253]. 
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capacity to form a ‘character’ is described as something akin to a fourth faculty, one whose 
purpose is the modulation of  the other three, such that the formation of  character is the 
formation of  a characteristic mode of  employing and restraining the three other faculties.250 
It is in this sense, that the Anthropology is a study of  the human being from the perspective 
of  what humans as a freely acting beings make, can make and ought to make of  themselves.251 
With some variation, reflections on the characters of  persons, of  men and women, of  
national communities and the four human races, and of  the human species as a whole, 
formed the content of  this second half  of  the lecture series for as long as it ran and these 
reflections are likewise reproduced in the Anthropology, the textbook Kant published in 1798 
on the basis of  his notes.252 Because of  the relative brevity of  the entry therein on race, many 
commentators have concluded that Kant, at least when gathering his notes into book form, 
had come to the conclusion that racial difference did not as such play a role in what humans 
can make of  themselves.253 I will now turn explicitly to the question of  education and 
educability, to show why this might be a conclusion drawn all too quickly. 
 
IV. The Educability of the Human Races  
In the 1770s, Kant was also charged with delivering a course on pedagogy, which, by Prussian 
decree, had been made mandatory at all universities. While Kant does not mention these 
lectures in any of  his outlines of  the two parts that make up pragmatic knowledge of  the 
world – anthropology and physical geography – some of  the questions raised by these 
lectures overlap significantly with those of  the anthropology, especially as they concern the 
character of  the human species. A defence can therefore be mounted for viewing Kant’s 
lectures on pedagogy as an extension to those on anthropology, as a set of  practical 
experimental meditations on the principles for making the best use of  what nature makes of  
humans. In the lectures on anthropology, the Enlightenment goal of  human perfectibility 
through education is nowhere more apparent than in the 1775–76 transcripts of  the 
Anthropology Friedländer. While observations regarding the specifically human need for 
 
250 Werner Stark, ‘Historical Notes and Interpretive Questions about Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology’, in 
Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27. 
251 APPV, 231 [AA: VII:119]. 
252 For Kleingeld’s argument that he no longer supported an idea of a hierarchy among the human races, it is 
important that these differences do not make a difference to what ‘man can make of himself’. It is true that 
Kant in the preface to the Anthropology writes that ‘even knowledge of the races of human beings as products 
belonging to the play of nature is not yet counted as pragmatic knowledge of the world, but only as theoretical 
knowledge of the world’ (APPV, 232). Does this mean that race is not at stake in the anthropology? The answer 
to this question to a large extent depends upon how one interprets the ‘not yet’ of the above quote, a point to 
which I return below. 
253 See for instance Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race’ and Storey, ‘Empire and Natural Order’.  
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education (Erziehung) are scattered across the transcripts and notes for the anthropology 
lectures, the Anthropology Friedländer stands out for its concluding section ‘On Education’ or 
‘On Upbringing’, which connects the problematic of  how to provide a determinate concept 
of  the character of  the human species with a number of  observations as to the importance 
of  pedagogy for ‘the improvement of  humanity toward its perfection’.254 This is hardly 
surprising, given that Kant’s first set of  mandated lectures on pedagogy stem from this same 
period, as does his written support of  the Philanthropinum Dessau, an experimental school 
whose founder, Johann Bernhard Basedow, authored the Methodenbuch (1773) on which 
Kant’s lectures on this topic were based.255 Kant’s praise for Basedow’s institute was 
grounded largely upon the manner in which it explicitly brought into accord an idea of  the 
vocation of  the human being, not only with a notion as to the role of  education in bringing 
about the conditions for a fulfilment of  this vocation but more significantly with a 
comprehensive plan for the determination and application of  the most suitable methods 
such an education might be carried out according to.256 These lectures that, like the end of  
the Anthropology and ‘Idea for a Universal History’, contain several extended discussions of  
Rousseau’s critique of  the distorting effects of  culture upon human nature, circle around the 
questions of  how natural predispositions might best be either restrained or put to use for 
civil and civic purposes. In other words, they consider how humans as beings with a natural 
potential for reason can be given the best possible education to allow them to assume the 
task of  becoming actual rational acting and thinking beings and contribute to the formation 
of  the species as a whole. In this regard, Lectures on Pedagogy touch on one of  the central 
aspects of  Kant’s philosophy of  history, namely the idea that those natural predispositions 
whose end is the use of  reason and which among terrestrial animals are particular to humans, 
do not develop instinctively within a closed circuit (as Kant considers mere animal 
predispositions to do) but are both ungrounded and open-ended.257 Two primary 
consequences can be drawn from this assumption, one which Kant very openly pursues in 
‘Idea for a Universal History’ and one which is more implicitly at stake but which is 
nonetheless crucial for grasping the schematising function of  the concept of  race in Kant’s 
philosophy of  history. First, when measured against the immense space of  possibility which 
 
254 LA, Friedländer, 250–55. 
255 In the summer of 1780 Kant would be forced to instead use his colleague Friedrich Samuel Bock’s Lehrbuch 
der Erziehungskunst für christliche Eltern und künftige Jugendlehrer, published that same year, as the textbook for this 
course. See Manfred Kuehn, ‘Kant on Education, Anthropology, Ethics’, in Kant and Education: Interpretation and 
Commentary, ed. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (New York: Routledge, 2012), 56.  
256 This is clear from the praise of the institute in Kant’s 1775–76 lectures on anthropology, LA, Friedländer, 
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this open-ended development entails, each individual human existence is dwarfed by its 
finitude. An absolutely central aspect of  Kant’s philosophy of  history is therefore the idea 
that whereas each individual animal may realise its species determination and fully develop 
its natural predispositions, no individual human being can do so and it is only at the level of  
the species that the full development of  the natural predispositions of  terrestrial reasoned 
beings can be accomplished.258 Second, that the non-instinctive character of  the development 
of  these predispositions renders crucial different modalities of  inter-generational (and, as 
argued below, inter-racial as well as inter-national) transmission in the relay of  perfection. 
Each generation must learn, develop and teach, form and be formed, such that in a long 
sequence of  generations, humans may overall become continuously better able to fulfil the 
vocation [Bestimmung] of  their species: to live in accordance with their rational nature. 
 Nowhere does Kant assume that this process is unwavering, fully continuous, or 
grounded in the ultimate goodness of  human nature. The fabric of  history, he writes, seems 
‘woven together out of  folly, childish vanity, and often also out of  childish malice and the 
rage to destruction’.259 What is more, since one generation might lose what had been gained 
by previous ones and leave only a ‘seed of  enlightenment’ to be recovered at a later point, 
the progress toward the perfection of  the species is ‘only fragmentary (according to time) 
and offers no guarantee against regression’.260 But this does not render education and 
formation as such any less crucial to Kant’s conception of  universal history. What it does is 
rather to heighten the importance of  what is best understood as a notion of  ‘educability’: 
the very capacity to learn, to take form, and to shape a ‘second nature’ for oneself, which to 
Kant, as Manfred Kuehn has noted, is not just an important human characteristic, but ‘the 
most important one of  all’.261 Educability is not a term Kant uses, but it is implied by those 
numerous formation processes that are central to both Kant’s anthropology and his 
philosophy of  history. Caught in a difficult to translate German terminological matrix, 
Erziehung, Ausbildung, and Bildung refer back to educability as their joint condition of  
 
258 This is a point of dispute in Kant’s critique of Herder and in Herder’s reply to Kant’s critique. Where Herder 
finds the idea that perfection happens in the species and not out of the individuals relation to the species 
concept, Kant, contrary to this, emphasises that in that case, ‘species’ would be a merely logical category whereas 
‘if “the human species” signifies the whole of a series [Reihe] of generations going (indeterminably) into the infinite 
(as this meaning is entirely customary), and it is assumed that this series ceaselessly approximates the line of its 
destiny [Bestimmung] running alongside it, then it is not to utter a contradiction to say that in all its parts it is 
asymptotic to this line and yet on the whole that it will coincide with it, in other words, that no member of all 
the generations of humankind, but only the species will fully reach its destiny. The mathematician can give 
elucidation here; the philosopher would say: “The destiny of humankind is on the whole a ceaseless progress, and 
its completion is a mere idea, but very useful in all respects – the idea of a goal to which we have to direct our 
endeavors in accordance with the aim of providence.”’, RJGH, 142. 
259 IUH, 108 [AA VIII:18]. 
260 APPV, 421 [AA VII:326] (translation modified). 
261 Kuehn, ‘Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics’, 66. 
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possibility.262 The possible conceptual distinctions implied by these terms within Kant’s 
writings, are difficult to track, both in the original, since the meaning of  each is not entirely 
consistent, and even more so in English translation, wherein a tendency to treat them as 
relatively interchangeable makes it almost impossible to identify subtle differences which 
partake in conceptual distinctions. Where Erziehung and Ausbildung for the most part 
respectively imply different forms of  child rearing and concrete education263 – being taught 
either customs, manners, skills, or knowledge – Bildung is most often used in a broader sense, 
to imply either different individual processes of  formation or numerous processes of  
formation taken together as a whole.  
 In the Lectures on Pedagogy and in Anthropology, Kant distinguishes between three 
predispositions whose end is the use of  reason, each of  which corresponds to three different 
forms of  educative requirements and correspondingly three endpoints for their 
development: a technical predisposition whose telos is skill [Geschicklichkeit]; a pragmatic 
predisposition whose telos is prudence [Klugheit]; and a moral predisposition whose telos is 
morality. The process of the development of each of these predispositions is in turn called 
‘cultivation’ [Kultivierung], ‘civilisation’ [Civilisirung] and ‘moral formation’ [moralische Bildung] 
or simply ‘moralisation’ [Moralisierung] .264 This threefold division is also the refrain according 
to which, in ‘Idea for a Universal History’, it is emphasised that while the age of 
Enlightenment may be both cultivated and civilised, it is far from moralised.265 Against this 
background, a scale of  the fourfold aspects of  an education according to each predisposition, 
also allows a glimpse of  the theory of  the educability of  human beings as such: that one 
must learn first of  all to become disciplined enough to restrict one’s animal nature and learn 
to learn. This much is clear from the fourfold differentiation of  the levels of  education found 
in the Pedagogy, which spells out how one must first learn: 
 
1) How to become self-disciplined, so as to ‘prevent animality from doing damage to 
humanity, both in the individual and in society. Discipline is therefore merely the 
taming of  savagery’.266 
 
262 Kuehn alludes to the transcendental function of ‘educability’ but does not develop the conceptual distinction 
between the formation and the education of the species. Ibid. 
263 In the ‘Essays regarding the Philanthropinum’, Kant uses the term Ausbildung practically analogously with 
the use of Erziehung in Lectures on pedagogy: as the unifying term which implies a number of different modalities 
of an educative process, including ‘’discipline’, training’, ‘instruction’, ‘schooling’. EP, 102; LP, 437. 
264 APPV, 418-419 [AA VII:322-333] LP, 444 [AA IX: 449-450].  
265 ‘We are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. We are civilized, perhaps to the point of  being 
overburdened, by all sorts of  social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held 
to be already moralized.’ IUH: 116.  
266 LP, 444 [AA IX: 450]. 
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2) To become cultivated. This is the process of  learning different skills and of  becoming 
skillful, the shaping of  a faculty for carrying out a purpose one has set oneself. It does 
not concern or dictate what concrete ends are worth pursuing but fundamentally 
concerns the procurement of  the means for carrying out ends. Because there are a 
multitude of  ends, there is likewise a multitude of  skills and the determination of  which 
skills are to be learned largely depends on ones future rank in society and on what one 
has a natural predisposition for.  
 
3) To become civilized or acquire the capacity to act prudently. This is the acquisition of  
the prerequisite knowledge for navigating human societies in accordance with 
established manners. It is this form of  knowledge which the anthropology in part is 
meant to convey in its focus on ‘national character’, such that students might be better 
placed when faced with manners different from their own. This is the realm of  what 
we might call ‘cultural differences’ in Kant.  
 
4) To nurture the predisposition to become moralised. This last step differs in character 
from the others in that one cannot, properly speaking, be taught to be moralised. It is 
something a moral agent does freely. The function of  education here is rather to foster 
a good disposition toward moralisation, such that the human being will ‘choose nothing 
but good ends’, which is to say ends that ‘are necessarily approved by everyone and 
which can be the simultaneous ends of  everyone’.267 
 
In the so-called Menschenkunde, a text composed on the basis of  anthropology lectures given 
in the early 1780s, one of the starkest racial hierarchies mapped out by Kant, is articulated 
precisely in the vocabulary of  Bildung as a formative process that breaks with mere natural 
inclination. Therein, the differentiated capacities of  the different races to enter into such 
processes on their own incentive is precisely what is at stake, and the different levels overtly 
repeat the different levels of  education outlined above:  
 
1) The American people acquires no culture [Bildung]. It has no incentives; because affect and passion 
are absent in it. They are not in love, thus they are also not fertile. They hardly speak at all, do not caress 
one another, also do not care for anything, and are lazy, they paint their faces in an ugly manner.  
 
2) The Negro race, one could say, is exactly the opposite of  the American; they are full of  affect and 
passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They acquire culture, but only a culture of  slaves; that is, they 
 
267 LP, 444 [AA IX: 450]. 
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allow themselves to be trained. They have many incentives, are also sensitive, afraid of  beatings, and 
also do many things out of  honour. 
 
3) It is true that the Hindus have incentives, but they have a strong degree of  composure, and they all 
look like philosophers. Despite this, they are nevertheless very much inclined toward anger and love. As 
a result they acquire culture in the highest degree, but only in the arts and not in the sciences. They 
never raise it up to abstract concepts; a great Hindustani man is the one who has gone very far in deceit 
and who has a lot of  money. The Hindus always remain as they are, they never bring culture further, 
although they began to cultivate [bilden] themselves much earlier. 
 
4) The white race contains all incentives and talents in itself; as a result it must be considered in a bit 
more detail. Information concerning it is given above. Whenever any revolutions have occurred, they 
have always been brought about by the whites, and the Hindus, Americans, and Negroes have never 
participated in them. All of  Europe, the Turks, and the Kalmucks belong to the white race. Under the 
whites one could make the division of  the Oriental and Occidental kinds [Schlages].268  
 
This hierarchy that divides those who do not acquire Bildung, those who can be formed but 
only into slaves, those who shape themselves according to highly refined forms but who 
stagnate there, and those who shape themselves according to all the natural predispositions 
for reason reflects a differentiation in the educability of  the different human races. The 
centrality of  capacities, limitations, and stagnations within different strata of  Bildung is crucial 
for any attempt to situate the natural historical characterisations of  races in relation to the 
universal world history of  peoples. That some are incapable of  Bildung – as a result of  the 
development of  their germs and predispositions – essentially entails that they have not been 
able to develop the means for restraining and reshaping their natural inclinations. It is not, 
then, that Kant considered there to be different forms of  transcendental frameworks for 
different races, nor that he considered other races to be devoid of  reason as such. But what 
he did maintain was that something in the natural historical determination of  each of  these 
groups of  humans either aggravated or tamed those ‘deficiencies’ which cause all humans, 
as animals with rationality, to fall short of  the demands of  reason. In the published 
Anthropology, Kant explicitly ties such a deficiency – not in reason or the understanding as 
such but in the way in which it is exercised or executed – to questions that concern civil and 
therefore political maturity: 
 
An understanding that is in itself  sound (without mental deficiencies) can still be accompanied by 
deficiencies with regard to its exercise, deficiencies that necessitate either a postponement until the growth 
to proper maturity, or even the representation [Stellvertretung] of  one’s person through that of  another in 
regard to matters of  civil nature. The (natural or legal) incapacity of  otherwise sound human beings to 
use his own understanding in civil affairs is called immaturity [Unmündigkeit].269 
 
 
268 Immanuel Kant, Menschenkunde, in Lectures on Anthropology, ed. Allan W. Wood and Robert B. Louden 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 320–21. 
269 APPV, 315 [AA VII 208]. 
 90 
This is the reason educability forms the prism through which we should be reading the essays 
on race, and why we have to carry that consideration through to the philosophy of  history. 
Because this is where race come to matter and has consequences in a conception of  a 
restricted capacity to impose the constraints necessary to educate oneself  which entails either 
a postponement of  self-representation or infinite guardianship. Which of  the two scenarios 
outlined are we then presented with in the philosophy of  history?  
 Since Kant considered the teleological end of  history to be the transformation of  a 
‘crude natural capacity for moral discrimination’ into an actual moral regard for duties and 
rights and, with it, the transformation of  a ‘pathologically compelled agreement to form a 
society finally into a moral whole’,270 what we have to ask is, are such transformations 
predicated on postponing the self-legislation of  peoples considered dependent on an 
educational process? Or, are they predicated on a perpetual state of  representation in which 
guardianship of  the cosmopolitan whole is entrusted to a select population? Both appear to 
be possible because they present, to my view, two primary interpretational options for 
understanding, in the Menschenkunde, the fourfold difference in the educability of  the human 
races – between those who acquire no culture; those who can be trained; those who acquire 
culture to the highest degree; and those who acquire both culture to the highest degree and 
the capacity to abstractly conceptualize it. Through the first of  these interpretational prisms, 
the fixation at a certain moment of  the development of  some germs and predispositions 
over and above others entails that for some races, no process of  cultivation or education is at 
all possible. This would seem to entail a number of  sinister consequences in terms of  the 
idea of  a permanent social and political organisation of  the world under white supremacy.271 
Through the second, the limitation in educability is not to be understood as permanent tout 
court but as a limitation of  what, within each race, those who belong thereto can make of  
themselves. That is, as something which, through the proper training and education from those 
who have already acquired a certain base level of  cultivation, might be impart to them. Where 
some of  Kant’s statements seem to hint at the first option, a note concerning the global 
prospect of  a historical progression of  the human species toward perfection, found among 
the loose sheets of  teaching notes for Kant’s anthropology lectures, hints at the latter:  
 
 The Oriental nations [orientalischen Nationen] would never on their own accord – 
We must seek the continuous progress of  humankind toward perfection in the occident, and from there 
its dissemination around the Earth [Verbreitung auf  der Erde suchen].272 
 
270 IUH (2007), 111 [AA VIII:21]. 
271 This is largely the interpretation which ensues from the argument presented in Tsenay Serequeberhan 
‘Eurocentrism in philosophy: The case of Immanuel Kant’, The Philosophical Forum 27:4 (1996), 333–56. 
272 Kant, Refl.1501, [AA XV:788-89]. Erich Adickes, the editor of Kant’s this part of Kant’s Nachlass, dates this 
reflection to a period between 1775–83. A similar diagnosis of the stasis of ‘Oriental peoples’ is found in the 
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There are two important aspects of  this brief  reflection, which enlists ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ 
for equally demographic and geographic purposes. First, with the idea of  a divide between 
Oriental and Occidental nations, Kant is not making a claim to a racial difference but to a 
difference within the white race, between those peoples united into civil wholes within the 
Middle East and North-East Eurasian regions, on the one side, and those in Western Europe, 
on the other.273 Does the fact that no other race is mentioned in the context of  this question 
mean that, by default, white humanity constitutes the population that guides progression in 
history? And, further, that the issue at stake is merely which part amongst them are the 
forerunners? Or, do racially determined differences not make themselves present in a 
manner, which concerns the political organisation of  the world?  
 Second, the passage is ambiguous with respect to the concluding reference on the 
dissemination of  progress toward perfection – most notably with respect to the means of  
dissemination. The following inquiry into the function of  geography within Kant’s 
philosophy of  history takes its cues from such ambiguities, since these are the issues through 
which its peculiar globality enters the frame, guided by the idea that ‘whole scope of  all the 
peoples on Earth […] will gradually come to participate in progress’.274 The question of  the 
dissemination of  the continuous progress of  humankind toward perfection ‘around the Earth’ 
can fruitfully be treated in conjunction with Kant’s anthropological perspective on the 
education of  humankind in the philosophy of  history. 
 
V. The Teleological Function of Culture  
There are three textual sites that are key for developing an understanding of  the full 
significance of  the claim that some groups within the human species have no or a limited 
capacity for Bildung, to Kant’s philosophy of  history: first, the Anthropology; second, the essays 
on universal world history; and third, because of  its centrality to the core arguments of  both 
the essays on race and those on history, the Critique of  the Power of  Judgement. The central claim 
in ‘Idea for a Universal History’ is that if  the perspective of  humankind as a species is 
 
lecture transcripts from the anthropology Friedländer (1775/76), the anthropology Pillau (1777/78) and in 
Menschenkunde (c.1781/82). The first sentence is ambiguous and it is unclear if it is poorly formulated, unfinished, 
or both. In his comments on this passage, Bernasconi translates ‘Die orientalischen Nationen würden sich aus sich selbst 
niemals’ as: ‘The oriental nations would never improve themselves on their own’. Bernasconi, ‘Will the Real 
Kant’, 18.  
273 This is clear from the way in which the Oriental–Occidental divide is drawn in the context of Kant’s 
discussion of racial difference in the lecture transcripts from the courses on anthropology: ‘All of Europe, the 
Turks, and the Kalmucks belong to the white race [and] under the Whites one could make the division between 
Occidental and Oriental kinds [Schlages]’. Kant, Menschenkunde, 320–21. 
274 CF, 304. 
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assumed, history can become rationally comprehended through the regulative idea of  an ‘aim 
of  nature’ that works itself  out therein – this claim is repeated in the appendix to ‘Toward 
Perpetual Peace’ where it concerns nature’s ‘guarantee’ for the arrival at peaceful 
cosmopolitical co-existence among the states on Earth. Kant grounds this claim on two 
related presuppositions. The first concerns natural teleology, that ‘[a]ll natural predispositions 
[Naturanlagen] of  a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and 
purposively [zweckmäßig]’.275 The second concerns human finitude and, as already discussed, 
entails that these predispositions are never fully realised within a single individual but only in 
the species. As Henry E. Allison has emphasised, neither those natural-organic 
predispositions that account for its development in determinate ways, nor the opposition of  
the species’ and individual’s realisation of  these predispositions can be considered anything 
other than dogmatic if  taken in separation from the analytic of  teleological judgment in 
Critique of  the Power of  Judgement.276 In the analytic, teleological judgments are explicitly stated 
to function as a supplement to causal explanations. They ‘serves us as one more principle for 
bringing nature’s appearances under rules in those cases where the causal laws of  nature’s 
mere mechanism are not sufficient to allow us to do so’.277 In this manner, ‘the thread of  
natural purposiveness connects the cosmopolitan politics in Kant’s philosophy of  history 
through the transcendental apparatus, to the ‘situated’ man of  the anthropology, and the 
thread carries the tension between the two’.278 The distinction between discipline and 
cultivation evoked in the Critique of  the Power of  Judgement is subsumed under the concept 
culture as, respectively, the ‘culture of  discipline [(Cultur der Zucht (Disciplin)]’ and the ‘culture 
of  skill [Cultur der Geschicklichkeit]’,279 in precisely those sections wherein the perspective 
changes from a natural-historical system of  nature to a historical system of  world history. 
The context for this shift is a discussion of  what Kant calls the ultimate and final purpose 
of  nature, a distinction which in itself  requires a little explanation. The purposiveness of  
nature as a whole is expressed in the maxim for judgment: ‘Everything in the world is good 
for something or other, nothing is gratuitous’.280 Judgements about the purposive structure 
of  nature as a whole are not based on something given to us in experience (unlike our 
 
275 IUH, 109. [AA VIII:19] 
276 Henry E. Allison, ‘Teleology and History in Kant: The Critical Foundations of Kant’s Philosophy of History’ 
in Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, ed. Amélie Rorty and James Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 28. 
277 CPJ, 236, [AA V: 360] 
278 Storey, ‘Empire and Natural Order’, 696. Storey’s argument for the continued weakening of the epistemic 
status of teleological judgements is insightful in many ways, but it seems to fail to consider that the practical 
relevance of such judgements as ideals might be more consistent than their theoretical relevance. 
279 CPJ, § 83, 319 [AA V: 431–32] 
280 Ibid. 
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judgements regarding organisms which only become possible mediated through a concept 
of  reason). Judgements regarding nature as a system of  purposes are derivative, dependent 
on a transfer of  our assumptions regarding the contingency of  organisms to the contingency 
of  the ‘world as a whole’.281 Here we have moved from a judgment regarding the 
purposiveness of  an inner form to that regarding the purposiveness of  an existing being for 
something else. It is in the specification of  the manner and conditions under which we can 
judge nature as a system of  means and ends – grass as purposed for oxen, oxen as purposed 
for man – that the distinction between final and ultimate ends of  nature is brought to the 
fore and that the place of  man within the system is attributed a special point of  reference.  
 The distinction between the ultimate purpose and the final purpose (end) of  nature 
rests on their respective placements, internally and externally, to the system of  nature as a 
whole. When we regard something as a natural purpose, when we consider organisms, these 
can be taken either as organised according to an end internal to the thing itself  (each 
organism making up a specific part–whole relation), or they can be considered as a means 
serving something else, as a link in the chain of  external purposiveness (each organism a part 
of  a whole). In the former, we might consider the organism as such to be a ‘final purpose’, 
that is, ‘a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of  its possibility’.282 In this 
sense it is an unconditioned purpose. But, as a link in the chain of  purposiveness, each 
organism also appears conditioned as a purpose for something else. Indeed, from the 
perspective of  nature as a whole, taken as one purposive system, we cannot locate ‘any being 
that could claim the distinction of  being the final purpose of  creation’.283 The idea of  this 
system, leads us beyond the world of  sense so that the unity of  a supersensible principle 
must be considered valid not merely for ‘certain species’ of  natural beings but for the whole 
of  nature as a system. This idea of  a final purpose was introduced as the scopus (goal or aim) 
of  nature. Insofar as nature is not directly conceived of  as a self-conscious system, the 
purpose must be considered as ascribed to it from without and as one that itself  lies beyond 
nature, as a supersensible beyond the limits of  experience.284 The final purpose, that which 
serves nothing else as a means, is identified as the moral vocation of  mankind, ‘the highest 
good in the world’.285 The Kantian teleology of  history is a development of  the formal 
 
281 Ibid., §75, 281. In the dialectic of teleological judgement, when treating teleological versus mechanistic 
explanations of nature, Kant denies that probability has any relevance, since ‘we are concerned with judgements 
of pure reason’. But this is specifically in the context of a discussion about the intending subject, not about the 
ideas of purposiveness as such. See, ibid. 
282 Ibid., §84, 322. 
283 Ibid., §82, 313. 
284 Ibid., §67, 258; Allison ‘Teleology and History in Kant’, 35. 
285 CPJ, §84, 323. 
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conditions for the realisation of  this aim.286  
 As the bearer of  a moral vocation and the final (moral rather than natural) end of  
nature, it is also in relation to mankind that the ultimate end or purpose of  nature is to be 
defined. This ultimate purpose ‘here on Earth’ is at one point defined as: ‘the purpose by 
reference to which all other natural things constitutes a system of  purposes’.287 In this 
manner, the structure of  Kant’s teleological system is organised with ultimate reference to a 
single point internal to the system. This point in turn has a final reference to a supersensible 
outside, beyond the bounds of  experience.288 An important caveat, here, is that the reflective 
character of  teleological judgements means that they, by taking our discursive (conceptual 
and intuitional) cognitive apparatus into consideration, assert only that the way we (beings 
that share transcendental conditions of  experience) can conceive of  organisms is in terms 
of  final causes, Endursachen.289 Not that this must, beyond our capacity for cognition, be the 
case. But that we judge in this manner means that internal to these judgements ‘man is the 
ultimate purpose of  creation here on Earth, because he is the only being on Earth who can 
form a concept of  purposes and use his reason to turn an aggregate of  purposively 
structured things into a system of  purposes’.290 Embedded within the system of  purposes, 
Kant conceives of  human beings as the prime perceiver of  it as a form of  unification. 
 That humankind has the capacity and, indeed, the subjective necessity to judge 
teleologically but also the capacity to act in accordance with a concept or an idea, prompts 
Kant to ask further what it is ‘within man himself  that is a purpose and that he is to further 
through his connection with nature’.291 What purpose, in other words, might we, through the 
optics of  teleological systematisation, detect nature as furthering through and in man as a 
species? Kant answers this question through reference to ‘what produces in rational beings 
an aptitude for purposes’ – a point from which a rupture from nature is effectuated as 
‘culture’.292 It is important, here, not to prematurely substantialise the idea of  culture since 
 
286 While the issue isn’t at the forefront of the Critique of the Power of Judgement, there is a specific temporality to 
the ideas of purposive structures because the idea of an end determines the means working towards it. 
287 CPJ, §83, 317. 
288 The question of intentionality is thereby projected onto to supersensible: ‘The purposiveness that we must 
presuppose even for cognising the inner possibility of many natural things is quite unthinkable to us and is 
beyond our grasp unless we think of it, and of the world as such, as a product of an intelligent cause (a God).’ 
Ibid., §75, 282. 
289 Ibid., §82, 316. 
290 Ibid., §82, 314. 
291 Ibid., §83, 317. On the surface, this clashes with the strong assertion in Kant’s moral philosophy that humans 
are to be considered as ends in themselves, never as a means. But if the final aim is moral then these sections 
can be understood as an attempt to understand how nature might indirectly work towards a moral aim. See 
Henry E Allison, ‘Freedom, Happiness, and Nature: Kant Moral Teleology (CPJ §§83–4, 86–7)’, in Kant’s Theory 
of Biology, ed. Ina Goy and Eric Watkins (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 221–38. 
292 CPJ, §83, 319. This assertion is part of the extended debate with Herder over what constitutes the purpose 
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what is primary, for Kant, is the cultivation process rather than its endpoint.293 This means 
that, once again, the educative substrate to the idea of  cultural progression becomes 
absolutely central. 
 Culture, then, is conceived of  as having an explicit teleological function for nature and 
is the highest natural purpose. The split introduced into the category of  culture – between a 
culture of  skill and a culture of  discipline – is central here. Where a culture of  skill signifies 
the formation of  both the will to realise an end and the actual practical skill that would give 
one a capacity to do so, a culture of  discipline signifies the development of  the ability to 
tame the immediate demands of  one’s desires and inclinations and marks the divide between 
animal and rational being. It is what raises the human being above ‘mere animal instinct’. 
Culture, then, is twofold: the capacity to set an end and the capacity to restrain impulses in 
order to work toward that end. It is the discipline of  animality within all humans. The natural 
impulses (hunger, tiredness, etc.) guide us insofar as they remind us that we must take care 
of  our bodies, but this does not mean we should allow them to rule over us. To have a culture 
of  discipline is to not subject oneself  to the ‘despotism of  desire’, but to resist or give in 
according to what the ‘purposes of  reason’ require.294 These two culturation processes 
interact, in history, in intricate ways. Where a culture of  discipline is said to have a ‘civilising 
if  not moralising effect’ on humankind, a culture of  skill is, at first sight, most central to 
Kant’s teleology of  history. It is through skill that the material conditions for the formation 
of  certain societal structures come into being, structures that are, for Kant, central to the 
study of  history.295 A culture of  skill is understood to be necessary to reach the stage where 
the condition for nature to achieve its final aim, Endabsicht, is achieved: ‘a specific form of  
freedom enabling constitution’ with ‘lawful authority within a whole called civil society’. The 
stability of  this constitution, in turn, is secured only in ‘a cosmopolitan whole, a system of  all 
 
of man. Already in the review of Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity, Kant critiqued Herder’s notion 
that happiness might be said to make up this purpose. Kant’s contra-argument is based on three points, that are 
discussed in greater depth in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. Firstly, that since the concept of what constitutes 
happiness is inherently bound to the specific circumstances of each individual, the realisation of happiness is 
depended on the individual conception of the meaning of the term and there is therefore no lawfulness to its 
purposiveness. Secondly, because of the difficulty of achieving happiness, it is never a state that is definitively 
reached: ‘for it is not his nature to stop processing and enjoying at some point and be satisfied’ ⁠. And thirdly, 
because nature in man, his dispositions (the mania for domination and the mania for possession), either works 
against happiness and, thereby, nature as such would not be able to achieve is purpose if it was human happiness, 
or, if it is the goal of nature, nature would be doing a really poor job at achieving it. Kant, CPJ, §83, 318 (AK 
430–31). 
293 For a more detailed account of Kant’s idea of culture as the ultimate end of nature see Pauline Kleingeld, 
Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants, (Würzburg: Köngingshauser und Neumann, 1995) 44-47. 
294 CPJ, §83, 319. 
295 Discussed above in relation to the essays ‘Idea for a Universal History’ and ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’. 
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states that are in danger of  affecting one another detrimentally’.296 In this way, the teleology 
of  universal history is understood as the manner in which nature, in and through human 
kind, works toward a moral end. But, the culture of  skill out of  which the cosmopolitan 
whole is generated rests first on the culture of  discipline, without it, the culture of  skill 
cannot, so to speak, get off  the ground. Where no self-restraint exists, no skills can be 
developed. 
 
VI. Two Ideas of Education in Kant’s Philosophy of History 
Much of  what is here addressed as the context of  race, educability, and moral predispositions 
has a prehistory in a neighbouring issue within Kant studies; namely, the problem of  how to 
conceive of  historical moral development from within the framework of  Kantian ethics.297 
Rarely, however, has the concept of  race or the essays and lectures that relate thereto been 
taken into consideration within this particular literature. In part, this is because such texts, as 
already mentioned, are frequently considered to fall within the purview of  the natural, not 
moral, ends of  human beings. However, since moral development concerns both how the 
development of  a moral predisposition, rather than morality itself, can be furthered and how 
one might conceive of  the relations between moral and natural determinations, such a strict 
division, as this chapter has endeavoured to argue, is theoretically unsatisfactory.  
 In the third part of  the essay ‘On the Common Saying’ (1793), Kant makes an appeal 
to the duty to improve the conditions for moralisation on behalf  of  posterity, as a duty to 
morally educate others, such that the predisposition towards morality is advanced and one 
therefore makes good on the practical assumption that since ‘humankind is constantly 
advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as progressing 
toward what is better with respect to the moral end of  its existence.’298 This accord (and 
potential discord) between different forms of  technical, pragmatic, and moral progression is 
likewise at the heart of  the philosophy of  history as it is inscribed in the final sections of  
Anthropology. By turning to the anthropological perspective on these issues, it is possible to 
demonstrate how Kant maintains a racial differentiation within the notion of  educability. 
 As Kant outlines in the Anthropology, in accordance with his other explorations of  the 
concept, universal world history concerns humankind not as ‘all of  the individuals 
(singulorum)’ but at the level of  the ‘species as a whole, that is, collectively (universorum)’299. The 
 
296 CPJ, §83, 320 (AK 433). 
297 It is this perspective which Pauline Kleingeld’s study of Kant’s philosophy of history places particular 
emphasis on. See Kleingeld Fortschritt und Vernunft and Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant, History, and Moral 
Development’ in History of Philosophy Quarterly 16, no.1 (January 1999), 59–80. 
298 OCS, 306. 
299 APPV, 423.  
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‘idea’ of  universal world history thereby describes a developmental process guided by 
purposive nature, wherein a set of  world political and economic conditions are established 
such that humans may overall and generationally be better able to fulfil the vocation 
(Bestimmung) of  their species: to live in accordance with their rational nature and fully develop 
the technical, pragmatic, and moral predispositions (Anlagen) of  reason. Again, universal 
world history is the history of  the establishment of  the conditions under which humanity 
might become not only ‘cultivated’ and ‘civilised’ but also ‘moralised’. There are two central 
steps to this process: the establishment of  a lawfully organised civil whole and the 
establishment of  lawfully organised relations between different civil wholes. As such, 
universal world history is the history of  the establishment of  a globe-spanning juridical order 
in which the anarchy of  inter-state relations is replaced by a lawful system regulating external 
relations between states. Since Kant readily admits that this process can be fluctuating, the 
assertion that history unfolds according to an end of  nature is best understood as a practically 
motivated assumption, meant to orient political and moral agents toward the general 
improvement of  the conditions of  humanity. It is an assumption which further entails that 
a future historian might at some point be able to write a systematic and teleologically organised 
history of  the civil constitutional and internationally legislative steps taken to ensure the 
continued approximation of  humankind to its vocation.300 The famous cosmopolitan whole 
– the establishment of  which Kant at various points describes as the cessation of  an 
international state of  barbarism – is, what would allow for sustained peaceful co-existence 
on Earth, such that individual states might be free to undertake that ‘long inner labour […] 
for the formation [Bildung] of  its citizens’, which the final step toward the moralisation of  
human beings requires.301 The arrival of  both the writer and the object to be written about, 
of  both the historian and cosmopolitanism, may be hoped for because the full development 
of  natural predispositions in humankind might be working itself  out through what otherwise 
seems to hinder the establishment a peaceful global social order: a particular predisposition 
to social antagonism, or what Kant called unsocial sociability.302 Through the expression of  this 
predisposition in war, Kant writes, nature drives humans ‘after many devastations, reversals, 
 
300 On Allison’s reading, the idea of reason that is the ‘idea’ of universal world history with a cosmopolitan aim 
is explicitly a theoretical idea guiding historiographical practice and not a practical ideal presumed as a guide for 
action. While it is true that it implies its future use as a theoretical idea whose function is to orient how ‘a 
philosopher might conceive this history in the endeavour to attain a synoptic comprehension of it’, I do not 
here consider this to be its primary function, nor do I believe Kant did so. This is attested to by the conclusion 
to the essay on universal world history, where Kant writes that the historiographic aspect is only a small motive 
for the attempt to produce such a history (namely for attempting, not to write it, but to bring it about). Allison, 
‘Teleology and History in Kant’, 24. 
301 IUH, 116 [AA VIII:26]. 
302 Ibid., 111 [AA VIII:20].  
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and even thoroughgoing exhaustions of  their powers […] to what reason could have told 
them even without much sad experience: namely to go beyond a lawless condition of  savages 
and enter into a Völkerbund’.303 Where humans fail to better themselves, nature may step in 
with a harsher education, forcing a disciplinary process from which improvement might 
proceed. 
 This is given greater specificity in the second part of  The Conflict of  the Faculties, where 
it signifies the history of  the political and legal union of  peoples and states, a history that 
concerns the ‘totality of  human beings united socially on Earth and apportioned into peoples 
(universorum)’.304 Where natural terrains, habitats and, local environments influence the 
development of  inherent predispositions that defined the determinate terrestrial elements 
for the distinction between different races, the different collective character of  ethnic groups 
is here woven out of  and revealed within a shared language, social norms, mores, and religion 
as unified within a separate political state and, therefore, occupying a definite geographic 
territory. ‘By the word Volk (populous)’, Kant writes in the Anthropology, ‘is meant the number 
of  human beings united in a region, insofar as they constitute a whole. This number, or even 
a part of  it that recognises itself  as united into a civil whole through common ancestry, is 
called a nation (gens).’305 It is law, the domain of  validity as well as its enforcement, which 
unifies a moment of  internal heterogeneity within a people so as to establish a harmonious 
set of  external relations. To see how this plays out, we might momentarily consider the 
division Kant introduces in The Metaphysics of  Morals, between active and passive citizenship.  
 While the only qualification for being a citizen is being fit to vote, the criteria of  being 
fit to vote comes with several conditions, the first and foremost being the independence of  the 
one who is to vote. This independences of  the citizen, consists in him ‘owing his existence 
and preservation to his own rights and powers as a member of  the commonwealth, not the 
choice of  another among the people’.306 Because this is not the case for the majority of  the 
people united under common laws, Kant introduces a split between active and passive 
citizenship. In the example provided, we get a fuller sense both of  the distribution of  active 
and passive citizenship and of  what is entailed by ‘independence’. Among those who cannot 
be said to be independent, Kant names: all women, minors, apprentices in the service of  
merchants or artisans, domestic servants (though not civil servants), artisan workers without 
their own shop, and private tutors. For some of  these (women, minors, apprentices, and 
domestic servants) their passive citizenship is partly grounded in their being dependent on 
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others for food and protection. For this reason, they lack ‘civil personality’ and their existence 
is, as Kant puts it, ‘mere inherence’.307 However, for this group, the problem is not primarily 
a question of  their ‘independence’. The lack of  civil personality should be understood in 
reference to one of  the attributes of  the active citizen. Writing of  the essential ‘civil equality’ 
among active citizens, Kant describes this as the state of  ‘not recognising among the people 
any superior with the moral capacity to bind him as a matter of  right in a way that he could 
not in turn bind the other’.308 In light of  this passage, the lack of  civil personality is best 
understood as reflective of  an inscription within unequal moral relations, where the husband, 
father, or master has the capacity to ‘bind’ in a way that is not symmetrical equalled. In short, 
those lacking civil personality are considered minoritarian citizens under the custody of  
others. The second group in the example (artisans without workshops, farmers without land 
and teachers without public schools) are what Kant calls ‘underlings’ (Handlanger) of  the 
commonwealth and more concretely illustrate what is meant by a lack of  ‘civil independence’, 
since the conditions under which they can sustain their existence entails a direct dependence 
upon a specific other, whose influence might come to dominate over them. By way of  example, 
in contrast to the workshop-owner, who mediates his business through the market to a number 
of  clients, the artisan, who has to regularly seek out clients and be engaged directly, comes 
‘under the direction or protection of  other individuals’ and therefore cannot be said to 
possess civil independence.309 
  While all are technically citizens under the commonwealth, not all are citizens in the 
technical sense. The divide between active and passive citizenship ensures a division between 
those who are voting citizens, therefore able to participle in the authorship of  the law, and 
those who are merely ‘associates’ of  the constitution. What is important in this is that the 
distribution of  active and passive citizenship is not settled once and for all. In fact, part of  
the reason for Kant making explicit that the category of  citizenship extends to all the subjects 
of  the law while at the same time introducing a divide between active and passive citizenship 
– rather than, say, retain a distinction between citizens and non-citizens – is precisely to keep 
open the possibly for a change in this distribution. To this effect, the only real limitation that 
this paragraph posits concerns the safeguarding of  the formal possibility for anyone to change 
their standing in society and thereby to move from passive to active citizenship (this 
presumably also entails that active citizenship can be lost): 
 






natural laws of  freedom and of  the equality of  everyone in the people corresponding to this freedom, 
namely that anyone can work his way up from this passive condition to an active one.310 
 
Of  course, this leaves open a question as to whether both the lack of  ‘civil personality’ and 
the lack of  ‘civil independence’ can be overcome, or if  there is a divide within the dived 
between active and passive citizens such that some, after all, would be considered to be 
irredeemable trapped within the category of  passive citizenship. One might suspect that the 
latter could be the case for women and people of  colour for, while children eventually grow 
up and apprentices eventually graduate, sex and race are categories of  identity that, for Kant, 
implied unfailingly hereditary characteristics.311 For the sake of  the present argument, what 
needs to be emphasised is that the movement from passive to active citizen and the 
conditions under which this movement can be carried out are the fundamental issues which, 
in the philosophy of  history, are transposed from individual citizens to an organised social 
whole before being elevated to the level of  inter-state relations in the idea of  
cosmopolitanism. 
 The cosmopolitan whole that Kant envisioned, the ‘progressive organisation of  
citizens of  the Earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically 
united’,312 entailed a conception of  cosmopolitan law that joins the two traditional 
dimensions of  public law – constitutional law (which codifies and legislates over the citizen-
sovereign relation within a delineated territory) and international law (which codifies modes 
of  engagement between sovereign bodies as well as between individual citizens from 
different states) – as the third dimension that related to as members of  a universal state of  
humankind.313 Cosmopolitan law is the law of  world citizens, irrespective of  their 
homeland.314 But, just as in the case of  national citizenship, while the ‘boundaries of  right 
are determined by Kant’s distinction between internal and external relations, and although 
the distinction itself  is conceptual, it can be given content only anthropologically’.315 What, 
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311 Since the concern here is the notion that one must be educated to citizenship, I am not going to expand upon 
questions of citizenship and identity. This point has garnered significant attention in secondary discussions of 
Kant’s political philosophy, especially as regards the place and moral worth of women. In it in relation to this 
topic, Kleingeld gives a full discussion of Kant’s bias against women and argues that contemporary inclusions 
of gender-neutral language when we are trying to get at Kant’s own position blurs this bias and therefore renders 
us less equipped to deal with it as a problem. See Pauline Kleingeld, ‘The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral 
Language in The History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant’, The Philosophical Forum 25, no.2 (winter 1993), 134–
150. Unfortunately, in light of the excellence of this article, it does not seem that Kleingeld is willing to accept 
that an analogous argument might be produced in relation to Kant’s racial bias. 
312 APPV, Handschrift addition, 429. 
313 TPP, 324. 
314 Soraya Nour Sckell, ‘A Cosmopolitan Law Created by Cosmopolitan Citizens: The Kantian Project Today’ , 
in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew C. Altman (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017), 596. 
315 Hedrick, ‘Race, Difference, and Anthropology’, 256. 
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then, does this mean for the porous relation between a Kantian conception of  race and of  
nation? 
 One striking feature of  the Anthropology is that while it only briefly addresses the 
pragmatic significance of  race, it extensively treats the subdivision of  the national character 
of  European nations that sit under the category of  white racial lineage. One possible 
explanation of  this exclusionary focus is found in the extended citation from the 
Menschenkunde discussed above, wherein the transition from a discussion of  race to a 
discussion of  nationality is effected through the conclusion that since ‘the white race 
possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself […], we must examine it somewhat more 
closely.’316 Another possible explanation is that while national characteristics specifically are 
said to be derived primarily from cultural distinctness, this is the case only for those nations 
in which a certain level of  cultural development has been reached – in this sense, Kant writes 
that it is only to the French and the English that national character proper can be attributed. 
For all others, a mixture of  natural and cultural determinations, of  national and racial 
limitations and potentials, will guide what such a people can make of  themselves. In other 
words, their non-inclusion in the Anthropology reflects a highly normative set of  assumptions 
inscribed within the idea of  what a true national character is composed of, with only a 
fraction of  the world’s population truly qualifying as such.317 And yet, Kant does specify, 
again and again, that what is special about humankind as opposed to other living species is 
that the entire species progresses in perfection. Despite serious consideration of  the racism 
and race theory enveloped within this teleological conception of  history, this is what causes 
scholars like Louden to conclude that the  
 
ideal of  a truly universal moral community where all people count remains the most important single 
legacy of  Kant’s ethics […] Kant’s writings in anthropology and empirical ethics do not tarnish this 
legacy. On the contrary they show us what we need to do to make it real. At the same time the underlying 
vision of  gradual moral universality in these texts also reveals that the true intent of  Kantian 
anthropology lies somewhere between transcendental and merely empirical concerns. In his lectures on 
anthropology Kant is not trying to make good on the ambitious claim that all philosophical questions 
are at bottom anthropological questions concerning the human subject but neither is he simply engaged 
in a descriptive account of  human cultures. Rather his aim is to offer the species a moral map that they 
can use to move toward their collective destiny.318 
 
Insofar as this describes a conception of  what Kant considered the function of  his 
Anthropology to be, this is a both perceptive and apt description. But, by downplaying how a 
racial dimension co-determines the questions of  moral development, with which both Kant 
 
316 Kant, Menschenkunde, 321. 
317 Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, 90. 
318 Ibid., 106 
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and Louden are wrestling, questions concerning the politics of  race are ignored rather than 
addressed. The view that ‘only some’ will progress to perfection and others remain behind 
or forever stuck (women, other races than whites) contradicts Kant’s continuous insistence 
upon the progress of  the entire human species. This is partly what transfers the pedagogical 
question of  education and the educators onto the relation between races and genders (whites 
become the educators of  non-whites, men the educators of  women). Indeed, since the whole 
of  the species is at issue while a part is particularised, the question of  an educative relation 
across the species forcefully imposes itself. Summarising the characterisation of  humankind 
in the Anthropology, we find the following statement: 
 
The sum total of  pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of  the human being and the 
characteristic of  his formation [Charakteristik seiner Ausbildung] is as follows. The human being is destined 
by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and 
to moralize himself  by means of  the arts and the sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency 
may be to give himself  over passively to the impulses of  ease and good living, which he calls happiness, 
he is still destined to make himself  worthy of  humanity by actively struggling with the obstacles that 
cling to him because of  the crudity of  his nature. The human being must therefore be educated to the good; but 
he who is to educate him is on the other hand a human being who still lies in the crudity of  nature and 
who is now supposed to bring about what he himself  needs. Hence the continuous deviation from his 
destiny with the always repeated returns to it.319 
 
As this makes clear, education has a crucial, but not straightforward, role to play in the 
philosophy of  history since at least two operative ideas of  an educative journey are to be 
found therein. That of  the immanent education of  humankind and that of  an ‘education 
[Erziehung] from above’. As mentioned, Kant had, in The Critique of  the Power of  Judgement also 
described the latter as an ‘education by nature’, and he here goes on to specify that this 
education is ‘salutary but harsh and stern in the cultivation [Bearbeitung] of  nature’ and 
‘extends through great hardship and almost to the extinction of  the entire race’.320 The first, 
most straightforwardly recognisable educational relation is that between different 
generations and different peoples, the transmission of  certain models for thinking and for 
learning to orient oneself  within the world. Here, Kant encounters, restates, and recognises 
the problem of  the education of  educators as one of  the greatest challenges faced by 
humankind. As he noted in the Lectures on Pedagogy, ‘two human inventions can probably be 
regarded as the most difficult, namely the arts of  government and education’.321 That humans 
are fallible means that no educator could ever teach perfectly according to the ends of  reason: 
 
319 APPV, 420 (my emphasis). 
320 Ibid., 423. This sentence is a reworking of one found in The Critique of the Power of Judgement, where Kant writes 
that in regard to the discipline of our inclinations, ’we find nature acting purposively, for it strives to give us an 
education [Ausbildung] that makes us receptive to purposes higher than those that nature itself can provide.’ CPJ, 
§83, 321. [AA V:433].  
321 LP, 441. 
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the problem of  moral education for our species remains unsolved even in the quality of  the principle, not 
merely in degree, because an evil tendency in our species may be censured by common human reason 
and perhaps also restrained, but it will thereby still not have been eradicated.322 
 
In effect, what amounts to any form of  progress here is the process of  the improvement of  
the conditions for an education, aiming at generational moral improvement. As such, moral 
improvement is in no way secured and progress by no means certain, but it is more likely 
that if  good education is in place, better citizens and more moral human beings will develop.  
 This is also clear in The Conflict of  the Faculties, where the problems of  a philosophy of  
history capable of  predicting the progression of  the human species are refracted through the 
problem of  education.323 The immanent idea of  education is herein divided into two models. 
One in which education comes from below (from individuals that improve themselves and 
then go on to improve the social and political whole), and one in which the form and 
principles of  education are imposed from the top down. Kant is unequivocal in his support 
of  this latter model, writing that the general education of  a people – a condition for their 
becoming not only good citizens but also good human beings who can improve and take 
care of  themselves – depends on a training which is not the prerogative of  families alone 
but should be carried out at state-level policy.324  
 
The whole mechanism of  this education has no coherence if  it is not designed in agreement with a well-
weighed plan of  the sovereign power, put into play according to the purpose of  this plan, and steadily 
maintained therein; to this end it might well behove the state likewise to reform itself  from time to time 
and, attempting evolution instead of  revolution, progress perpetually toward the better.325  
 
When compared to the early texts on Basedow’s Philanthropinum and on Enlightenment 
experiments in educational methods, it seems clear that Kant actually became increasingly 
agnostic as to the extent to which national improvements of  education could be the key to 
the uninterrupted progression of  the human species toward the better. This is where the 
second idea for an educative journey comes to supplement that of  an immediate educational 
relation. It is an equally complex issue and one which Kant also treats in both The Conflict of  
the Faculties and in the Anthropology. Essential in both texts is the exemplary function of  an 
established constitution and the notion of  the unsocial sociability of  humankind. The idea 
here is that, once a constitution in accordance with reason and the universal principles of  
legality has been instantiated, it will play the role of  exemplary model in history henceforth. 
 
322 APPV, Handschrift addition, 422. 




As exemplary, such a constitution will not, once it has entered the world as phenomena, ‘be 
forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and a faculty in human nature for improvement 
such that no politician, affecting wisdom, might have conjured out of  the course of  things 
hitherto existing, and one which nature and freedom alone, united in humankind 
[Menschengeschlecht] in conformity with inner principles of  right could have promised.’326 
Although the actual course of  social and political developments fluctuate because regressions 
and progressions are dependent on the free acts of  individuals and their varying capacities 
to restrain their animal nature and to live morally in relation with one another, once the 
example is set as a standard, it remains a point of  orientation. 
 The means and dynamism which drives a move from ‘international barbarism’ to a 
lawful cosmopolitan whole, lies in the conflictual natural predisposition whereby humans as 
a multitude cannot do without each other and yet cannot help but be objectionable to each other. This is 
encapsulated in the idea that war amongst civil wholes is ‘like a mechanical device of  
Providence, where to be sure the struggling forces injure each other through collision, but 
are nevertheless still regularly kept going for a long time through the push and pull of  other 
incentives’.327 War, which impedes progress by the way in which it funnels funds away from 
the task of  educating each population and which is, Kant states, unquestionably one of  the 
greatest evils, nevertheless serves a purpose insofar as it drives nations toward the formation 
of  a cosmopolitan whole. This is both ‘a regulative principle: to pursue this diligently as the 
destiny of  humankinde, not without grounded supposition of  a natural tendency toward it’328 
and the point at which Kant’s philosophy of  history becomes most clearly a historical 
theodicy. 
 The second idea pertains to the possible means of spreading this example across the 
globe, to all the populations of the Earth such that, eventually, a move from ‘international 
barbarism’ to a lawful cosmopolitan whole can be effectuated. This is both where the twofold 
expression of humankind’s ‘unsocial sociability’ – war and commerce – become central as 
the dynamic and conflictual forces in a universal world history toward cosmopolitanism and 
where the two ideas of education in Kant’s philosophy of history come to interact in complex 
manners. Though Kant seems to have wavered on the degree to which commercial sociability 
might either quell or incite conflict,329 he remains unwavering on the view that war – though 
it may in the short term impede progress by the way in which it funnels funds away from the 
task of educating each population and is in this and other regards to be considered, 
 
326 Ibid., 304 [AA VII:88]. 
327 APPV, Handschrift addition., 425. 
328 Ibid., 427 (with minor amendments). 
329 Ypi, ‘Commerce and Colonialism’, 99–126. 
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unquestionably, one of the greatest evils – serves a purpose from the projected  standpoint 
of the whole of universal world history insofar as it drives nations toward the formation of 
a cosmopolitan whole.330 It is, in other words, a part of that ‘harsh and salutary’ education 
through which purposive nature pushes humankind to continuously shape itself and develop 
its predisposition to reason. Though Kant cannot sanction colonisation from the standpoint 
of his moral or political philosophy, in the philosophy of history it appears as a part of this 
very same history of the harsh education of humankind. In this history, one part of humanity 
seems retrospectively to have been entrusted with the immanent education of those who 
have not of themselves been able to progress. And while Kant’s philosophy, prospectively, 
is the open-ended development of the predispositions for reason, the cosmopolitan ideal 
which is thought to best support this endeavour, remains profoundly marked by an 
assimilationist tendency, as the Kantian philosophy of history traces its geography from a 
white European centre and around the globe. 
 
330 TTP, 319 and APPV 427. 
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But it is the state that first supplies a content that not only lends itself to the prose of history but also helps to produce it.  
 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 1830331  
  
In Kant’s treatment of the idea of the vocation of the human species, he continually returned 
to the problem, thrust upon reason, of the existence of the ‘happy inhabitants of Tahiti’ who, 
never visited by more civil nations [gesittetern Nationen], had been destined to live for 
thousands of centuries in their tranquil indolence’.332 An altogether different primary 
imaginary of difference is inscribed within G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. For him, it was the 
ancient civilisations of the East and their political, artistic, religious, and philosophical 
traditions that the system of philosophical science, in some form or another, had to pass 
through in order to fulfil its encyclopaedic ambition. Hegel’s image of difference is, at least 
in this regard, internally more complex that Kant’s, shaped out of numerous studies of 
particularly Indian and Chinese texts.333 And though Hegel’s erudition on these topics was 
decidedly second-hand – as he, unlike the Humboldt brothers, lacked both the motivation 
and the language-skills necessary to undertake such work himself – it was a form of erudition 
nonetheless.334 This chapter examines how Hegel’s philosophical world history, the history 
 
331 PWHCE, 115. 
332 Kant, RJGH, 141. 
333 Hegel’s (in)famous dismissal of black Africa and of the Amerindian populations notwithstanding. 
334 In an 1822 letter, written during his first course on philosophical world history, Hegel stressed that he was 
exceedingly ‘occupied with the Indian and Chinese sphere, absorbed in quarto and octavo volumes’. According 
to Karl Ludwig Michelet, the first editor of Hegel’s collected writings, a heavily annotated and self-composed 
compendium of excerpts from especially French and English works on ‘the Orient’ had formed the basis for 
the narrative developed in the course of these lectures. Unfortunately, this compendium does not appear to 
have been preserved. In the case of Hegel’s work on India and the concept of Indian philosophy – which was 
informed by the then-general eclipse of an earlier Sinophile impulse, as reflected in Leibniz’s work – an extensive 
mapping of both the materials that were in circulation generally and the material Hegel would most likely have 
consulted can be found in Ignatius Viyagappa, G.W.F. Hegel’s Concept of Indian Philosophy (Rome: Gregorian 
University Press, 1980). See also Aakash Singh Rathore and Rimina Mohapatra, ‘Hegel’s Indological Sources 
and the Standard Interpretation’, in Hegel's India: A Reinterpretation, with Texts, ed. Aakash Singh Rathore and 
Rimina Mohapatra (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 14–22. As regard’s Hegel’s concept of China, 
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of world spirit, set the terms for the envelopment of the world outside of Europe within his 
encyclopaedic system and what this might mean for the legacies of Hegelianism.  
 Of all the heirlooms left to us by Hegel, his conception of philosophical world history 
is without doubt one of the most commonly disputed. It is also one of the most commented 
upon aspects of Hegel’s philosophy outside of the disciplinary bounds of philosophy 
narrowly conceived, perhaps matched only by the master–slave dialectic. But where the 
isolation of the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit was re-read constructively, during 
the twentieth century, as the ground for thinking problems of recognition, misrecognition, 
and structural inequalities inscribed within the formation of self-consciousness,335 references 
to the final sections of Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the philosophy of objective spirit in 
the Encyclopaedia, and the lectures on the philosophy of world history have, more often than 
not, been almost exclusively critical. This is the case insofar as extracts from these texts often 
function as metonyms for all that might be misguided in Hegel’s philosophy; the equation of 
world history with the self-realisation of spirit as unsustainable absolute idealism, and the 
‘true theodicy’ which redeems the ‘slaughter-bench of history’ the sign of Hegel’s apologism 
for both the present state of the world and for past suffering. When it comes to the question 
of its Eurocentrism, an analogous operation has transformed the very idea of Hegelian 
philosophy into a metonym for much that is wrong with critical theory.336 Such a twofold 
metonymic reduction, a reduction that circulates more readily than perhaps it should, might 
lend some truth to Walter Kaufmann’s assertion that Hegel’s philosophy of history, because 
it is so well known, ‘in the more demanding sense of that word, […] is scarcely “known” at 
all’.337 To ‘know’ in Kauffman’s sense of the word (a decidedly Hegelian sense of the word) 
 
see Robert Bernansconi, ‘China on Parade: Hegel’s Manipulation of His Sources and His Change of Mind’, in 
China in the German Enlightenment, ed. Bettina Brandt and Daniel Leonhard Purdy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2016), 165–80. 
335 Of course, many of these were mediated through Alexandre Kojève’s famous emphasis on the master–slave 
dialectic in his Heidegger-infused lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. Judith Butler’s Subjects of Desire partly 
mapped the trajectory of the master–slave dialectic in France after Kojève but largely leaves out of the linage 
which runs through Frantz Fanon and the shift of terrain onto that of racism and (im)possible intersubjectivity 
between colonized and colonizing subjects. See Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987). A brief overview of the influence of Kojève’s reading of the master–slave dialectic upon Simone 
de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon and Luce Irigaray can be found in Alison Stone, ‘Hegel and Twentieth Century in 
French Philosophy’ in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Mayer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
697–717. 
336 This was the explicit contention of Robert Young’s White Mythologies. A similar critique forms the subtext to 
Amy Allen’s recent reckoning with Jürgen Habermas’s and Axel Honneth’s versions of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory, arguing that they cannot be de-colonized while retaining a commitment to an essentially Hegelian 
‘imperialist meta-narrative’ which subtends their conception of normative grounding. See Amy Allen, The End 
of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
337 Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 
15. In The Open Society and its Enemies (1941), Karl Popper produced a polemicist reading of Hegel’s philosophy 
of right and philosophy of history as the philosophical prefiguration of twentieth-century totalitarian political 
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means more than just familiarity with the abstract outlines of the concept of world history 
as, in Hegel’s words, ‘progress of the consciousness of freedom’338 or with the four sequential 
moments of spirit’s development according to an ‘Oriental’, ‘Greek’, ‘Roman’, and 
‘Germanic’ principle. Rather, to know in the substantial sense amounts to the rare production 
of a reading that constructs a relation between the historical present of the reading itself and 
the relevant texts in their context. For a time, the famous and infamous ‘end of history’ thesis 
constituted the primary conceptual site for re-readings of this kind.339 Arguably, the distinct 
but related issue of Hegel’s Eurocentrism might be said to do so today since, as the global 
continually imposes itself as a problem to be thought, no serious engagement with 
philosophies of history can disregard those questions which emerge from the overlap of 
epistemic and political concerns which characterise the problem of Eurocentrism. 
Conversely, philosophical discussions of Eurocentrism seem almost inevitably to circle back 
toward a confrontation with Hegel and the afterlives of Hegelianism in critical theory. It is 
within this circle that the chapter here unfolds, as it reconstructs in order to complexify the 
intimacies of the concept of Eurocentrism to Hegel’s philosophy of history. Since this 
reading of Hegel is preliminarily grounded on an examination of the centrality of critiques of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history to the very construction of the concept of Eurocentrism, the 
chapter engages, on the one hand, a set of literatures on the concept of Eurocentrism and, 
on the other, Hegel’s writings on the concept of philosophical world history and related 
 
projects, an iconic liberal critique that made it the primary target of Kaufmann’s comments. In ‘The Hegel Myth 
and its Method’ Kaufmann explicitly took on Popper’s textually piecemeal selections. Today of course, 
Kaufmann’s characterisation will have to be taken as a truth with modifications, especially if we consider that 
there is a discrepancy between portraits of Hegel which use a polemic against his philosophy of history as the 
starting point for critical discussions of Eurocentrism more broadly considered and those explorations of 
Hegel’s philosophy of history which are more internally situated within studies in the history of philosophy. I 
will discuss works in the former category in the following section. In the latter category, see especially Joseph 
McCarney, Hegel on History (London and NY: Routledge, 2000); Will Dudley (ed.), Hegel and History (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2009); and most recently Terry Pinkard, Does History Make Sense? Hegel on the Historical Shapes of 
Justice (Cambrigde MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). 
338 PWHCE, 86. 
339 As is the case for the master–slave dialectic, Kojève is a central mediating point in this reception history, 
although his own position on the matter of when precisely the end of history was to be located shifted 
considerably over the years, as he admits. See Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James 
H. Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 159–62. Peter Osborne’s The Politics of Time has a useful discussion 
of the presuppositions and dead ends of three versions of the identification of the present with the end of 
history: Fukuyama’s 1989 orthodox Hegelian identification of the historical present with the realisation of reason 
in the institutions of a liberal ‘world order’ after the fall of the Berlin Wall; Niethammer’s cultural conservative 
and pessimist equation of the historical present with the annihilation of reason as freedom and therefore of 
reason tout court (post-histoire); and the Marxist–Hegelian conception of the end of history as a goal immanent to 
the historical present. See Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time (London: Verso, 1995), 36–44. For a more recent 
assessment of the end of history thesis, its precursors in Enlightenment philosophy and in particular its 
reception history, see Eric Michael Dale, Hegel, the End of History, and the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
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passages from his broader oeuvre. Such material offers a wealth of themes broached and 
questions posed, much more than can be fully mapped within one chapter.340 Rather than 
attempt any such mapping, the exegetical work is oriented by the inscription of the figure of 
the Earth as a space of inhabitation and relation in the philosophy of spirit, for two reasons. 
Since ‘the Eurocentric’ is best understood not in opposition to the global but as a particular 
conception both of ‘globality’ and of the ‘becoming global’ of the modern world alike, what 
should be questioned is the uneasy non-identity of the figure of the planet with the ‘world’ 
of world spirit. 
 The reading begins, therefore, with the idea of a ‘planetary life of man’ in the first 
paragraphs of the philosophy of subjective spirit and in the manuscript pages that contain 
what Hegel called his account of the ‘the geographic foundation of history’ in the lectures 
on the philosophy of world history. These two textual sites are of particular interest when 
read in conjunction, because they show how the concept of race is inscribed and 
circumscribed in Hegel’s concept of philosophical world history. From this basis, it is argued 
that, for Hegel, philosophical world history in the philosophy of objective spirit not only 
systematically occupies the place of the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan world-whole, but 
also – as the history of the actuality of objective spirit – functions as the medium through 
which the abstract character of this idea is critiqued. After examining the exposition of 
international law (das aüßere Staatsrecht) in Elements of the Philosophy of Right and the transition 
to philosophical world history, this chapter concludes with an interrogation of the status and 
function of the concept of ‘world’ in philosophical world history and of how world history 
is supposed to effectuate the transition to absolute spirit. This analysis adds another layer to 
the articulation of Eurocentrism in Hegel’s philosophy, since it concerns the construction of 
the standpoint from which intra-worldly and inter-national comparisons are carried out. 
 
I. Reading Hegel Today: The Parameters of  Eurocentrism 
‘Eurocentrism’, a somewhat polysemic signifier, is most critically potent when specifically 
articulated in relation to concepts of history. This is the perspective from which the subtle 
and sometimes difficult to determine difference between simply being ‘centred on Europe’ 
and ‘Eurocentrism’ stands out most clearly. It is in naming and opposing the ramifications of 
 
340 Although they touch upon the problem of Eurocentrism in interesting ways, the following foregoes a 
discussion of the link between Hegel’s conception of the ‘right of heroes’ to formalise and thereby found a 
social whole and what Ranajit Guha calls the ‘right of conquest’. Likewise, the consequence of seeing a necessary 
connection between Geschichte and Historie, the ‘internal link’ between ‘what happened’ and ‘the narrative account 
of what happened’, as revelatory of the divide between peoples with and without history will not be discussed 
either. These aspects are the central point of reference in Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (New 
York: Columbia University Press 2002), 43–44. 
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a specific conception of the geographic trajectories of global historical development that 
Eurocentrism gains critical traction, and, as such, not every preoccupation with motifs, 
events, concepts, or narratives that exclusively refers to Europe and its history necessarily 
comes accompanied with the superiority complex named by this term. What critical analyses 
of Eurocentrism have brought into focus is the ideological character of a set of 
presuppositions which culminate in the idea that historical dynamism – in questions of 
morality, socio-economic development, artistic innovation, or political and technological 
progress – essentially is European.341 The designation of Europe, and, more broadly of ’the 
West’, as the originary territory of modernity came as the corollary to this multifaceted 
localisation of historical dynamism, and consolidated the imaginary of an exceptional 
European civilisation that, through inherent features, came to possess historical priority over 
all other sites of political organisation, cultural production, religious and social life.342 On its 
basis, the passage to modernity for all non-Western societies or communities was understood 
to practically translate into the imperative of a transformational passage through 
‘Westernisation’.343  
 It is in relation to the above conception of Eurocentrism that Hegel’s philosophical 
world history has played a significant role as an emblematicly Eurocentric philosophy of 
history. To elucidate the construction of the concept of Eurocentrism therefore entails an 
assessment of this critique of Hegel. Inversely, to reconstruct the parameters and central 
aspects of the question concerning Hegel’s Eurocentrism also implies an account of the 
concerns and aims that animate such a critique and these point beyond a narrowly 
philosophical scope, to the critique of social relations. To begin with the latter of these, the 
stakes can most clearly be gauged from Samir Amin’s Eurocentrism (1988), which argued that 
Eurocentric theories of historical development served eminently political functions within 
the context of the globalisation of capitalist social relations. This was the case initially in 
philosophies of history that functioned as so-called justificatory discourses of European 
colonial and imperial projects but also, importantly, after formal decolonisation, in the 
conceptions of history underpinning economic theories of ‘modernisation’ through 
developmentalist foreign policies – the latter understood to instantiate a predominantly 
 
341 The assumption in contemporary critiques of Eurocentrism, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty’s, is that it is a 
problem which persists both in institutions and in discourse after the substantial terms on which it seems to be 
premised have been taken apart – that is, after faith in any substantially unified notion of progress dissolved in 
the face of historical atrocity and after the identity of ‘the European’ has been deconstructed at several turns.  
342 Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model of the World. 
343 On the remarkable fluidity of this category and the permeations between the idea of ‘Europe’ and that of 
‘the West’ as discursive rather than geographic references, see Fernando Coronil, ‘Beyond Occidentalism: 
Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories’ in Cultural Anthropology 11, no.1 (February 1996), 53. 
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economic rather than largely territorial imperialist tendency: ‘Eurocentrism […] implies a 
theory of world history [une téorie de l’hisotoire universelle] and, departing from it, a global 
political project’.344 For this reason, it is not simply the fallacies of a misguided theory that 
various critiques of Eurocentrism have sought to make manifest but, more importantly, its 
operationalisation as a lever of oppression and exploitation in different historical and geo-
political circumstances. While the form of such critiques may vary – both according to 
disciplinary standards but often most notably according to the specific political geographies 
they invoke345 – they all confront the idea of exceptional progress that subtends the view of 
Europe or ‘the West’ as more enlightened, civilised, or modern than Asia, Latin America, 
Africa, or the Middle East, with the repeated instances of colonial and imperial violence 
which this idea is thought to have been both premised upon and justificatory of. From this 
perspective, one sense in which to understand the objects of critiques of Eurocentrism is as 
the enduring misidentifications of the constitutional role of imperial or colonial domination 
of large parts of the world by European powers, within the history of capitalism, with a sense 
of inherent moral, political, aesthetic, and intellectual superiority.346 In other words, the 
critical operation grows out of a corrective conception of modernity and the history of 
capitalism, colonialism, and so-called primitive accumulation. In the vocabulary of world-
systems theory, the theoretical assumptions and historical misconceptions that went into 
constructing the idea of European historical priority ultimately amounted to a denial of the 
constitutive character of relations between European ‘core’ regions and globally distributed 
‘peripheries’ in the formation of the modern world – in what might be called the isolationist 
prejudice of European modernity.347 Following this pattern, critiques of Eurocentrism have 
tended to emphasise both the importance of these relations and the continued damning 
effects of the European colonial system, understood to have largely set the terms for the 
geographic expansion of the capitalist world economy. Indeed, one aspect of contemporary 
Eurocentric discourses might be characterised as the naturalisation and thereby de-
 
344 Samir Amin, Eurocentrism second Edition, trans. Russell Moore and James Membrez (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 2009), 154.  
345 Particularly relevant here are the differences in national and regional registers between the critiques of 
Eurocentrism articulated from the standpoint of the colonial histories of India and Latin America and the 
critique of Orientalism which focused on the relation to the Middle East and the Arab world, as well as of the 
difference between these often nationally delineated (postcolonial national) regions and what can perhaps best 
be called ‘transnational sites’ that are necessary references for inquiries into the history of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade. 
346 Enrique Dussel, ‘Eurocentrism and Modernity: Introduction to the Frankfurt Lectures’, in The Postmodernism 
Debate in Latin America, ed. John Beverley, José Oviedo, and Michael Aronna (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1993), 65–76. 
347 See Giovanni Arrighi and Jason W. Moore, ‘Capitalist Development in a World Historical Perspective’ , in 
Phases of Capitalist Development: Booms, Crises and Globalizations, ed. Robert Albritton, Makoto Itoh, Richard Westra, 
and Alan Zuege (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 56–75. 
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politicisation (most often through either cultural and racialised essentialisms) of existing 
systemic inequalities established and reproduced precisely through this very system.  
 To identify the historical and conceptual presuppositions of naturalisations such as 
those mentioned above, Amin’s work summarised several years of preceding discussions on 
this topic and specified a set of criteria for the recognition of Eurocentric assumptions in 
socio-historical theory.348 On this account, the misidentifications characteristic of 
Eurocentrism have, as malleable aspects of ideological formations, been characterised by 
four primary traits: i) the annexation of Hellenism to the imaginary of a strictly intra-
European cultural and political inheritance-sequence; ii) an ingrained, if at points re-coded, 
racism that grounded ideas of trans-European cultural unity; iii) the interpretation of 
Christianity, also exclusively annexed to Europe, as the unifying principle which maintains 
this cultural unity with little regard to the history and politics of institutional religious life; 
and, finally, iv) the corresponding construction of a view of Europe’s ‘others’ (in Amin’s 
analysis, the near East and more distant Orient) in accord with both the racist foundations 
of cultural units and the static, ahistorical, conception of religion (and of Islam in 
particular).349 While Amin primarily formulated this fourfold definition with a view to Max 
Weber’s historical sociology, and the link formed therein between Protestantism and the 
concepts of modernity and rationalisation,350 each of the four traits are important vectors for 
the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of world history. Indeed, at the level of its content, they 
to a large degree encapsulate what is considered problematic therein: the primacy given to 
the Greek city-states as the site where consciousness of freedom first emerged in an 
organised community; the conception of a ‘chain of tradition’ running from ancient Greece 
to modern Europe; the latent philosophy of race inscribed in the natural determinations of 
each people; and the universal significance of protestant Christianity to the realisation of 
 
348 There are of course other and more contemporary definitions to be found as well. Most recently and for 
their own purposes quite precisely, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu have defined Eurocentrism more 
expansively as a ‘mode of inquiry’ characterized by three interrelated assumptions about the nature and 
development of modernity: internalism, historical priority and linear developmentalism. On this account, 
Eurocentric studies adhere (intentionally or by feat of obliviousness) to a) a methodological internalism which 
sees the socio-cultural and economic changes of modernity as developed in dynamics set exclusively within 
geographic boundaries of Europe, b) an ensuing normative assumption of historical priority of ‘Europe’ or in 
some instances ‘the West’ over the rest of the world, such that the distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
always produces the ideological others of Europe as lagging behind historically and finally c) the, as a 
consequence of these first two, predictive and thereby interventionist proposition that all societies must move 
through universal stages of historical development and thought these ‘catch up’ to more advanced societies. See 
Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism 
(London: Pluto Press, 2015), 4–5. 
349 Amin, Eurocentrism, 165. 
350 In essence, modernity as epochal signifier of the process of an increasing disenchantment and rationalisation 
of the world with primarily protestant Christian roots. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1904–05), trans. Peter Baehr/Gordon C. Wells (London: Penguin Books, 2002). 
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freedom paired with a strong divide drawn therein between peoples with and without 
consciousness of freedom, with and without history. Many of these traits, however, are also 
to be found in a number of other philosopher-historians from the same period. So how 
exactly are we to understand the fact that Hegel’s writings have come to hold the dubious 
honour of constituting a privileged site of intervention insofar as the critique of the 
Eurocentric origins of modern social theory and political philosophy is concerned?  
 At least part of the answer lies in a reception history which lies beyond the scope of 
this chapter. That is to say, it is the continued importance of Hegel to critical thought which 
infuses the question of his Eurocentrism with relevance over and above that of other late 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century thinkers. That Hegel offers such a powerful account 
of the historicity of freedom and of the relations between social practices and the conceptual 
forms these practices both are understood and can be contested through, is exactly the reason 
why his Eurocentrism is significant. Precisely for this reason, it is important not to isolate 
the philosophy of world history from the philosophy of objective sprit which precedes it, as 
has often been the case in critiques of Hegel’s Eurocentrism. Textually, it is also important 
to avoid such an isolation because philosophical world history, as a discipline in its own right, 
was the last to be transposed into the system of philosophical science and its full 
development came years after the concept of ‘word history’ had first been systematically 
introduced in the 1817–18 Heidelberg Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science (Naturrecht 
und Staatswissenschaft)351 and in the Encyclopaedia of 1817, in which the first iterations of Hegel’s 
mature philosophy of objective spirit are to be found. Prior to their systematic introduction 
in the context of the ‘philosophical science of the state’, scattered references to world history, 
world spirit, and their importance for philosophical science as such appear in several 
important text; although the concept of philosophical world history is not properly 
developed until after their completion, references are to be found in certain passages of the 
‘Jena Drafts of a System’ (1802–06) 352, the Essay on Natural Law (1803), and the Phenomenology 
 
351 Discovered in 1982, these are also known as the First Philosophy of Right. The published edition of these 
lectures is based on the transcripts made by the law student Peter Wannenmann. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on 
Natural Right and Political Science, trans. J. Micheal Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
352 This is the title given to the collection of manuscripts and lecture notes for three consecutive lecture series 
delivered by Hegel in Jena in 1803–04, 1804–05, and 1805–06, assembled in the German as G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer 
Systementwürfe I–III, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6–8, ed. Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag), 1975–76. In English, the second section of Jena I, the first philosophy of spirit, was published 
alongside the 1802–03 manuscript System der Sittlichkeit as G.W.F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy 
of Spirit, trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (New York: SUNY Press, 1979). The second Jena system was 
published as The Jena System 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics, trans. John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni 
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986). Part three of Jena III is published in G.W.F. 
Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805–06) with Commentary, 
trans. Leo Rauch (Wayne State University Press, Detroit), 1983. The literature on the continuities and 
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of Spirit (1807). Of published works, it is only in the official accompaniments to the lectures 
on the philosophy of objective spirit that a narrative of the sublation of the particular 
universality of Völkergeister by the absolute universality of Weltgeist finds a place, and even 
here solely in outlines. This presents somewhat of an interpretational difficulty for readers 
today, one which has tended to reduce discussions of Hegel’s Eurocentrism to the thorny 
question of the legitimacy of the textual base on which both critiques of Hegel’s philosophy 
of world history and defences thereof can be articulated.  
 The philosophical transposition of world history into the encyclopaedic system was – 
as was the case with the histories of absolute spirit (art, religion, and philosophy) – effected 
not primarily by any written account, but in dictation and elaborations of lectures given 
during Hegel’s Berlin years (1818–31). For all of the lectures on philosophical world history, 
auditor transcripts exists in several editions, but, in shifting through these transcripts, it is 
hard to determine precisely what can and what cannot be said to properly belong to Hegel, 
as opposed to his students or transcribers, since it is only in the case of the 1822–23 (also 
marked ‘28’) and the 1830–31 introductions that fragments of Hegel’s own manuscripts have 
been preserved. Reason in History, the most famous pseudo-Hegelian amalgamation to have 
come out of the lecture transcripts and manuscripts, is in this regard a good example of the 
more narrow sense in which his philosophy of history, in the history of its reception, 
constantly has balanced on the edge of distortion.353 The problem of textual legitimacy 
 
discontinuities of Hegel’s philosophical project whilst in Jena residence and teaching position has been ample 
following Karl Rosenkranz first published them under the title of Didactic Modification of the System (see Georg 
Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London: 
The Merlin Press, 1975, 423ff.) but the main anglophone work remains H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Night 
Thoughts (Jena 1801–06). 
353 The lectures on world history ran from 1822–23 and again in 1824–25, 1826–27, and 1828–29 with the final 
course of 1830–31 coming to its end just before Hegel’s death. Several amalgamations of transcripts and 
manuscripts have since attempted to construct a book containing Hegel’s ‘philosophy of history’ on their basis . 
The first complied edition, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte was edited by Hegel’s student Eduard 
Gans and based mainly on the later lectures. It appeared in 1837 as volume nine of the eighteen-volume edition 
of Hegel’s Werke prepared and published by an ‘association of friends of the deceased’, the so-called 
Freundesverinsausgabe. It was then extended with materials from earlier lectures by Karl Hegel in a second edition 
from 1840. It was Karl Hegel’s edition which in 1857 was translated into English by John Sibree as The Philosophy 
of History, the only English edition available for more than a hundred years. Not until 1975 did H.B. Nisbet 
translate the first volume to a 1917 four-volume edition of the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte 
edited by Georg Lasson which had been revised by Hoffmeister in 1957, published in English as Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History: Introduction. A new edition, from which I will also be quoting here, is based on the 
more recent German critical editions of Hegel’s work and was edited and translated by Robert F. Brown and 
Peter C. Hodgson in 2011 as Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, vol. 1. Herein the surviving manuscripts 
for both the 1822–23 and the 1830–31 introductions are printed, followed by a full lecture transcription of the 
1822–23 course, based primarily on Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim’s fair copy of notes written during the 
lecture and Heinrich Gustav Hotho’s transcript. A second volume with a full transcript of the 1830–31 lectures 
has been announced as underway but not yet published. A detailed publication history of the German editions 
can be found in Tim Rojek, ‘Die Editionsgeschichte der hegelschen Geschichtsphilosophie.’ in Hegels Begriff der 
Weltgeschichte: ein wissenschaftstheoretische Studie (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), 10–43. 
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therefore springs from the fact that, out of the written work that explicitly deals with 
philosophical world history, the bulk of the materials are to be found in manuscripts and 
lecture transcripts, while only the conceptual outlines included in three iterations of 
Encyclopaedia and in Elements of the Philosophy of Right constitute what has been called 
‘authoritative’ published texts on the subject. Since for all other available sources the chance 
remains that displacements or simplifications might have snuck into the work of student 
transcriptions, or that Hegel himself might have intentionally simplified to accommodate 
different audiences,354 a minimum of hermeneutical caution is required when reconstructing 
the philosophy of world history. For this reason, it has more often than not been the case 
that the defence of Hegel critiques those on the offence on the grounds of their lack of 
philological consideration, dismissing what are considered hyperbolic citational practices that 
isolate and emphasise the most offensive passages while ignoring others that seemingly 
contradict them. This issue is aggravated, no doubt, by the fact that the most damningly 
crude reasonings and offensive offhand judgements over the political systems and intellectual 
capacities of non-Europeans, are to be found in transcripts, remarks, and additions, rather 
than in the so-called authoritative texts. When compared to the authoritative texts, these 
lesser writings, it is claimed, should be given less weight, and the charge against Hegel be 
modified, or as it is often termed, the reading nuanced.355 However, an objection constructed 
on this premise misses it’s mark, at least if the issue is, as is here suggested, with the 
paradigmatic quality of Hegel’s writings and the ways in which these qualities are reasserted 
in appropriations. For, if this is the case, we might ask if the difference between authoritative 
and non-authoritative texts is one that makes a difference? Is it not rather the case that, 
beyond any fixation on fictional positions which could properly be identified as ‘Hegel’s’ 
alone, what should be considered the point of references are those works which the reception 
history developed in relation to? In this regard the additions, remarks, and lectures, because 
of their easily accessible character, seem to demand interpretation as much as the major 
published texts. That is to say, the force of one interpretation over others on account of its 
embodiment of what was authentically ‘Hegel’s position’ dissolves when it is faced with the 
ricketier matter of the several layers of historical mediations which are at issue here.  
 
354 The aspect of simplification is something Hegel himself emphasises at several points in the lectures, and it is 
clear, as Paul Ricoeur emphasises in his commentary on the philosophy of world history, that the categories 
with which Hegel explicates the teleological structure of spirit’s self-realisation, the ‘means’, ‘materials’ and ‘aims’ 
of its realisation, are notably less complex than those categories with which Hegel discusses teleological 
structures in The Science of Logic. See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative vol.3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David 
Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 194ff. 
355 This is the case made by Sandra Bonetto, ‘Race and Racism in Hegel: An Analysis’, Minerva: An Internet Journal 
of Philosophy 10 (2006), 35–64. 
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 That the knot between Hegelianism and Eurocentrism passes through precisely such 
layers is perhaps best exemplified in Enrique Dussel’s description of what he calls the two 
paradigmatic approaches to understanding modernity as a historical phenomenon and 
periodising category. Dussel contrasts the ‘Eurocentric-paradigm’ to the ‘planetary-’ or 
‘world-paradigm’, and characterises Hegel’s work as the apotheosis of the former, the most 
developed philosophical expression of the notion that Europe had exceptional internal 
characteristics which allowed it ‘to supersede, through its rationality, all other cultures’.356 For 
Hegel, Dussel writes, ‘the Spirit of Europe (the German Spirit) is the absolute Truth that 
determines itself through itself without owing anything to anyone’.357 The subtext to this 
characterisation is to be found in Hegel’s paring of a conception of the development of the 
principle of each national spirit as primarily determined by internal contradictions, and in the 
identification of the Germanic people as carrier (Träger) of the ‘current stage’ of world-spirit 
– out of which the central concepts of political modernity and the parameters for the 
comprehension of their truth are generated.358 The developmental sequence that in the 
philosophy of world history runs from from the ‘Oriental world’ through to the ‘Germanic 
world’ is taken as the most crystalline expression of Eurocentrism as ideology: both an 
effectuation of Eurocentric misidentifications and the surface on which they becomes legible 
as ideological constructs. Moreover, in placing Europe, and more specifically what Hegel 
calls the Germanic nations, unequivocally at the centre of philosophical world history, Dussel 
presumed, that Hegel sees this particular shape of spirit as not only, retrospectively, the most 
‘advanced’ stage of development of the concept of world spirit, but also, prospectively, as 
spatially totalisable to the level of the globe. Is this the case? That is, is Hegel’s philosophy 
of world history not only isolationist, but also expansionist? 
 To answer this question, it is first worth noting that there are preciously few passages 
in Hegel’s writings which explicitly address the dynamics through which the latter 
 
356 Enrique Dussel, ‘Beyond Eurocentrism: The World System and the Limits of Modernity’ , in The Cultures of 
Globalization, ed. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 3–
4. 
357 Dussel’s counter-proposal, for a planetary paradigm of the modern, is equally interesting insofar as it doesn’t 
seek to do away with any and all ideas of the historical centrality of Europe in the emergence of modernity, rather 
it re-inscribes it in relations of disavowed dependencies with its co-constituted peripheries by drawing in particular 
on world-system theory’s centre-periphery models of the capitalist world system. This second paradigm 
understands the specificity of European modernity as the ‘management’ of centrality: ‘In other words, European 
modernity is not an independent, autopoietic, self-referential system, but instead is part of a world-system: in 
fact, its centre. Modernity, then, is planetary. It begins with the simultaneous constitution of Spain with reference 
to its “periphery” (first of all, properly speaking, Amerindia: the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru).’ Ibid. 
358 EPR, §347 and §354. This is the analysis indicated by the passages emphasized by Dussel in the lectures he 
gave in the Frankfurt Lecture Series and which later were published in The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the 
‘Other’ and the Myth of Modernity, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995), 21–26. An earlier 
version of what became the first chapter in this book can be found in Dussel, ‘Eurocentrism and Modernity’. 
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expansionist process might unfold. Even the most notable exceptions to the predominant 
occlusion of the perspective of world-trade, inter-, and, trans-national politics in the 
philosophy of objective spirit – namely, Elements of the Philosophy of Right §§246–48 which 
address the role played by colonisation in the reproduction of civil society and §§330–40 
which, as the second moment of the development of the modern concept of the state, deals 
with international law and the relations between independent nation-states – have a radically 
restricted scope when it comes to the perspective of what could be understood as ‘global 
relations’. The former because the concept of colonisation is introduced almost exclusively 
to articulate aspects of the internal dynamic between civil society and the state, in a view of 
the colonies as an expansionist mean to alleviate tensions produced by social polarisation in 
the ‘fully developed civil society’.359 The latter because the juridical relations between states, 
already restricted by Hegel to the essential form of the nation-state, are taken to be fully 
focalised in the question of war, with hardly any mention of either international private law 
or extra-national political institutions. Thus, in order to address the above question, the 
following focuses on how the planetary and the global is inscribed within Hegel’s philosophy 
of history as a site, respectively, of inhabitation and relation. To do so, three moments in 
Hegel’s philosophy of spirit are singled out: i) Hegel’s treatment of the Earth in the 
philosophy of subjective spirit and it’s relation to what he calls the ‘geographical foundations 
of history’ in the philosophy of objective spirit; ii) his critique of the idea of cosmopolitanism 
in §§330–40 of Elements of the Philosophy of Right; and iii) in the philosophy of world history as 
such, where the question becomes what possible relations are to be found between the 
concepts of world and globe. 
 
II. Telluric Determinacies: Race and the Emergence of  the Universal Human 
Why start an examination of the inscription of a planetary perspective in Hegel’s philosophy 
of world history in the Encyclopaedia philosophy of subjective spirit rather than in the 
philosophy of objective spirit and the moment of transition to the philosophy of absolute 
spirit? Because, as Robert Bernasconi among others has argued, by reading the philosophy 
of world history in light of the passages which concern the ‘natural soul’ as an object of 
anthropology, it becomes possible to assess the complex entanglement of racially determined 
differences with historically developed differences in Hegel’s philosophy of world history.360 
Building from these claims, as the following argues, the importance of spiritually determined 
differences over and above natural differences in the philosophy of world history rests on an 
 
359 EPR, §248, 269. 
360 Robert Bernansconi, ‘With What Must the Philosophy of World History Begin? On the Racial Basis of Hegel’s 
Eurocentrism’, Nineteenth-Century Contexts 22, no.2 (2008), 171–201. 
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already adjudicated divide in the populations of the Earth, according to how ‘spiritualised’ 
the relation, internal to a community, of its specific configuration of spirit and nature is.  
 This conjuncture of the philosophy of world history and the philosophy of subjective 
spirit is not simply an external imposition, forced onto the systematic development otherwise 
unfolding in the encyclopaedic. It follows Hegel’s own interjections, since the concept of 
world history is repeatedly inserted within his exposition of the concept of the natural soul 
in order to better compare and contrast the latter with spirit. Thereby, these sections come 
to anticipates and subtend the later introduction of the idea of the ‘geographical base of 
world history’. In this account, as in Hegel’s philosophy more generally, the division between 
nature and spirit is crucial and never static.361 Nature is always conceptualised internally to 
spirit, just as spirit as it sets itself apart from nature is already implicitly included therein.  
 The natural soul is the unity of all natural qualities and determinacies in general, taken 
as an object in abstraction from all spiritual determinations. It is, Hegel writes, a ‘microcosm 
into which the macrocosm compresses itself’.362 Within this microcosm, racial differences 
are those ‘universal particularisations’ and qualitative determinations that express ‘the 
planetary life of man’. That is to say, race is constituted as the form of difference expressing, 
within the concept of the natural soul, the effects of concrete geological and climatic 
conditions within a ‘territory where human beings congregate in large masses’.363 Racial 
differences are, in other words, those determinations of the concept of the human species 
which Hegel considers to belong within a natural history of the Earth.364 A subdivision of 
the ‘Earth-individual’ into four world-regions (Weltteile) of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America 
structures the distribution of racial difference into ‘Caucasian’, ‘Mongolian’, ‘Negro’, and 
‘Malayan/American’. This division (and the geographical differences it attests to) mirrors 
perfectly the one found in the manuscript on ‘the geographical grounds of world history’, in 
which the physical properties of the terrains on which world history unfolds and, just as 
importantly, those on which it does not, or at least has not, unfolded are delineated.365 The 
question here is, just what kind of ‘ground’ geography, and therefore race, can be said to 
 
361 There is of course no easy way to summaries Hegel’s concept of spirit, but in what follows I understand 
spirit, in accord with Terry Pinkard’s concise definition, as the sociality of structures of recognition. Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
362 PM, §391, 35. 
363 Ibid., §393, 40. 
364 Ibid., §392, 35ff. 
365 The primary sites in the philosophy of spirit where Hegel discusses spirit and nature in terms of the earthly 
or planetary life of humankind are in the philosophical anthropology and in the importance of the geographic 
base to the concept of the state. In the lectures on the philosophy of world history, it is in the appendix to the 
1975 edition, ‘The Natural Context or the Geographical Basis of World History’, that this perspective is 
reintroduced. In the 2011 translation, the appendix has been inserted into the lecture transcript itself, to 
emphasize the systematic position of geography in Hegel’s conception of the state. See PWHCE, n.55, 191. 
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provide in world history?  
 World history, according to Hegel’s well-known formula, unfolds along a line of 
latitude from East to West and in this form, it does not (yet) encompass a planetary whole. 
Two primary divisions structure this circumscription: a continental and a climatic one. 
Continentally, that between the ‘Old World’ (Africa, Asia and Europe) and the ‘New World’ 
(the Americas). According to the continental division, Hegel argues that it is the terrain of 
the ‘Old World’ that is of relevance to philosophical world history, since the traces of ancient 
civilisations in Mexico and Peru provide no proper interpretative material for spirit – they 
are ‘long gone’ – and since the societies formed after European colonisation are still 
considered to be at the outset of their formation. What can at most be said of the ‘New 
World’, on the other hand, is that it is a ‘country of becoming and of the future’.366 The 
predominant geological features of the landscapes of each three remaining continents are 
presented from extreme birds-eye perspective: highlands encompassed by mountains 
(Africa), the antithesis between highlands and valley plains (Asia), and the alternation 
between mountains, hills, valleys and plains (Europe).367 The specificity of Europe is found 
in the absence of any one overriding geographic principle and the higher complexity of forms 
of social organisation attributed to this continent is mirrored in a landscape where ‘everything 
is individualised’.368 Climatically, this division of terrain is matched by one of temperate 
zones, on the one hand, and tropical or frigid zones, on the other. Only in the temperate 
zones, specifically in the Nordic regions, are world historical peoples to be found. This is the 
basis on which Sub-Saharan Africa, characterised both by secluded highlands and pernicious 
humidity, is excluded from philosophical world history. On Hegel’s account, it ‘remains in 
its placid, unmotivated, self-enclosed sensuality and has not yet entered into history’.369 It, 
too, is a continent of futural history. Both these topographical descriptions and the 
conceptual divisions generated on their basis would have been fairly commonplace among 
Hegel’s contemporaries, but the manner of their incorporation into his philosophy of world 
history is quite specific. Hegel considers the determinative effects of the planetary natural 
environment on human social and intellectual existence to be of an always restricted but also 
variable scope among different communities. What is important is not so much the very fact 
of natural determination but rather the specific ways in which communities relate to those 
determinations that derive from the terrains they inhabit.370 Therefore, for Hegel, the 
 
366 On the intellectual history of the division between the old and the new world see Antonello Gerbi, The Dispute 
of the New World, trans. Jeremy Moyle (Pittsburgh: University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
367 PWHCE, 196 
368 Ibid., 200 
369 Ibid., 198 
370 Robert Bernansconi, ‘Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti’, in Hegel after Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett (London 
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particularities of human communities are not grounded in first-nature racial determinations 
but in what he calls second nature, a concept that the below returns to in the discussion of 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Second nature is a form of spiritualised determination which 
appears nature-like, including customs and languages that humans orient themselves within 
as if they were natural givens. Second nature within a community can have an implicitly 
structuring function or it can become the explicit object of reflection (and transformation). 
This dimension is included in what Hegel considers to be a compliment to ‘racial differences 
of humankind’ [Rassenverschiedenheitern des Menchengeschlecht]’, namely national difference, or 
‘differences in national spirit [Unterschiede der Nationalgeister]’. These are, in line with the 
etymological link between natio and nasci (to be born), those differences which express 
universal particularisations born out of common descent.371 Neither of these should be directly 
inscribed in the conception of a people (Volk), since the particularity of each people is the 
particularity of a spiritual configuration, of differences generated out of the particular manner 
in which the spirit of each people sets itself apart from nature. Philosophical world history 
is, for Hegel, ‘the necessary development, from the concept of the freedom of spirit alone’.372 
It is changes within the concept of spirit that the general concept of philosophical word 
history follows and purportedly displays. The spirit of a people has a history precisely insofar 
it is not strictly naturally determined, but is composed of its deeds, its religion, language, 
customs, laws, art, accomplishment, actions, and relations to other peoples: ‘Everything is 
the work of a people […] and each people is only this work’.373 While this characterisation of 
the spirit of a people deserves expanding, it is for now simply worth noting that despite the 
distinction, there are nevertheless also paragraphs in the philosophy of subjective spirit that 
blur the lines established between these three conceptions of difference, at several points 
lapsing into a crude geographical materialism that is short of mediations.374 In the Zusatz to 
§393 in the Encyclopaedia, on planetary humanity and racial difference, world historical 
privilege seems irrefutably granted to white Europeans, at the very least chronologically:  
 
It is in the Caucasian race that spirit first attains to absolute unity with itself; here for the first time spirit 
enters into complete opposition to naturalness, apprehends itself in its absolute independence, breaks 
 
and New York: Routledge, 1998), 41–68. 
371 On the difference between the spirituality of a people and the naturality of a nation, and in particular of the 
relatively low importance Hegel ascribes to the latter, see McCarney, Hegel on History, 140. 
372 EPR, §342, 372. 
373 PWHCE, 159. 
374 It is in particular the case for a lot of the anti-black racism to be found here, such as when Hegel writes of 
black Africans that since the inner territories of the African continent is cut off from the sea, the inhabitants 
‘feels no urge to freedom and endures without resistance in allgemeine sklaveri’ , PM, 64. 
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free from the oscillation between one extreme and the other, achieves self-determination, self-
development, and thereby produces world-history.375 
 
The ‘Caucasian race’, for Hegel, is the first race in which spirit properly breaks from a natural 
determination and asserts spiritual domination over and above merely race-geographical 
nature, and becomes, as Rei Terada has perceptively remarked, post-racial in a manner which 
allows for a historical differentiation to emerge, rather than the nature-like reproduction of 
communities with great similarity amongst them.376 While differences of geographic terrains 
and climatic conditions may constrict and condition spirit as natural universal substance (the 
natural soul), as forms of natural determination they are always mediated through spiritual 
ones. Taken for themselves, landscapes and climatic zones are therefore understood, in the 
philosophy of world history, as highly abstract explanatory categories.377 From the standpoint 
of the philosophy of objective spirit, what is significant and what has determinative force 
proper, is not the natural environment as such, but how it effects the relation between spirit 
and nature. While geography might be able to give an idea of ‘the ground on which spirit 
moves’, it provides nothing more than this.378 From the perspective of world history, what 
truly matters is how spirit relates to this ground: if and how it separates itself out from the 
natural ground and becomes conscious of its own relation to it. As such, it is precisely those 
peoples who Hegel considered ‘too natural’ that are excluded from history. Importantly, this 
is not directly an argument meant to justify or legitimate slavery or to provide a natural 
ground of differential right. ‘Descent’, Hegel writes, 
 
affords no ground for the entitlement or non-entitlement of human beings to freedom and to dominion. 
Man is implicitly rational; herein lies the possibility of equality of right for all men, – the futility of a 
rigid distinction between races that have rights and those that have none.379  
 
But, this does not mean that race plays no role in the philosophy of world history. It just 
makes for a more complicated scenario, in which only those societies that have overcome their 
racial determination participate therein. Precisely a lack of such a conscious relation is what, 
for Hegel, separates so-called historical societies from ahistorical ones, since the community 
in which a ‘natural’ relation to its configuration of spirit and nature means that it also 
reproduces itself as if naturally since changes in nature are changes that do not change the 
concept of that which undergoes change. For this reason, Hegel calls it a manifold play of 
 
375 PM, 42–43 (translation modified). 
376 Ibid., §393, Zusatz, 47. Rei Terada, ‘Hegel and the Prehistory of the Postracial’, European Romantic Review 26, 
no.3 (2015). 289–99. 
377 PWHCE, 191. 
378 PWH, 152. 
379 PM, 40. 
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shapes that nevertheless remains wearisome and tedious, essentially a return back into the 
same.380 In nature, the repetition of a cyclical process reveals the underlying persistence of 
classes and species (Gattungen) that retain stability in the midst of surface alteration. It is in 
this manner that the Phenomenology of Spirit can remark that ‘organic nature has no history; it 
falls from its universal, from life, directly into the singleness of existence’.381 While all humans 
live in a configuration of spirit and nature, the specific form of this configuration is what 
truly matters to the philosophical historian who tracks changes in the concept and 
consciousness of freedom. Harsh climatic conditions or disadvantageous terrains here entail 
a ‘natural force so great that the spiritual aspect remains in identity with it and thus cannot 
position itself over against the natural; this separation and self-composure are inherently the 
first condition of a higher spiritual development’.382 Conversely, in the favourable diversity 
of the European continent ‘land here is such as to bring with it freedom from the forces of 
nature; here, therefore, universal humanity can emerge’.383 Through a proper diversification 
of particular national forms of spirit, the concept of spirit is deepened within itself such that 
the particular can be recognised as the particular of a specific universal. Continental Europe, 
in this manner, is privileged as the site of inhabitation where the greatest spiritual 
individuation and differentiation could emerge. As Alison Stone has argued, this means that 
the difference between Europeans and non-Europeans for Hegel comes to be expressed in 
the fact that: 
 
Non-Europeans could not question such authorities [the authority of their specific mode of social 
organisation] because their cultures did not grasp freedom as including the moment of overcoming or 
setting-oneself-free from nature and the given. Because freedom was not grasped as including that 
moment of human separation from nature and the given, no contradiction was perceived in freedom 
being limited by nature, e.g., confined to people of certain castes, or by given states of affairs, e.g., 
customary authority and ritual. Non-Europeans lacked a critical motor to drive social change, hence 
lacked history proper – or indeed freedom as properly distinguished from unfreedom.384  
 
In compliment to the privilege of  inhabitation, another significant but less commented on 
geographical privilege is granted by Hegel to Europe as a site of  relation, on account of  its 
position in the divide between land and sea. As a space of  acquisition, commerce, and 
communication, the sea ‘separates lands but connects peoples’ and is accordingly of  word-
historical significance. In the early lectures on the philosophy of  right, the connection to the 
sea and the global scope of  colonial trade-posts and empire formations is addressed in this 
 
380 PWHCE, 108 and 154. 
381 PS, §295. 
382 PWHCE, 192. 
383 Ibid., 204. 




In the past the Europeans (the Spanish and the Portuguese and the Dutch as well) went to foreign 
peoples with limited vision for which those peoples were inferior. Only beginning from the English, 
who started out from the human being as thought, was the entire world put into universal relation. The 
landlocked countries, which have no relation with any sea, remain stagnant and closed up in themselves. 
Needs and commerce give rise to a world interest. World history shows the sides of  the ethical totality, 
world trade shows the sides of  relation as such.385 
 
Alongside the few paragraphs within Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, this passage is among 
the very few that points toward a conception of  something like what today would be called 
‘globalisation’ within Hegel’s writings. With his mention of  the ‘sides of  relation’ and the 
figure of  the planet as a relational space, the Earth becomes not just a site of  inhabitation, 
but a space for the expansion of  civil society, of  geo-political forces and interrelations.  
 
III. Actuality and the Territory of  Objective Spirit 
In order to uncover Hegel’s conception of  political terrains beyond that delineated by the 
territorial state, so central to Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, there are two different 
geographical orders to consider. First that of  an intra-European international order that 
structures and is structured by interactions and formalised relations between different 
sovereign states. Second, the properly planetary space wherein the ‘unity’ of  the European is 
set against the rest of  the world. The first of  these can be discerned in Hegel’s engagement 
with two ideas prominent in discussions of  natural law: that of  cosmopolitan law and that 
of  the state of  nature. It is between Hegel’s critique of  the idea of  cosmopolitanism in the 
form of  a merely abstract ‘fixed position’ and his critical re-appropriation, in the context of  
foreign politics and international law, of  the idea of  a state of  nature that the parameters of  
this space within Hegel’s philosophy of  objective spirit becomes apparent. While what 
follows restricts the scope of  the analysis primarily to the exposition of  international law in 
Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, it is necessary to make a detour through an exposition of  
the concept of  actuality within the philosophy of  objective spirit. For, while we can only 
make proper sense of  the critique of  cosmopolitanism when it is grounded in the 
argumentative sequence that concerns juridical relations among sovereign states, this 
sequence – the critique of  cosmopolitanism and the idea of  a ‘real’ state of  nature amongst 
sovereign states – makes little sense without at least a preliminary grasp of  Hegel’s concept 
of  actuality. Furthermore, since the philosophy of  objective spirit as objective spirit 
effectively culminates in these same passages, once philosophical world history is introduced 
 
385 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Right 1820, quoted in Lucia Pradella, ‘Hegel, Imperialism, and Universal 
History’, Science and Society 78, no.4 (October 2014), 439. 
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and effectuates the transition to absolute spirit, this is also the place to question what 
functions the concepts of  world history and world-spirit serve within the system of  science. 
What should become apparent in the course of  the analysis is the intimacy that the 
Eurocentrism of  the philosophy of  world history shares with the identification of  the 
nation-state as the primary and ultimate point of  reference for the philosophical exploration 
of  ‘reason as it actualises itself ’. This means that at the crux of  these issues – how Hegel 
characterises international relations and his ensuing critique of  cosmopolitanism – is the 
question of  actuality (Wirklichkeit) and reason (Vernunft) and, more specifically, the arbitration 
of  what possess them and what the processes of  actualisation adheres to. Notoriously, this 
is a question which in some sense is as old as the publication of  Elements of  the Philosophy of  
Right itself.386 In an 1821 review of  the work, the theologian Heinrich Paulus gave voice to 
one formulation of  it, which is particularly pertinent to the problem of  Eurocentrism. 
Commenting on the famous appropriation of  a passage from Aesop’s The Braggart, ‘Hic 
Rhodus, hic saltus’, – used by Hegel in the preface to demarcate the difference between 
philosophy and the construction of  ‘mere’ ideals such as, in his view, that of  
cosmopolitanism – Paulus asked: 
 
[W]here is the Rhodus on which the philosopher is supposed to perform his political dance? – Is it 
Germany, France, England or Spain? – But as already indicated, if  any one of  these realms or all of  
them together were to be designated as Rhodes, would not Switzerland, North America, The Ottoman 
Empire and practically all of  Asia, be entitled to cry out that each of  them is also an actuality, a Rhodes, 
and that this philosophy of  right should demonstrate the jump (saltus) on the ground and soil of  their 
actuality?387  
 
In his review, Paulus probes at the problem of  identifying the ‘ground and soil’, not just the 
territorial form but also the locality of  actuality proper. We might further this by asking, if  
such a territory exists, how does Hegel legitimate the standpoint from which this is judged 
to be the case? The conception of  actuality as such, the categorial pivot of  the philosophy 
of  objective spirit, must be the proper starting point from which to address these issues and, 
for this reason, the place to interrogate how actuality relates to reason. In order to understand 
 
386 The question in the first instance was posed as whether the Prussian state by Hegel was considered as the 
actualisation of reason and thereby as the true reconciliation or whether this realisation of reason was ‘still to 
come’, effectively something to be achieved through praxis. On this see Jean-François Kervégan, The Actual and 
the Rational: Hegel and Objective Spirit, trans. Daniela Ginsburg and Martin Shuster (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2018), 209–12.  
387 H.E.G Paulus, quoted in Bernasconi, ‘With What Must the Philosophy of World History Begin?’, 172. The 
full review is reprinted in Manfred Riedel, Materialen zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1975), 54–66. Hans-Christian Lucas remarks that ‘the Eurocentrism of Hegel’s philosophy finds in 
Paulus an early opponent, and an acute one’ in his extended discussion of both Paulus’ critique and Hegel’s 
response. Hans-Christian Lucas, ‘The Identification of Vernunft and Wirklichkeit in Hegel’, The Owl of Minerva 25, 
no.1 (autumn 1993), 40. 
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what philosophising means in Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right and to understand the divide, 
outlined in its preface, between legitimate and illegitimate claims to the status of  
philosophical thought and to philosophical science, the importance of  the speculative 
identity of  rationality and actuality cannot be understated. This speculative identity, in Hegel’s 
view, is what allows one to judge what is against the measure of  the real possibility of  what 
ought to be,388 and is, with good reason, one of  the most commented upon aspects of  Hegel’s 
political philosophy. This is especially true since one of  the central speculative propositions 
of  the work – ‘What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational’389 – is what grounds 
the rigour of  the philosophy of  objective spirit as it conceptualises social orders as ‘ethical 
life’ and also what informs, with modifications, the use of  Hegel’s philosophy in the service 
of  ‘immanent critique’. However, precisely what its ‘speculative’ (rather than 
straightforwardly predicative) identity consists in cannot be fully comprehended within the 
context of the philosophy of  objective spirit itself, since, as Hegel warns his readers at several 
points, ‘the nature of  scientific procedure in philosophy, as expounded in the philosophical 
logic, is here presupposed’.390 
  Philosophy, so Hegel writes in the opening paragraph to Elements of  the Philosophy of  
Right, is the work of  grasping ideas as self-realising concepts, rather than the analysis of  
‘mere’ concepts in their ideal interrelation. Mere concepts can be constructed out of  the 
abstraction (and fixation) of  any trait shared between any number of  particulars, but to 
develop the idea out of  the concept is to demonstrate not only that the concept has actuality 
but also how it gives itself  actuality. While the argumentative demonstration of  this process 
belongs to The Science of  Logic, one crucial way Hegel explains this ‘giving of  actuality to itself ’ 
is in terms of  the translation ‘into actuality [of] what one is in terms of  one’s concept (as 
possibility, capacity [Vermögen], or predisposition)’ through ‘development [Ausbildung]’ or 
 
388 There are numerous studies and discussion of Hegel’s critique of the mere representations of the world as it 
‘ought to be’ and of the Kantian Sollen as a ‘ein Bloßes Sollen’ (EPR, 88). As should be clear by my emphasis on 
the ‘real possibility’, it is the one-sided and antinomical character of the concept of freedom which the ‘ought 
to be’ accords with, rather than the ‘ought to be’ itself, that he critiques. Like all antinomies, it is ‘based on 
formal thinking, which fixes upon and asserts the two moments of an Idea in separation from each other, so 
that both are lacking in truth and do not conform to the Idea.’ (EPR, 87) 
389 EPR, 20. ‘The meaning of the formula is to be understood approximately as follows: the self-developing 
reason and the likewise self-developing actuality are united in a developmental process in such a manner that 
this unity is to be understood not as the mere identity of what is identical, but only as the identity of what is 
identical and what is not identical, and identity that is differentiated within itself and reaches new unities’. Lucas, 
The Identification of Vernunft and Wirklichkeit’, 32. 
390 EPR, §2, 28. I have decided to broadly limit the ensuing discussion of the ‘scientific procedure in philosophy’ 
to Elements of the Philosophy of Right and the lectures on the philosophy of world history in order to develop a 
fuller reading of the how the self-realisation of the concept should in context be understood. Where relevant 
and where the argument is developed, further reference is made to the Encyclopaedia and The Science of Logic.  
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formation and shaping.391 The formative (and, we might add, educative) aspect is important 
here, because the context for this characterisation is the concept of  the human being as free 
in the sense of  self-determining. In their immediate existence (Existenz), humans are ‘external 
to their concept’ in the sense that while they may potentially be free and self-determining; it 
is only by exercising this capacity, by learning to exercise it and by recognising themselves as 
capable of  doing this, that they coincide with their concept. While ‘all humans’ may 
potentially be free and self-determining, this means little provided there is no self-conscious 
comprehension of  this potential, which happens only in its actualisation.392 Moreover, it is 
‘the concept alone […] which has actuality, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself ’.393 
This means, first of  all, that not everything which exists can be said to be actual, something 
that is also clear from the care Hegel takes in distinguishing actuality from the reality of  
empirical and contingent existence (Realität or Dasein) and concrete determinate existence 
(Existenz).394 One significant consequence of  this differentiation is that it makes clear that 
whatever Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right may be, it is not an attempt to show that the 
existing (Prussian) state is the embodiment of  reason on Earth. What, then, is the specificity 
of  actuality over and above contingent empirical existence and determinate existence? The 
actual is the immediacy of  ‘essence at one with its appearance’395 and thereby a form of  
immediacy whose internal contradictions are more highly developed than is the case for both 
‘being’ (Dasein) and ‘existence’ (Existenz): 
 
Being and existence presented themselves earlier as forms of  the immediate; being is quite generally 
unreflected immediacy and passing-over into another. Existence is immediate unity of  being and reflection, 
and hence appearance […] The actual is the positedness of  that unity [the unity of  essence and 
appearance].396 
 
The unity of  essence and appearance means that the concrete or determinate existence of  
what is actual depends on nothing ‘behind’ it on which to ground or explain either its being 
or its meaning, that which has actuality exists as its own essence immediately. Importantly, it 
is always the product of  an actualisation, the process of  spirit’s actualisation. From this 
perspective, the work of  philosophy is to demonstrate how the concept carries within it the 
 
391 EPR, §57, 86. 
392 This is concept of the actuality of freedom as self-determination is in part what is problematic in the 
philosophy of history, the demarcation of large parts of humanity as only ‘potentially free’ because they’re forms 
of society do not provide the form of social recognition in which the self-comprehension of freedom can be 
realised. 
393 EPR, §1, 25. 
394 EL, 214. 
395 SL, 339. 
396 EL, 214 
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determinations out of  which it is engendered. This, however, only works because there is a 
similar movement in the opposite direction: only what can be shown to possess actuality is 
truly a philosophical concept and just as there are things in existence that do not possess 
conceptual necessity, there are also plenty ‘concepts’ that do not have actuality, that are empty 
abstractions or simple representations. From the standpoint of  philosophising, then, what the 
identification of  actuality and rationality amounts to is the work of  discerning congruencies 
between the rational and the actual, ‘an infinite process of  adjustment between concept and 
being’.397 In the ‘Logic of  the Concept’, Hegel explicitly addresses the idea of  the state with 
which Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right is concerned, especially the difference between 
particular, finite states and the idea of  the state: 
 
Finite things are finite because, and to the extent that, they do not possess the reality of  their concept 
completely within them but are in need of  other things for it […] That actual things are not congruent 
with the idea constitutes the side of  their finitude and it is according to this side that they are objects, 
each in accordance with its specific sphere […] That the idea has not perfectly fashioned their reality, 
that it has not completely subjugated it to the concept, the possibility of  that rests on the fact that the 
idea itself  has a restricted content: that essentially as it is the unity of  the concept and reality, just as 
essentially is it also their difference; for only the object is the immediate unity, that is the unity that exists 
in itself. But if  a subject matter, say the state, did not at all conform to its idea that is to say if  it were not 
rather the idea of  the state; if  its reality, which is the self-conscious individuals, did not correspond at 
all to the concept, its soul and body would have come apart; the soul would have taken refuge in the 
secluded regions of  thought; the body dispersed into singular individualities. But because the concept 
of  the state is essential to the nature of  these individuals [they are mediated through it just as it is 
through them], it is present in them as so mighty an impulse that they are driven to translate it into 
reality, be it only in the form of  external purposiveness, or to put up with it as it is, or else they must 
perish. The worst state, one whose reality least corresponds to the concept, in so far as it still has 
concrete existence, is yet idea; the individuals still obey the power of  a concept.398 
 
This passage aptly underscores how the philosophy of  objective spirit is also concerned with 
the power (the force to manipulate, shape, and determine) which conceptuality has in social 
reality because social reality, in some sense, already has a fundamentally conceptual character. 
The field of  actuality in this view is the field of  conceptual efficacy in social life.  
 
 IV. Cosmopolitanism or the Real State of  Nature 
For this reason, aspects of  Hegel’s philosophy of  objective spirit might in fact be helpful for 
thinking Eurocentrism as a structural problem, though, as I will show below, with important 
caveats. In order to do so, we can turn to Hegel’s engagement with the concept of  
cosmopolitanism in the context of  his conceptualisation of  international legal relations. This 
critique can be characterised as a delimitation of the real conditions of possibility for, and 
 
397 Kervégan, The Actual and the Rational, xxvii 
398 SL, 673. 
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obstructions to, a cosmopolitan order, rather than as outright rejection.399 Let’s first consider 
how Hegel treats the idea of  cosmopolitanism and the background to his critique. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, thirty years before the publication of  the Elements of  the Philosophy 
of  Right, Kant concluded those paragraphs in The Metaphysics of  Morals which concern the 
state in its internal constitution and external relations by projecting the idea of  legal binds 
among nations to something akin to a world-whole. ‘Since the Earth’s surface is not unlimited 
but closed’, wrote Kant, ‘the concepts of  the right of  a state and of  a right of  nations lead 
inevitably to the idea of  a right for a state of  nations (ius gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius 
cosmopoliticum)’.400 What gives rise to these conceptions are the effects of  ‘the spherical shape 
of  the place they [all nations of  the Earth] live in, a globus terraqueus [a globe of  earth and 
water]’.401 The determinate spatial limits of  the Earth, in other words, affects the meaning of  
co-habitation among nation states: 
 
they stand in a community of  possible physical interaction (commercium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation 
of  each to all the others of  offering to engage in commerce with any other, and each has a right to make this 
attempt without the other being authorised to behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this 
attempt. – This right, since it has to do with the possible union of  all nations with a view to certain 
universal laws for their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum).402 
 
The community of  possible physical interaction calls, within Kant’s philosophy of  right, for 
an account of  a mode of  regulation which might ensure that, at a minimum, all actual 
attempts of  interactions not be met with hostility. When Hegel makes reference to this idea 
of  cosmopolitan right (both insofar as this might refer to the rights of  citizens and refer to 
the legal relations among nation-states), it is, on the whole in a profoundly critical sense. 
Already in the 1802–03 Essay on Natural Law, both the critique and its ground are clearly 
articulated. The problem with the cosmopolitan ideal is not so much that it is cosmopolitan 
as that it is a mere ideal;403 as Hegel puts it, the ‘vacuity of  the rights of  man or the equal 
vacuity of  an inter-national state or a world republic’ stem from the fact that they are 
 
399 Robert Fine, ‘Kant’s theory of Cosmopolitanism and Hegel’s Critique’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 29, no.9 
(2003), 609–30. 
400 MM, §43, 455. 
401 Ibid., §62, 489.  
402 Ibid. 
403 In Elements of the Philosophy of Right there is also a second, slightly different argument against Kant’s regulative 
ideal of perpetual peace among nations that places Hegel in line with Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot and Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers of civic virtues (Adam Ferguson in particular). Rather than focus on the formalism of 
the ideal, this second argument appeals to a philosophy of war wherein one of its justifications lie in the way it 
is seen to function as a preservation of the ‘ethical heath of nations’ by calling for actions that are oriented 
toward the protection of the unity of the state (universal interests) over and above the private preoccupations 
of individuals in civil society (particular interests). See EPR, §324, 361. 
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‘abstractions and formal constructions’.404 A radically different conception of  what the 
philosophy of  right entails is at the bottom of  this highly critical characterisation of  
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan rights, one that is best understood in light of  the 
centrality of  the category of  actuality to the philosophy of  objective spirit accounted for 
above. The spatial delineation of  the Earth only constitutes a realm of  possible physical 
interaction and therefore does not pose a significant form of  constraint upon the 
development of  the philosophical conception of  right, thus of  the state that we find in 
Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right. The existence (Dasein) of  right as something ‘universally 
recognised, known, and willed’ has to be mediated in a concrete willing and knowing subject to have 
actuality and objectivity.405 It is the lack of  institutional frameworks that might act as such a 
subject that motivates Hegel’s critique of  cosmopolitanism as a mere ideal. Hegel comments 
on individual cosmopolitan rights, the rights of  a Weltbürger, when he remarks that, 
 
I am apprehended as a universal person, in which [respect] all are identical. A human being counts as such 
because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, a Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc. This 
consciousness, which is the aim of  thought, is of  infinite importance, and it is inadequate only if  it adopts 
a fixed position – for example, as cosmopolitanism – in opposition to the concrete life of  the state.406 
 
Like the abstract shape of  the Earth, the idea of  one human community has no any objective 
actuality within Hegel’s system. ‘All men’ or ‘world citizens’ might be members of  a class that 
share characteristics, but the forces which separate them as living individuals from one 
another are written into social life in a manner that overpowers the use of  such terms as 
moral or political ideals. Without an institutional embodiment ‘humanity’ as a political 
concept is to Hegel nothing more than an artificially constructed unity. It is, in other worlds, 
an abstraction with no determinate content but a concept you can only arrive at precisely if  
you abstract from this content. To understand what, for Hegel, does constitute a determinate 
content and how this is expressed in the relation among nation-states, we can consider first 
the following summary: ‘The nation state [das Volk als Staat]’, writes Hegel, ‘is the spirit in its 
substantial rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on 
Earth’.407 The state – essentially always a nation-state for Hegel – is both the ultimate 
authority and the most concrete actualisation of  freedom in the realm of  objective spirit. 
Herein lies both the rationale behind the rejection of  a place for cosmopolitan law within a 
philosophical treatise on right and the use of  the ‘state of  nature’ as a concept-metaphor to 
describe the space of  geo-political relations. 
 
404 Hegel, ‘On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law’ in Political Writings, 179. 
405 EPR, §209, 240. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid., §331, 366. 
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 It might at first seem striking to note that Hegel describes the relations between states 
as comparable to the ‘state of  nature’ wherein ultimately ‘might is right’, since the critique of  
arguments from the state of  nature (whether presumed to be a state of  harmonious natural 
and free co-existence or a brutal realm of  brutal coercion) is a persistent trait within his 
writings. The state of  nature in general means nothing to Hegel but the complete immersion 
of  spirit into nature, a ‘condition of  savagery’.408 Both in Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right 
and in the lectures on the philosophy of  world history, he critiques the mobilisation of  
rational constructions and reconstructions of  an initial human ‘state of  nature’ within natural 
law as well as in conjectural histories for the illegitimate projection of  an atomistic 
conception of  the individual into a theory of  the formation of  society.409 The idea of  natural 
right in this sense, he maintains, contains an ambiguity, it might mean either that certain rights 
are ‘given by nature’ immediately, such as those ascribed to man in the state of  nature, or 
that natural rights are those which are ‘determined by the nature of  the thing’, which is to 
say, by the concept. The first sense is what Hegel is critical of, the notion that humans 
originally lived in a condition where certain natural rights prevailed, which the formation of  
society and political states infringed upon; a critique of  the idea that organised community 
means a restriction of  ordinary individual freedom and the sacrifice of  their full exertion.410 
Since freedom, for Hegel, is precisely self-determination and the assertion of  difference from 
nature, it makes little sense to discuss whether man was more ‘free’ in a state of  nature or 
where legal restrictions could regulate the behaviours of  individuals. Instead, it is only in the 
context of  inter-state institutional relations that the idea of  a state of  nature makes sense, 
because states are conceived as true atomistic individuals. 411 Unlike the illusory, but not 
ineffective, individualist conception of  human beings that abstracts from a myriad of  both 
interpersonal and institutional mediating factors, states, so Hegel seems to claim, are truly 
self-sufficient wholes. In logical terms, the idea of  the state is not subsumable as a species to 
 
408 EPR, §194, 231. 
409 In the lectures on the philosophy of world history, the primary object of critique is not Hobbesian or 
Rousseauist arguments from a state of nature (which do not make any claim to being accounts of the actual 
beginnings of history) but the investment of authority into Biblical scripture concerning an originary paradisiac 
condition of man – a revealed world of nature, a first true religion, and a perfect alignment of freedom and 
justice – from which humanity had since degenerated into a multiplicity of different religions. See Hegel, 
PWHCE, 111. 
410 PM, §502, 223. 
411 Ibid., §333, 368. An extended discussion of his critique can be found in Hegel, ‘On the Scientific Ways of 
Treating Natural Law’, 110ff. We might ask if he is in fact unwittingly reproducing this same assumption of 
atomism at the level of international politics. It seems to be an assumption of the reality of the independence of 
states from one another – Hegel is explicit in that states are largely self-sufficient and can provide for their own 
needs – that makes him settle of the nation-state not only as the privileged but also, in effect, the only actor on 
the scene. 
 132 
any higher genus but is the universal idea as genus.412 Whereas several of  the concepts at play 
in Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right have shifted position between genus and species relatively 
to other concepts, the state is only genus. What Hegel appears to suggest is that although 
there might exist notions of  supra-state structures, these do not possess the same degree of  
‘the actuality of  right’. Hence, there is no rightful seat of  jurisdiction in disputes between 
states. It is a kind of  ‘realism’ of  the possibility that irreconcilable and non-sublatable 
differences of  interest might destabilise the international order. From this perspective, the 
form of  international law, as a mode of  relation among independent states, is restricted to 
that of  mutual obligation, because the enforcement of  agreements between states is entirely 
dependent upon the will of  each particular state and therefore ultimately a contingent matter: 
 
The principle of  international law [Völkerrecht], as that universal right which ought to have international 
validity in and for itself  (as distinct from the particular content of  positive treatise), is that treaties, on 
which mutual obligations of  states depend, should be observed. But since the sovereignty of  states is the 
principle governing their mutual relations, they exist to that extent in a state of  nature in relation to one 
another, and their rights are actualised not in a universal will with constitutional powers over them, but 
in their own particular wills.413 
 
Without might, without an institutional capacity to enforce cosmopolitan laws, the claim that 
they should obtain remains, on Hegel’s account, moralistic. It would then depend on the 
goodwill of  states and be entirely contingent. When spirit finds itself  dispersed into a 
multiplicity of  particular universals – into a plurality of  co-existing nation-states – there is 
no objective overcoming of  their particularity which would preserve both the sovereignty of  
the state and it’s particularity: ‘A general confederation of  nations [Volkerverein] for 
permanent peace would mean the supremacy of  one nation, or it would mean there is only 
one nation (the individuality of  nations suppressed), a universal monarchy.’414 Since no 
international tribunal can dissolve the potential threat of  a lapse into a state of  nature among 
states – or organise the ‘ceaseless turmoil’ which exposes each state as an ethical whole to 
contingency415 – this is in some sense as far as the philosophy of  objective spirit goes: the 
comprehension of  conflict as an always immanent treat to the modern system of  states. In 
drawing this conclusion, Hegel seems to completely forego the perspective of  the actuality 
of  private as opposed to public international relations (international civil law). He does 
mention that commerce and the globalisation of  trade ‘derives its world-historical 
significance’ from the combination of  legal relations between distant countries (in the form 
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of  contracts) and the formative role (Bildungsmittel) such interactions have within a society, 
but he does not seem to consider that this might also conceptually imply the possibility of  
significant restraints conditioning the sovereignty of  states.416 As the concretisation of  spirit, 
the world is, however, more than simply a diversity of  particulars, which is to say finite, 
organisations of  freedom that struggle (are at war) or co-orporate (trade) with one another. 
But, this ‘more’ is also generated out of  the state-form and its history. It is in what Hegel 
calls the ‘manifest [erscheinende] dialectic of  the finitude of  these spirits’, that the spirit of  the 
world, word-spirit or spirit which transcends even national particularity, produces itself.417 
But it does so not as a higher form of  organised freedom, not as an empire, a supra- or 
transnational institution, but through time, in history which deals with ‘what has taken place, 
thus with something contingent, transitory, and past.’418  
 Is it possible, like Paulus questioned, to localise this sphere of  intra-state relations? 
Technically, it is the characterisation of  necessary contradictions inherent to the modern state 
system and as such only historically localisable. This is then what the philosophy of  world 
history is introduced to do. It is therein that an account of  not just the relation between intra-
European states but also the demarcation of  this system against and as opposed to its 
planetary others is developed. On the one hand in the transcendence of  objective spirit, and 
on the other in the globalisation of  a specific order of  objective spirit, as the following 
paragraph from the philosophy of  world history makes clear: 
 
[A]ll the states of  Europe relate to the outside world [das Ausseren] as a single unity. […] Up to now, the 
periods [of  world history] involved relating to an earlier and a later world-historical people. But now, 
with the Christian religion, the principle of  the world is complete […] The only relationship that the 
Christian world, as inwardly consummate, can have with the outside world is relative: and, regarding this 
relationship, it must be clarified that the outside world is intrinsically overcome. For the Christian world, 
this relationship to the outside is currently the world [of  Islam] […] The Christian world has 
circumnavigated the globe and dominates it. For Europeans the world is round, and what is not yet 
dominated is either not worth the effort, of  no value to rule, or yet destined to be ruled. Outward 
relationships no longer constitute epochs, are no longer the determinative factor; the essential 
revolutions occur inwardly.419 
 
This twofold movement, of  transcendence and dissemination, is what the following and final 
sections of  this chapter will give an account of. The concept of  world in philosophical world 
history is crucial to this analysis because the non-identity of  world and globe is one of  the 
most crucial insights generated out of  the critique of  Eurocentrism.  
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IV. The World of  Worlds Shaped out of  Freedom  
World (Welt) has no one fixed meaning across Hegel’s oeuvre but is mobilised in different 
contexts wherein moments of  internality and externality, or dynamics of  internalisation and 
externalisation, are at stake in the dialectic. This is not because world is simply what is 
‘outside’ a knowing subject. Rather, there are also multiplicities within as well: the world of  
phenomenal encounters as well as the world of  inward reflection; the worlds which spirit 
creates for itself  and the world of  nature. In common across these different contexts is that 
‘the world’ is never simply assumed as something that exists in itself, not the world as an 
object of  dogmatic metaphysical cosmology, but is always relationally positioned. In Elements 
of  the Philosophy of  Right, the proper domain of  a philosophy of  right (objective spirit) is also 
called ‘the world of  spirit produced from within itself  as second nature’.420 It is, as discussed, 
a world of  institutional and political constraints and possibilities that have no direct natural 
ground, but are instead generated out of  the ways in which humans continuously set 
themselves apart from nature and relate to the manner in which they set themselves apart. It 
is a world that happens in a feedback loop, in what Karen Ng has called Hegel’s idea of  the 
‘double constitution’ of  the human being, a living being that always is more than living. The 
concept of  the human species, and of  spirit as human spirit, is characterised by the fact that 
‘the determination and activity of  reason always expresses itself  as double – self-conscious 
activities are actualisations, transformations, and explicit appropriations of  basic life-
activities, and the particular self-relation of  self-consciousness is constituted by the fact it is 
a life that knows itself  as life, a life that can consciously grasp and determine the conditions 
of  its life’.421 In the minimal philosophical anthropology  thereby outlined, this continuous 
mediation of  nature and second nature, it is the world as second nature, the historical 
specificity of  the self-conscious activities which are actualisations of  reason, which 
constitutes the overriding determining factor. It is this social world which also makes up the 
historically malleable substance of  the individuals within it – insofar as individuality is shaped 
out of  a negotiation with established customs, norms and formalised legal relations as well 
as with the specific ways in which the material reproduction of  life is sustained. Crucially, the 
world of  second nature is in every instance constructed under conditions of  finitude, it is a 
temporal world. Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right ends in a form of  philosophical history for 
precisely this reason. The deepest sense of  ‘right’ is one that comprehends not just the one 
whole within which moral and political judgments have validity, but also the history of  the 
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coming into being of  this whole. Such a history is a history of  the formation and destruction 
of  determinative norms and institutions, not a historian’s history but the history of  the 
concept of  freedom from the side of  the self-reproducing structures which conditioned how 
it was conceptualised and lived differently at different times. As Hegel puts it, ‘[w]orld history 
as a whole is the expression of  spirit in time’.422  
 The delineation of  the groups that share these specific conditions – what produces 
social unity and is socially produced – are conceptualised in Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right 
as the nation-state. The state is the existence in the form of  legal objectivity of  this ethical 
substance, both for its members and for other states. This is what Hegel means when he 
writes that the nation must become a state to be recognised in its specificity and 
independence. This conception of  the nation-state is intricately linked to that of  
philosophical world history. In this sense, philosophical world history it is both related to 
and separated from the kinds of  universal history discussed in the heuristic typology of  
historiographical forms which forms the preface to the lectures on philosophical world 
history. These, which Hegel refers to as ‘surveys of  the entire history […] of  the whole world in 
general’, are characterised, in their more felicitous variants, as those that aptly summarise and 
abridge the intricacies of  historical sequences in favour of  an all-encompassing account of  
the histories of  states.423 When the 1830 manuscript introduction opens with the assertion 
that the meaning of  ‘world history’ does not need any further specification and that what is 
commonly understood by it will suffice for the purpose of  the lectures, it is in all likelihood 
this state-centred synoptic and compilatory form of  history writing which he has in mind.424 
But, as we have seen, since the philosophy of  world-history is about the worldly shape of  
spirit, it is global neither in its actual scope nor in its pretences. This is the case precisely 
because the ethical world is totalised out of  the concept of  the state as nation: 
 
The history of  this immersion of  the world spirit within itself  or – and this amounts to the same thing 
– this free development in which the Idea releases its moments (and they are only its moments) from 
itself  as totalities, and in doing so contains them in that ideal unity of  the concept in which real 
rationality consists [besteht] – the history of  this true formation [Gestaltung] of  ethical life is the concern 
[Sache] of  universal world history.425 
 
If  anything inscribes an implicit reference to the ‘whole world’ it is the exclusivity of  world 
spirit in that there is only one and that it resides in only one particular nation at any one time.  
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As totalities, these have an immanent historicity, their principles of  internal development. 
Likewise, these totalities as wholes have historicity, they fade, are ruined and becomes aged; 
even if  they do not disappear from the face of  the Earth, they become reduced to instances 
of  an earlier instantiation of  world spirit. In this regard, the justification for both the focus 
on the state and the exclusivity of  ‘world spirit’ comes out of  the very concept of  philosophical 
world history itself. That philosophical world history is the exposition of  a sequence of  
‘ethical totalities’ – the ‘Oriental world’, ‘Greek world’, ‘Roman world’, and ‘Germanic world’ 
– means that each of  these ‘worlds’ are to be understood as reflected totalities that map 
concrete social wholes, in which a specific configuration of  the relation between first and 
second nature was or is dominant.426 The state is a crucial focal point in this regard firstly, as 
mentioned, because it is the site for the objective expression of  the social order and therefore 
also a – in fact, the – site for post-factual interpretation of  what the constitutive elements of  
any given social order was. Secondly, the state as a conscious ethical institution is what forms 
a temporary bulwark against the ruin and destruction of  time. It is the production of  
endurance on the territory of  finitude. But the introduction to the philosophy of  world 
history, which provides the abstract concept of  philosophical world history, also makes it clear 
that however central the idea of  the state is to this concept, it is neither the aim nor the 
ground of  world history.427 World history, rather, ‘is the necessary development, from the 
concept of  the freedom of  spirit alone, of  the moments of  reason and hence of  spirit’s self-
consciousness and freedom.’428 To fully elucidate this point requires a more determinate 
account, first, of  the concept of  spirit and, second, of  the specificity of  the aspect of  spirit 
summarised under the name of  Weltgeist and its co-determinacy with that of  Volksgeist. 
 In the lectures on philosophical world history, Hegel offers two concrete description 
of  spirit, as it is expressed within an individual and as it is expressed by the spirit of  a people, 
the latter of  which is my primary concern here, in particular in view of  how each people is 
said by Hegel to produce their world: ‘When a people has objectified itself  in its work, it has 
arrived at its satisfaction […] it has erected what it itself  is as a work, as its world.’429 In this 
manner, Volksgeist holds together the ontological unfolding of  ethical substance, from the 
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side of  its objective development. This holding, containment, and delimitation has, or so is 
Hegel’s claim, a principled existence or a principle of  its self-development, it has ‘a history’. 
‘World spirit’ however, is both identical with and more than any one of  the particular national 
social wholes. It always only finitely exists in its overlap with one particular Volksgeist. Insofar 
as it is ‘in the world’ world spirit is nothing but the national spirits it is being realised with: ‘the 
world spirit transcends this particular form, but it must assume it as far as it exists’.430 That, 
how, and at which moment world spirit nevertheless transcends these particular forms is the 
real object of  philosophical world history; spirit which out of  its own proper activity gains 
(absolute) knowledge of  itself.431  
 The core of  this definition of  spirit is that a structure which can change within its very 
concept has no stable essence outside of  the movement whereby it becomes different. That 
is a very particular kind of  essence. It is one whose appearance primarily takes the form of  
the destruction of  what it was before. If  this process occurs in time, then there would be no 
unity in its being if  it did not remember what it was before. As such, it would also not be 
able to know itself  as a being that changes. To truly know this, it has to know both self-
destruction and a means of  preservation of  what was destroyed. What it was before has to 
somehow be contained within it. There has to be a comprehension of  how it is in time, not 
merely as the transitory passage of  moments, of  how the experience of  what it was (the 
past), what it is now (the present), and that it can be differently (the future) is configured 
together. Becoming oneself  through change must encompass both the actual process of  
changing, of  becoming something through destruction, and, out what was destroyed, 
become something new. This change does not begin from scratch every time; although it 
happens from within destruction, the shaping of  the concept is marked by what was before. 
Knowing that one is becoming through change requires, in other words, recollection. World 
spirit and philosophical world history is a work of  recollection rather than simply memory 
because what matters to both is the activity of  remembrance, rather than the static image of  
what was. When Hegel writes that the essence of  spirit is self-consciousness, what is named 
is a constant movement of  change within the concept and comprehension of  change: ‘Only 
if  it is turned in upon itself  can a subject have true reality. Spirit exists only as its own 
product’.432 World history is spirit’s self-portrait, if  such a portrait could include all of  those 
older selves that are no longer dominant, but which nonetheless determined what it became. 
It is ‘the portrayal of  the labour of  spirit to arrive at knowledge of  what it is intrinsically’,433 ‘a 
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series of  spiritual shapes that lead to the actualisation of  the principle of  spirit and that end 
in such a way that spirit grasps [comprehends] itself ’.434 And, contrary to the cyclicality of  
natural change (and of  change in societies with a naturally overdetermined second nature), 
the changes in world history are changes within the concept of  spirit. It is qualified as 
philosophical by feat of  the ‘application’ of  thought to historical studies, under the 
assumption that ‘reason governs the world, and that therefore world history is a rational 
process’.435 Philosophical history is the work to discern within the traces of  what has 
happened, the traces of  historical events and deeds, the immanent reason for why they took 
place when considered from the standpoint of  their contribution to the overarching end 
(aim) of  history: the consciousness of  freedom. The consciousness of  freedom here 
delineates the degree to which any given social configuration is able to grasp itself  as such, 
to understand itself  as a spiritually organised community. The state and the constitution 
function in the philosophy of  world history as nodal points for a number of  other spiritual 
activities: ‘art, religion, and science, and therefore culture as such, can emerge only in a 
state’.436 Because the universal ‘for the first time’ becomes actual in a state, it is a condition 
for the emergence of  knowing and thinking, while custom is lived as the force of  a 
universality that is only immediate, the immediate mode of  the ethical. When custom is 
formalised in the state wherein laws exist – which are the universal in the form of  knowing 
– the state actualises a spiritually existing community. 
 It is in this context that we find the first outlines of  Hegel’s stages of  world history: 
world history as the consciousness of  freedom: among ‘Orientals’, as the freedom of  one; 
in the Greek polis, of  some; and in the realisation of  the Christian principle of  the inherent 
freedom of  spirit in humanity, of  all. Each of  these three are aligned, respectively, with the 
despotic, the democratic and the monarchical constitution. The first of  these is to be found 
in the Oriental realm; the undivided substantial natural whole of  a patriarchal society. In 
general, Hegel’s here considers the distinctions between the secular, the religious and the 
moral to make little sense in regard to this world historical realm since the state is said to be 
a ‘magnificent whole’ against which no individual personal rights can be articulated.437 
Similarly, the divisions into social classes, divisions out of  second nature, ‘harden into a 
 
434 Ibid., 191. 
435 Ibid., 79. Hegel carefully notes that, from the side of history, this is merely an assumption. For the 
philosophical deduction that grounds the claim that reason ‘is itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual 
life and the infinite form that activates this content’ (ibid., 79–80), he defers in both the philosophy of world history 
and in Elements of the Philosophy of Right to The Science of Logic. 
436 PWHCE, 180. 
437 Ibid., §353, 377. 
  139 
natural system of  castes’.438 This is substantial and natural spirituality, the state that ‘only lives 
in its movement’ but since the distinctions it does posit become ‘fossilised’ this movement 
becomes ‘an elemental rage and deviation’ – the force of  natural destruction.439 The Oriental 
world is geographically hemmed in along valley plains, the Chinese river valleys, the Ganges 
and Indus in India, and the Tigris and the Euphrates in the Middle East. These three sites 
provide the ground of  natural determinations (the geological terrain and the climate) of  the 
Chinese, Indian, and Persian spirits of  peoples. For each, the connection among them is ‘only 
for the concept, not in the phenomena.’440 That is, no historical transition occurs in the 
geographical traversal across ‘the Orient’; China, India, and the Middle East are simply 
considered as the concretely one-sided expressions of  the concept and no dynamism 
between actuality and conceptuality can account for move from one to another. This is also 
why there is no focus on single spirits of  peoples (which does not exist as such) but is, rather, 
a collection of  the indistinctions among those who, as a whole, are considered to make up 
the elements of  the ‘oriental world’. Similarly, Hegel provides no definite chronological 
demarcations. This is because the social world in the Orient is not temporalised for Hegel – 
it exists as if  it was nature. Properly speaking, the chronological sequence only begins after 
world history has reached Greece, the point from which the continuity of  development is 
established. But even here, specific events are scarce (apart from those few which are ‘epoch 
making’); it is, instead, the texture of  an age that Hegel seems set to decipher and transpose 
into conceptual form. In this second world historical realm, the Greek, Hegel sees the 
emergence of  the principle of  personal individuality, but only its emergence. This realm is 
free ethical life. Decisions of  the substantial will of  the state are understood to be mediated 
through a power that stands outside it as fate, and the care for the particularity of  needs is 
allotted to slaves, not incorporated as a part of  the free organisation of  the community.441 
Although, in the Greek polis, the consciousness of  freedom emerges incompletely, it does 
so with a distinct harmonious congruence between the concept of  freedom and its lived 
actuality. It is among the Greeks that ‘some are free’.442 Slavery as an institution is central to 
this stage of  Hegel’s argument, since the ‘beautiful freedom’ of  the few was premised on it 
and such knowledge of  the freedom of  spirit and of  man is restricted by its dependence 
upon the servitude imposed on humanity.443 The third world historical realm, the Roman, is 
the ‘infinite diremption of  ethical life’. It is the production of  a difference between abstract 
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universality and private self-consciousness. The Roman empire is the demise of  the 
harmonious unity of  the individuality of  ethical life for the people subsumed under it, such 
that individuals ‘sink’ to the level of  private persons, citizens that have equal status through 
formal rights.444 The fourth world historical realm is the Germanic. This is the full articulation 
of  the negativity of  spirit, its loss of  self  and world which took place in the Roman realm. 
This absolute negativity of  spirit is the ‘turning point’. Here spirit grasps the infinite positivity 
of  its own inwardness: the unity of  the finite and the infinite, or as Hegel also puts it ‘of  
divine and human nature’.445 There are several stages to the internal development of  the 
Germanic principle. The inwardness of  the principle of  the unity of  the finite and the infinite 
reveals its content to actualise it in a secular realm of  individuals held together by ‘emotions, 
loyalty and companionship’ which nevertheless is still ‘ethical barbarism’. It is barbaric in that 
it has not arrived at the thinking of  its mode of  social and political coherence, and likewise 
with the intellectual realm. While its content is ‘the truth of  the spirit within it’ this content 
has not been though and is lived as sheer religious imposition and command.446 These two 
realms, the worldly and the spiritual, are both rooted in the unity of  the idea. Their struggle 
is at the same time the becoming insubstantial of  their difference, as ‘the spiritual realm brings 
its existence’ into secularity as representational thought and the ‘worldly realm’ refines and 
develops into the rationality of  right and law. For absolute spirit, their difference is 
insubstantial:  
 
In the state, the self-consciousness finds the actuality of  its substantial knowledge and volition in organic 
development; in religion, it finds the feeling and representation [Vorstellung] of  its truth as ideal 
essentiality; but in science, it finds the free comprehended cognition of  this truth as one and the same in 
all its complementary manifestations, i.e. in the state, in nature, and in the ideal world.447 
 
It is among the Germanic nations that the intervention of  Christianity finally brings about 
consciousness of  the inherent freedom of  spirit in humanity, the most proper nature of  
human beings is freedom of  spirit. The gradational narrative of  the coming to realisation of  
the character of  human beings passes through religious feeling (innermost region of  spirit) 
and then ‘to incorporate this principle into secular existence was a further task whose 
solution and application would require a long and arduous labour of  cultural formation 
[Bildung]’.448 It is understood that being something from the outset might still require 
enormous work to recognise oneself  as being this. There is no automatic organisation of  the 
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world according to the principles of  freedom and reason, only the continued attempts to 
shape the world according to them. The series of  these attempts is the long process of  
history itself  and this is what philosophical world history is the attempt to illustrate. But how 
precisely is this philosophical world history supposed to effectuate the transition to absolute 
spirit within the system?  
 To answer this question, we can turn to the opening of  the final edition of  the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, where Hegel issues a warning: the deduction of  the structure of  
philosophical knowing – the abridged version of  which this so-called ‘lesser’ logic contains 
– takes place within a generalised dislocation: 
 
[…] we long for an ordinary notion, one that we are already familiar with; consciousness feels as if, together with the 
mode of representation, the very ground, where it stands solidly and is at home, has been pulled from under it. Finding 
itself displaced into the pure realm of the concept, it does not know where in the world it is.449 
 
For this reason, it will in all likelihood be a disorienting experience for its readers. There are 
several reasons for this, not least being that philosophical knowing (or speculative knowing) 
is absolute, it assumes that the dissolution of  the distinction between the subject and the 
object of  knowledge has been achieved.450 This distinction is the mark of  finite knowing, 
which is always determined in relation to what it knows or, which amounts to the same thing, 
limited by it. The phenomenological standpoint of  absolute knowing is achieved at end of  
the Phenomenology, once natural consciousness arrives at the point of  knowing itself  within and 
as identical to spiritual and thus social self-comprehension: ‘Pure self-recognition in absolute 
otherness’.451 The structural comprehension of  speculative knowing is the outcome of  The 
Science of  Logic. In the pure realm of  the concept, it self-generates, differentiates itself  
internally, and knows itself  as such. Part of  what it knows is that it must enter into existence 
and not only as the abstract conception of  being with which the Logic began, but concretely, 
in the world of  nature and the world of  spirit. The enactment of  speculative knowing in the 
form of  the systematic representation of  these wholes is the philosophy of  nature and the 
philosophy of  spirit. Its result is the known speculative idea: ‘standing directly at the centre 
of  all things […] standing directly at the midpoint of  all science and art, so that all things lay 
open to humanity as an intelligence’.452 Relocation comes only at the end, when the centre 
can be affirmed.  
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 This relocation comes as a result of  self-comprehension, which Hegel also calls the 
‘self-interpretation’, that is the ‘being and principle’ of  (absolute) spirit. The self-
interpretation of  spirit is ongoing, since the completion of  each act of  comprehension 
produces a difference internal to spirit, a new conception of  itself  that is actualised and in 
turn comprehended. It is spirit working to comprehend itself  as the completed act of  
comprehension.453 As Hegel put it, the completion of  an act of  comprehension is at the 
same spirit’s alienation (Entäußerung) and transition.454 As it comprehends what it itself  is, 
spirit assumes a new and ‘higher’ shape. This activity is simultaneously a self-liberation from 
the limiting form of  natural immediacy that spirit necessarily assumes in its actualisation. 
This, however, is not only a matter of  world history, but of  an interplay between the history 
of  world spirit and the histories of  absolute spirit. During the exposition of  world history, 
there is a moment where the concept appears to be torn in two directions. One develops the 
view of  the spirit of  the world insofar as it manifests itself  in the political history from which 
the dynamic of  the historical demise and emergence of  states could be culled.455 By contrast, 
the second view of  it as ‘spiritual actuality in its entire range of inwardness and externality’ 
indicates that the field opened by the philosophy of  world history has a much more expansive 
content.456 The latter is what anticipates the introduction of  absolute spirit into the system 
through the form of  art, religion, and philosophy. Comparing this exposition in Elements of  
the Philosophy of  Right with that of  the Encyclopedia and other lecture courses, it is apparent that 
the systematic incorporation of  art, religion, and philosophy as forms of  absolute spirit into 
the system itself  constitutes a form of  philosophical history. Each of  these forms, and their 
corresponding lecture courses, might each more aptly be understood as the philosophical 
history of  art, the philosophical history of  religion, and the philosophical history of  
philosophy. In each case, it is the history of  the achievement of  their concept that is at issue; 
it is the realisation of  the concept of  art, religion, and philosophy, respectively, and the 
philosophical comprehension of  these realisations into these concepts within Hegel’s own 
system. How, then, are we to understand the relation of  these forms to one another and, 
ultimately, to philosophical world history? This question gains in complexity if, as Walter 
Jaeschke insists, they are not to be read as the sequential construction of  the ‘stages’ in the 
history of  absolute spirit (from art in Greece to the Christian dogma of  the triune God and 
 
453 EPR, §343, 372f. The latter seems to be the strictly contemplative reading. The emphasis on ‘going out of 
itself’ might rather point to the fact that sprit has changed its concept and actualises this new concept to then 
again comprehend its difference. 
454 Ibid., §343, 372f. 
455 Ibid., §340, 371. 
456 Ibid., §341, 372. 
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the sublation of  its representational content in philosophy) but rather as the partial histories 
of  the one absolute spirit.457 
 This question gains in pertinence if  we consider world history in its narrower 
articulation as political history or the history of  states. The coming to self-consciousness of  
absolute spirit occurs in the recollection of  the stages of  the development of  its principle (self-
comprehension) which also constitutes the necessary moments in the development from the 
concept of  the freedom of  spirit. These stages and moments run in a sequence of  four to 
which four world historical realms correspond.458 In each, a national spirit develops according 
to its principle. The first stage is that of  substantial spirit, spirit in itself. From the perspective 
of  objective spirit this is ‘individuality [Enzelheit] submerged in its essence’. The second stage 
is that of  substantial spirit which comes to know itself  as such. From the perspective of  
objective spirit, this is ‘beautiful ethical individuality [Individualität]. The third stage is that of  
‘self-absorption’ of  the knowing being for-itself  until it is purified into abstract universality 
that comes to stand in opposition to the spiritless objective world. The fourth stage is the 
transformation of  this latter spiritual opposition, the return into substantiality of  spirit, such 
that ‘spirit attains its truth and essence in its own inwardness and becomes at home in and 
reconciled with the objective world’.459 
 The philosophy of  world history knows that Europe is not all there is, that the 
‘European spiritual community’ is not the only place where the sociality of  reason manifests 
itself. And yet, it unequivocally places this ‘community’ at the centre because it is the point from 
which the centre as such is affirmed. This is clear from the way in which Hegel in the 1830–31 
manuscript introduction comments on the then-current debates on comparisons of  cultural 
forms; in particular, the different ways of  understanding both the writings of  Confucius as 
a form of  philosophy and the comparisons of  Homeric and Indian epic poetry. The crux of  
this matter lies in what Hegel perceives as the formalism of  most attempts at such 
comparisons. The form of  science is the attempt to determine what is essential and to 
disregard that which is not; within the philosophical science of  world history, what 
determines that which is essential is the consciousness of  freedom and the determinate 
phases of  its development. To comprehend, in its universal aspect, a determinate whole, 
nothing less than a world historical realm can be what is at stake for Hegel. The categories 
 
457 Walter Jaeschke, ‘World History and the History of Absolute Spirit’, in History and System, ed. Robert L. 
Perkins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 193–221. 
458 EPR, §352, 376. In this paragraph there is a possible ambiguity: each principle is realised by a ‘concrete 
configuration’ in a ‘world historical realm’ which is not strictly speaking or necessarily the same as a national 
spirit. I have not found any passages which elucidate this within Hegel’s own writings. It might simply be that 
a ‘world historical realm’ is the realm of that people which has world historical significance at any given time. 
459 EPR, §353, 377. 
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through which cultural products are comprehended, ‘genius, talent, moral virtues, moral 
sentiments, and piety can be encountered’, so he emphasises, ‘in every region, under all 
constitutions, and in all political circumstances’.460 There are a multiplicity of  works and all 
are generated out of  human spiritualised nature in a wide variety of  circumstances. ‘But if  
this means that the distinctions that arise out of  the self-consciousness of  freedom are 
unimportant or nonessential in relation to the above mentioned qualities, then [with such a 
claim] reflection remains tied to abstract categories and waives any claim to determinate 
content because they provide no principle for it.’461 The elaborate comparative works of  the 
age (Schlegel’s Sprache und Weisheit der Indier and earlier Christian Wolff ’s Oratio de Sinarum 
philosophia practica) are conditioned, to Hegel, by the very culture of  abstraction; highly trained 
at finding formal analogies they may well be the work of  cultured minds (minds that can self-
reflectively think abstractly are cultured minds) but these comparisons contain, so Hegel 
argues, nothing that is ‘solid or rational’ and cannot provide any principle for the determinate 
content of  the abstract categories which they employ. These categories cannot be applied 
abstractly, in a manner that disregards the specific social structures in which the work as 
emerged. Each work is the self-reflection of  a social whole and only as such can it be ‘read’. 
Hegel is therefore not in these passages objecting to corporativism as such, but is rather 
attempting to eschew what he perceived as a certain formalism of  aesthetic and moral 
judgements. The plane of  comparison for him could only be world history itself  which is 
not concerned with the moral standpoint, but belongs to ‘a higher plane than that to which 
morality belongs’.462 The place of  aestheticism and morality, and of  questions which belong 
to these spheres, can only be articulated in a dynamic between the individual or work and the 
ethical life that shaped them and within which they move. In world history, those who pushed 
back against progress may even, in Hegel’s words, have been nobler than those who facilitated 
the progress that the new shape of  spirit necessitated. A changing of  the whole of  a legal 
institutional framework happens when it has already been ‘relinquished’ by spirit. This is why 
‘world historical deeds’ are not judged to be such on account of  their moral worth or juridical 
legality, but, instead, are justified ‘from the standpoint of  the [larger] world’.463 The necessary 
relationship between world historical deeds or acts and the principles of  world history 
‘already constitute the judgement’, and for this reason world history ( and the study of  it) 
can abstain from making moral judgements.464 Hegel’s eurocentrism from this perspective 
 
460 PWH, 140.  
461 PWHCE, 120. 
462 Ibid., 121. 
463 Ibid., 122. 
464 Ibid. 
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consists in the fact that he both powerfully argues for the situatedness of  all interpretation and 
at the same time affirms that philosophical world history – the product of  a specific spiritual 
configuration – can comprehend ‘the sum total of  all possible perspectives’.465 
 That there are several layers to the Eurocentrism of  Hegel’s philosophy is what makes 
it such as a fruitful site for thinking about the nuances and different problematics articulated 
within this concept. That is, if  Hegel has become the name for an ideological structure while 
simultaneously allowing for this structure to be named, a return to Hegel might give us a 
more precise articulation of  the problem of  Eurocentrism. Such Eurocentrism has, in this 
chapter, been accounted from a twofold perspective: from the side of  the exclusivity of  the 
concept of  freedom as configured out of  spirit as self-determination out of  nature and 
reflection on this determination in conceptual form; and in the assumption of  the absolute 
standpoint of  judgment wherefrom the enunciation of  absolute universality is produced. 
Because the criticality of  the concept of  Eurocentrism lies not just in naming a misguided 
idea about the moral superiority or historical progressiveness of  ‘Europeans’ but in the way 
in which this idea is inscribed within the texture of  political organisations, rights distributions, 
trade relations, and economic dependencies, Hegel’s position in relation to this concept is the 
paradoxical one of  being someone who provides valuable tools for thinking the 
efficaciousness of  ideas and the thinker who himself  most strongly embodied the very thing 
which his philosophy can be used to critique. At the same time, the bind between Hegel and 
Eurocentrism is further complicated by the fact that Hegel’s philosophy of  objective spirit – 
because it fundamentally concerns the efficaciousness of  conceptuality in social life – also 
forms a powerful conceptual reservoir for thinking about the ways in which the world might 
actually be (or have been) Eurocentric. That is, if, as Hegel believed, the work of  philosophy is 
to demonstrate how the concept carries within it the determinations out of  which it is 
engendered, it is difficult to leave Hegel behind altogether. Understood in this sense, Hegel’s 
account of  colonisation as a way for the state to try and tame tensions produced in civil 
society, need not be read as an endorsement (though in Hegel’s own terms that would be a 
coherent position)466 but can be understood as the assessment of  real contradictions inherent 
in the knots and imbrications between state and economy. Attempts to follow through on 
this critical potential within Hegelian thought, can be located in the long lineage of  Marxist-
 
465 PWH, 30. 
466 ‘Hegel’s argument for colonialism is of the ‘civilizing mission’ family. Effectively, his defense is that 
colonialism benefits most those who fare worst under it—colonized peoples—by civilizing and bringing them 
freedom [I would add here, a concept of freedom] that they cannot access without passing through colonial 
subjection. For Hegel, colonialism and the advancement of freedom go hand-in-hand.’ Allison Stone ‘Hegel 
and Colonialism’, 11.  
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(anti-colonial) Hegelians.467 Where the Kantian model embodied the normative projective 
ideal of  a cosmopolitanism to come, Hegel’s philosophy of  history instead produced a 
geopolitical imaginary lodged within the present. It is as such that it should be encountered 
and countered. 
 
467 It is by following this line of reasoning that Hegel’s importance to anticolonial thought can be emphasised, 
prominent among which were of course Marxist anti-colonial thinkers such as C.L.R James (especially in Notes 
on Dialectics) and to a degree also Frantz Fanon in Wretched of the Earth. Timothy Brennan has made the case that 
the philosophy of objective spirit is anti-colonial per se, but as I argue here in the conclusion, the exclusivity of 
Hegel’s conception of freedom as configured in separation from nature paired with the vindication of the 
absolute standpoint for the enunciation of universality makes this a largely untenable claim. Timothy Brennan, 
‘Hegel, Empire, and Anti-Colonial Thought’, in Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies, ed. Graham Huggan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 142–61. 
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 Deutschheit ist Kosmopolitismus mit der kräftigsten Individualität gemischt.  
 Novalis, letter to Friedrich Schlegel, 1797468 
 
In contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism, one can sometimes get the impression 
that, from a historical perspective, the Enlightenment revival of the idea was univocally 
Kantian. That it, in other words, came solely as the corollary to Kant’s moral universalism 
and that, in the final instance, the merits and limitations of cosmopolitan politics are to be 
decided on the same grounds as that of the merits and limitations of Kant’s universalism and 
the problematic inscription of racial-differences within his regulative idea of universal world 
history. But, as much as the tensions internal to the Kantian idea of cosmopolitanism were 
and are significant, another idea of cosmopolitanism occupies an equally important political 
and theoretical position. This ‘alternative cosmopolitanism’ entails both an implicit critique 
of the ‘epistemology of ignorance’469 attributed to Kantian universalism and the explicit 
affirmation of cultural plurality as inherently valuable. Contrary to the paradigmatically 
Kantian idea of cosmopolitanism, its discursive origins are not easily delimited to one set of 
canonical texts. More nebulously, it is premised on a different philosophical cosmology, 
wherein a mediation of the philosophy of history with a philosophy of language produces a 
different conception of political and moral universals and therefore also the grounds for a 
different conception of the cosmopolitan ideal.  
 
468 Novalis, Werke IV: Briefe und Dokumente, ed. Ewald Wasmuth (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider), 367. 
469 The idea that ignorance constitutes not a neutral epistemic terrain but, as substantive practices of sanctioned 
and socially acceptable practices of ignorance, is an expression of structural inequality has been much explored 
within contemporary social epistemology. See, for instance, Linda Martín Alcoff, ‘Philosophy and Philosophical 
Practice: Eurocentrism as an epistemology of ignorance’, in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, ed. Ian 
James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 397–408; Linda 
Martín Alcoff, ‘Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types’, in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon 
Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 39–58. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ANOTHER PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, 
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM: 
THE BROTHERS VON HUMBOLDT 
 
 148 
 It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that within the writings of the Alexander 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt these aspects are to be found and, for this reason, the brothers 
can together be considered – within a series of what might be called ‘cultural 
cosmopolitanisms’ – to constitute an emblematic site for the articulation of an extant 
‘alternative cosmopolitanism’ in the emphatic sense. This argument proceeds in three steps. 
First, the rationale for considering the genealogical roots of an alternative cosmopolitanism 
as traceable to both Humboldt brothers is provided through a set of broader reflections on 
what it means to read their works today as, in some sense, part of a shared oeuvre. Then, I 
locate the specificity of their cosmopolitan ideal, as seen against other cultural 
cosmopolitanisms, by emphasising the linguistic schematism that Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
philosophy of language introduces into the concept of culture. I argue that by mediating the 
concept of culture with that of linguistic difference, this cosmopolitanism displaces but does 
not expel the problematic concept of race analysed within the first two models. This 
displacement is expressed within an ineluctable tension in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
conception of language and linguistic difference; within his writings on language and on 
history, the elements of both a culturalist egalitarian tendency and a tendency to re-affirm 
the supremacy of certain cultures on the basis of a hierarchical classification of languages are 
to be found. Furthermore, even when specifically emphasising the former of these 
tendencies, I suggest that if the Humboldtian alternative is to be considered more than a 
moral ideal in the Kantian sense, the significance of Alexander von Humboldt’s meta-
political writings on colonial modernity and the politics of racial difference, in particular the 
explicit practical-political commitment to the abolition of slavery, are as central to the 
cosmopolitan project as the philosophy of language and culture that it is conceptually 
articulated within. 
 
I. Two Brothers, One Science: Reading the Humboldt Brothers Today  
The proposal to read the two Humboldt brothers together and the claim that both the idea 
of an alternative cosmopolitanism and that of an alternative philosophy of world history can 
to be discerned out of the intellectual interplay between them, resonates with a recent 
tendency in Humboldt scholarship. It is only within the last decades that scholars have begun 
to consider the potentials of reading the two brothers as part of a shared outlook or even as 
forming something akin to a joint research programme, beyond the intellectual division of 
labour between the ‘human’ and the ‘natural’ sciences which hitherto has often been 
projected onto their respective works; or more precisely put, between the geisteswissenschaftliche 
perspective of the older brother, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), and the 
naturwissenschaftliche perspective of the younger brother, Alexander von Humboldt (1769–
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1859).470 While my reconstruction of the Humboldtian idea of cosmopolitanism and the 
philosophy of world history that it stands in a dynamic relation to, contributes to this line of 
research, it also, in a sense, demands it if the limits and aporias proper to these idea are to be 
grasped in their full depth. Conversely, to hold the two siblings apart and to understand their 
works as separate projects has allowed for a delineation which simply casts the older as the 
Prussian patriot and the younger as the globetrotting cosmopolite. In line with such a 
delineation, suspicions of nationalism and appraisals of cosmopolitanism can be held safely 
at a distance from one-another. The indefeasibility of this type of division, historically as well 
as conceptually, was already remarked upon by Friedrich Meinecke in his 1908 
Cosmopolitanism and the National State which focused precisely on the interrelation of universal 
and national ideals in the context of the emergence of the modern German idea of the nation-
state. Commenting on the widespread notion that a fundamentally cosmopolitan orientation 
within political philosophy in the eighteenth century was displaced by a nationalist turn in 
the early nineteenth century, Meinecke noted that: 
 
The current view is that an epoch of cosmopolitan thinking preceded the awakening of the national idea 
and of the idea of the national state in our country also. If we should demonstrate no more than that in 
this study, we shall have said nothing new. However, this same view also sees cosmopolitanism and 
national feeling as two modes of thought that mutually exclude each other, that do battle with each 
other, and that supplant each other. Such a view cannot satisfy the historical mind that has a deeper 
awareness of circumstances and that insists on a thoroughly detailed demonstration of every stage in 
the evolution of ideas.471  
 
An approach refusing a straightforward or settled antithesis between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism is needed if both the potentials and the pitfalls of the Humboldtian 
cultural-linguistically coded alternative cosmopolitanism are to be displayed.472 This is 
 
470 There has been, in recent years, increasing focus on the exchanges between the brothers. In emphasising the 
importance of thinking them together, I thus draw on this tendency, which in Germany has been spearheaded 
by Jürgen Trabant’s focus on the importance of their interactions for the ‘second birth’ of European philology 
and by Ottmar Ette’s insistence on the idea of their shared translational and dynamic research programme. See 
Jürgen Trabant, Traditionen Humboldts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990); Ottmar Ette, ‘Languages 
about Languages: Two Brothers and One Humboldtian Science’, HiN - Humboldt im Netz. Internationale Zeitschrift 
für Humboldt-Studien 19, no.36 (2018), 48–61; and the essays gathered in Les Fréres Humboldt: L’Europe de l’esprit, 
ed. Bénédicte Savoy and David Blankenstein (Paris: De Monza/Paris Sciences et Lettres, 2014). Peter Hanns 
Reill has proposed a parallel argument for overcoming the projection of a stark divide between the natural and 
the human science internally to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work through an emphasis on the importance of 
Enlightenment vitalism to his construction of a ‘science of culture’ but does not take into particular account the 
interplay between the two brothers. See Peter Hanns Reill ‘Science and the Construction of the Cultural Sciences 
in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Case of Wilhelm von Humboldt’, History and Theory 33, no.3 
(October, 1994), 345–66. 
471 Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, trans. Robert B. Kimber (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), 21. 
472 Wilhelm von Humboldt is, with good reason, a key figure in Meinecke’s study. Meinecke treats him: first, as 
the intellectual who in the late eighteenth century contributed to the nationalisation of the universal; and, second, 
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especially the case because, in light of the displacement of the question of racial hierarchies 
from natural onto cultural-linguistic registers, some have argued that a commitment to 
cosmopolitanism (in this case cultural cosmopolitanism), by its mere presence, contradicts 
and thereby rules out a ‘crypto-racism’ in the philosophy of language.473 This form of 
argumentation both occludes an understanding of the intimacy which concepts of race have 
with those of nationality and fails to account for what is best understood as the dynamic 
tensions between ideas of universal humanity and national particularity in the case of the 
alternative cosmopolitanism at stake here. The fraught interrelation between these two is 
what I will foreground here, and it is best achieved from the perspective of both Humboldts.  
 This is not to deny that they, each in their own right, form towering figures in cultural 
history and in the history of the sciences. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work in philology and 
cultural linguistics are landmarks of nineteenth-century philosophies of language and it is 
furthermore nearly impossible to give an account of the institutional politics of the German 
university reforms in this same period without mention of the role he played therein, as 
statesman and as a key figure in the founding of the University of Berlin. Similarly, Alexander 
von Humboldt’s travel writings and natural historical studies, his treaties on the description 
of the physical universe, and his historical and political reports from Venezuela, Cuba, 
Mexico and Ecuador, all form important points of references for an understanding of early 
nineteenth-century views of the Americas, on the question of slavery, and the mistreatment 
of indigenous populations by colonists and missionaries, as well as on the status and 
conception of earlier South American and Mesoamerican civilisations. A brief overview of 
the, for my purposed, most important aspects of their individual works will make apparent 
their convergences, overlaps and shared presuppositions. For Wilhelm von Humboldt this 
means an assessment of the conjuncture of historical and linguistic research trajectories; for 
 
as the statesman, a key figure navigating the European post-Napoleonic landscape of power-politics wherein 
ideas of national autonomy and ideas of a universal European federation were not mutually exclusive but rather 
the sign of a different cosmopolitanism, one premised on an idea of a community of organic national units 
strategically directed against what was considered to be a an essentially French abstract universalism. See 
Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State, 34–48 and 140–47. 
473 This appears to be the point that Michael Forster implicitly makes when he argues that it is, pace Hans Aarsleff, 
illegitimate to characterise Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of language as ‘crypto-racist’ because he also 
expressed a belief in the ‘moral dignity of – and need to respect – human variety in all its differences’ and, with 
Alexander, argued against the scientific character of colour-based racial classificatory schemas. While I don’t 
necessarily believe the linguistic transposition of race renders it ‘crypto’, Aarsleff is correct to characterise as an 
expression of racism the tendency to hierarchise languages according to the degree to which their grammatical 
form is suited to, as Wilhelm describes it in a letter to two American colleagues, ‘giving the mind the habit of 
methodical reasoning and for the development of all the intellectual forms of man’. For all the justified critiques 
of Aarseff’s overemphasis on the importance of Condillac and the French Idéologues to Humboldt’s philosophy 
of language, he at least names a problem which Forster (and many others) are all too eager to explain away. See 
Hans Aarsleff, ‘Introduction’ in OL, lxii–lxiii. 
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Alexander it means an assessment of the status of his scientific expedition to the Americas 
and the view it offers onto colonial modernity.  
 As the brother most explicitly concerned with universal and world history, Wilhelm, 
in a 1793 letter to Karl Gustav Brinkmann, noted that in his view there was ‘no object as 
interesting as the philosophy of history’.474 His approach to this object was, however, 
fundamentally heterodox and oriented by an attempt to overcome the impasses into which 
he considered the predominant philosophies of history to have been led, particularly, by their 
reliance on too abstract a conception of the human species. To this effect, a preoccupation 
with the study of languages – practically in the acquisition of foreign languages and 
theoretically within the nascent discipline of linguistics – was continuously matched in the 
course of his intellectual life by a preoccupation with the study of history – in particular 
ancient Greek but also contemporary European. In the same period as his first published 
essay on language, On Speaking and Thinking (1795–6), set the parameters for what would be 
a life-long investigation into the relation between linguistic difference, spiritual difference, 
and the synthetic force of speech, he also composed The Eighteenth Century (1797), a portrait 
of the age that attempted to situate the period through an emphasis on the importance of 
national character, as the individuality of human communities, for the paths of historical 
development. And while a view of his published works might initially lead one to assume 
that the study of history was replaced by the study of languages,475 a number of unpublished 
drafts and sketches for essays show that the methodological and epistemological questions 
which the former had provoked persisted as a steady undercurrent, explicitly discussed in the 
famous 1821 address to the Prussian academy, ‘On the Historian’s Task’.476 In these largely 
methodological treaties, emphasis is placed on the importance of taking into account, within 
the study of history, both a strict natural history of the human species and the linguistic 
multiplicities through which humanity has expressed itself in the form of national 
individuality. As the following attempts to show, the culmination of these reflections are to 
 
474 Wilhelm Humboldt, letter to Karl Gustav Brinkmann, 19 December 1793, in Wilhelm von Humboldts Briefe an 
Karl Gustav Brinkmann, ed. Albert Leitzmann, (Leipzig: Karl W. Hiersemann, 1939), 72 (my translation). 
475 The most well-known works on language include both the concrete analysis of specific languages, such as 
the famous study of the Basque language (research for which was carried out at the turn of the century and 
which eventually was published in 1821), the Essay on the Languages of the New World (1812), On the Grammatical 
Structure of the Chinese Language (1826), On the Languages of the South Sea Islands (1828), and more general theoretical 
reflections on the prospects and parameters of the newly emerged discipline of comparative linguistics such as 
On the Comparative Study of Language in Connection with the Various Epochs of the Development of Language (1820), On the 
Emergence of Grammatical Forms and Their Influence on the Development of Ideas (1822). 
476 In addition to a number of concrete studies such as ‘Latium und Hellas’ (1806) and ‘Geschichte des Verfalls 
und Untergangs der griechischen Freistaaten’ (1807–08), it is ‘Betrachtungen über die Weltgeschichte’ (1814) 
and ‘Betrachtungen über die bewegenden Ursachen in der Weltgeschichte’ (1818) that particularly demonstrate 
a continued preoccupation with the philosophy of history. These texts are discussed in greater detail to below. 
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be found in the first volume of his On the Kawi Language on the Island of Java, the theoretical 
introduction to his unfinished analysis of Austronesian languages (posthumously published 
between 1836–39, with the introduction also published independently and prefaced by 
Alexander von Humboldt in 1836).477 In this introduction, titled ‘Über die Verschiedenheit 
des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des 
Menschengeschlechts’, or ‘On the Diversity of Human Language Structure and Its Influence 
on the Spiritual Development of Humankind’,478 the parallel trajectories of linguistic and 
historical lines of inquiry are persistently woven together, because the linguistic theory found 
therein ‘is at the same time [a] theory of society and history’.479 The result is a sprawling and 
tension-filled mediation, wherein the philosophy of language is made to pass through a 
philosophy of history, and the philosophy of history made to pass through a philosophy of 
language. The Humboldtian linguistic intervention into the philosophy of history, which, in 
truth, makes it a philosophy of the cultural-linguistic determination of worldviews, is at the 
theoretical crux of the idea of an alternative cosmopolitanism at stake here.  
 This intervention is directly inscribed within the cosmology proper that Alexander von 
Humboldt wrote late in his life. The planetary perspective of the popular-scientific work 
Cosmos, written between 1843–44, heavily relies on On Language for its discussions of the 
place of human existence within a dynamic world of multiple natural forces. The influences 
between the brothers, however, flowed in both directions. From the materials which 
Alexander sent home from his scientific expedition to the Americas, Wilhelm produced his 
first theories as to the significance of the grammatical structures of the languages indigenous 
to the Americas. In the case of the brothers von Humboldt, the intimate relation between 
travel literature and philosophy of history is mirrored within their familial connection. The 
character of Alexander’s expedition therefore deserves a few words of its own.  
 In 1799, Alexander and his French travel companion, the physician and botanist Amié 
Bonpland, set out for what would become a five-year voyage to the Americas. With nearly 
impossible-to-obtain passports, granted by the Spanish King Carlos IV, and with funds to 
sustain their scientific expedition taken out of Alexander’s inheritance, they were able to visit 
Spain’s American colonies, entry into which had until then been policed with extreme caution 
by the Spanish Crown. After a brief stop on Tenerife, the transatlantic expedition took them 
first to Cumaná in modern-day Venezuela, where they moved inland along the Orinoco and 
Quasisquare rivers, those parts of the journey whose narrativisation have most forcefully 
 
477 The introduction to On the Kawi Language on the Island of Java is sometimes known as the Kawi Introduction, 
but will, henceforth, be referenced to by its English title, On Language. 
478 Translation modified. 
479 Jürgen Trabant, ‘Vanishing Worldviews’, Forum for Modern Language Studies 53, no.1 (January 2017), 22. 
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mythologised the image of them both as great European explorers. From December 1800 to 
March 1801, they visited the island of Cuba, before making their way to regions of South 
America that today comprise Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In March 1803, the expedition 
arrived by sea from Lima to Acapulco in the viceroyalty of New Spain. From his base in 
Mexico City, Alexander made numerous voyages inland and ultimately stayed in New Spain 
for close to a year. The final leg of the journey brought Bonpland and Alexander to Cuba 
once more and then briefly to Philadelphia where they met with Thomas Jefferson. In August 
1804, the expedition arrived in Bordeaux and Alexander returned to Paris.480 
 To each of these locations, Alexander brought a wealth of scientific measuring 
instruments and a carefully composed notation-apparatus out of which his published diaries 
would be composed. Attempting to record his surroundings in their fullness, he tracked the 
botanical environment, the geographical and geological lay of the land, as well as the peoples 
who inhabited it: their customs and manner as well as the political and economic conditions 
under which they lived. The aim was the production of a Totaleindruck, a complete impression, 
of each site, encompassing both natural and cultural phenomena. This research would be 
transposed into an exceedingly voluminous chronicle: an opus americanum on the 
environmental, political and historical terrain of the Americas. Published in French between 
1805–39, the series consists of 30 volumes in sum. Some seven of these make up the Political 
Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain (originally published in five volumes between 1808–10) and 
the Political Essay on the Island of Cuba (originally published in two volumes between 1825–26). 
These two essays, along with Views of the Cordilleras and Monuments of the Indigenous Peoples of the 
Americas (originally published between 1810–13), contain his most explicit anthropological 
and socio-political observations, but, it must be remembered, also bore a particular status as 
part of the colonial archive of the Americas. 
 Alexander’s ability to sustain the costs of the expedition to some degree freed the 
scientific efforts and cartographic ambitions from the direct colonial drive to acquire wealth 
in the New Continent. Instead of premising the expedition on the promise to deliver 
roadmaps for the extraction of precious metals, he and Bonpland could prioritise 
constructing theories and collecting empirical data with which to comprehend the cosmos. 
In itself, this did not raise their expedition above an inscription within the practicalities of 
colonial exploitation. Although it is clear from Alexander’s texts that he was sympathetic to 
indigenous populations and outraged by the brutality of plantation slavery, his 
expedition, like all European scientific expeditions to the Americas, was inextricably 
 
480 For a detailed account of both these travels and the relation between the research carried out there and the 
way it feed into the Cosmos book see Laura Dassow Walls, The Passage to Cosmos: Alexander von Humboldt and the 
Shaping of America (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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conditioned by unavoidable colonial infrastructures and power relations. What is important 
here is that besides the general fascination generated by the ground-breaking botanical, 
zoological, and even anthropological observations of Alexander’s publications, it was 
particularly the Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain which made his travel writings hugely 
popular among a wide European audience. As the editors of the revised 1825–27 French 
edition noted: ‘All those who were in charge of colonial administration … recognised the 
necessity of consulting Mr. Humboldt’s works.’481 It became especially important among 
those foreign investors looking to do business in Mexico after its independence in 1821, as 
it provided the first systematic assessment of the state of the country’s silver mines. 
Moreover, his exceedingly precise cartographic representations of the area in the end quite 
literally provided the maps for where to find them.482 Regardless of explicit intentions, parts 
of the work carried out during their expedition can therefore be considered to have helped 
provide the conditions for a new and primarily economic mode of colonial exploitation in 
the Americas, at the very moment where many of the colonies were at the brink of achieving 
independence.483 That is, they can be considered to have helped create the conditions for 
what in contemporary parlance would be called neo-colonial exploitation. So, while it is true 
that Alexander and Bonpland enjoyed some relative scholarly freedom and, moreover, they 
were not bound to deliver their results exclusively to the Spanish Crown, this, at best, points 
to an ambivalent colonial heritage. The uneasy existence of cultural pluralism within an 
unevenly structured world, which forms the problem to be reckoned with within the 
Humboldtian alternative cosmopolitanism, is in this manner expressed within this very 
expedition. This is not the least of the reasons why Alexander’s political essays are interesting 
today, as they contain his understanding of the complexities of the expedition’s position 
within a historically uneven and world-wide field of political and economic forces. 
 The most significant aspects of Alexander’s writings for the concept of alternative 
cosmopolitanism are therefore to be found not in the natural-scientific treatises but in his 
analysis and discussions of the economy, political landscape and colonial history of the 
 
481 Editors’ Preface, PEKNS, 5. 
482 Likewise, the Political Essay on the Island of Cuba also contains extensive discussions of how and where a canal 
might be built such that ships would not have to navigate around South America but could pass through. Here 
Alexander imagines state and private companies forming a corporative to sustain the massive costs of such an 
endeavour. A form of postcolonial power discrepancy sustained through control of infra-structure. For a brief 
discussion of the details of the British reception of the Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain, see Vera M. 
Kutzinski and Ottmar Ette, ‘All the Bumps in the Road’, in PEKNS, xviii. 
483 This is the focal point for Mary Louise Pratt’s reading of the expedition as marking the point of an 
‘reinvention’ of the Americas, arguing that Alexander’s opening up of South and Latin America to a wide 
European audience also spelled the moment of a new and more in-land territorial phase in the search for raw 
materials by a ‘capitalist vanguard’ and in the rivalry for seizure of overseas territories. Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial 
Eyes, 109–40. 
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Americas. With these texts, Alexander proved himself to be an early and keen observer of 
how the politics of colonial modernity formed a decisive aspect of the becoming-global of 
the world. As a ‘historian of America’, his meticulous portraits of the Spanish colonial 
viceroyalties make it apparent that a cosmopolitanism with a moral commitment to cultural 
plurality remains fearfully impotent if it is not paired with an understanding of the trans-
national economic and political conditions that produce inequalities among ‘cultures’. 
 The scientific trajectories of the two brothers overlap not only in their biographical 
details or in their frequent references to one another within their writings, but also, and much 
more significantly, at the conceptual and epistemological level. Something like a 
Humboldtian research programme begins to appear once it is recognised how their works 
are conjoined by their commitment to the public responsibility of the sciences, conditioned 
by a philosophy of education and Bildung, and their insistence that scientific inquiry be 
premised upon the onto-epistemological primacy of interaction and dynamism.484 This 
programme is shaped by three basic yet decisive insights. Firstly, no full truth can be 
ascertained monolingually (be this of ‘scientific’ or of ‘natural’ languages) and therefore 
translations form not just an auxiliary or communicational compliment to science but one of 
its presuppositions. Secondly, knowledge is always constructed out of moving parts and 
science therefore has to be dynamic in nature. And finally, scientific presentation both 
depends upon and should aim towards globality and must work at the construction of a 
properly planetary conception of totality. Alexander’s Amerikanische Reisetagebücher explicitly 
registered the fundamental axiom for this conception of science with the brief note: 
‘everything is interaction’.485 The idea that everything not only interacts but is interaction was 
for Alexander crystallised in the highly combinatorial theoretical model found in his Cosmos, 
in which simple causal chains were displaced by an expansive ‘general interlinkage, not in a 
simple linear direction, but in a web-like, intricate interweaving’.486 Something very similar 
can be said of  Wilhelm’s study of  languages, wherein metaphors of  weaving and of  
organismic interrelation figuratively translate a conception of  language in which primary 
 
484 Ette, ‘Languages about Languages’, 50. The following summary of the basic outlines of what could be called 
a Humboldtian research programme is indebted to Ette’s proposals in this article. 
485 The context for this expression – a German interruption into what is otherwise a French text – was that of 
a set of climatological and geological reflections that today have an ominously prophetic quality to them: 
‘L’évaporation, causeé par la chaleur, produit le manque d’eau et de rivieères, et le manque d’évaporation (source 
principale du froid atmosphe ́rique) augmente la chaleur. Alles ist Wechselwirkung.’ A. Humboldt, quoted in 
Ottmar Ette, ‘Everything is interrelated, even the errors in the system: Alexander von Humboldt and 
globalization’, Atlantic Studies 7, no. 2 (June 2010), 115. 
486 The physical history and the physical description of the universe here merge into a ‘allgemeine Verkettung, 
nicht in einfacher linearer Richtung, sondern in netzartig verschlungenem Gewebe’. See A. Humboldt, Kosmos. 
Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung. vol. I, 1845, 33. The reissued English translation from 1848 carries no 
trace of this methodological inscription in the corresponding pages. Cf. CAS, vol.1, 34–35. 
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importance is placed upon the reciprocal affection between the individual and the universal, 
between language users affecting language and language forming its users. In an early letter 
to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann, which proclaimed Wilhelm’s wide-ranging ambitions of  
scientific and educational reform, we glimpse how such a view of  interaction paradoxically 
both entails hyper-anthropocentrism and explodes the limits of  a ‘merely human’ 
perspective.  
 
A complete restoration of  the sciences, and even more, of  all human endeavours, has been needed for 
centuries, and the necessity grows with each year [...]. The most important step toward this restoration 
is to bring unity to all human striving, to show that this unity is the human person, indeed, the inner 
human person, and to describe to the human person how he affects everything beyond himself, and 
how everything beyond himself  affects him, and from this, to depict the state of  humankind [den Zustand 
des Menschengeschlechts], to conceptualise its possible revolutions, and to explain to the extent possible, its 
real ones.487 
 
The pure anthropocentrism which situates the unity of  all science within the concept of  man 
as that which ‘affects everything beyond himself ’ can be neatly held in place only if  the 
second half  of  this sentence is ignored, namely that ‘everything beyond himself  affects him’. 
That everything beyond man affects him entails that while man is central, he is himself  ex-
centric. This eccentricity of  man as man was, as I will show later, both to be found in the 
relation of  the human organism to its physical environment, and, most significantly 
expressed in the intimacies of  language and thought. This intimacy underlies the 
Humboldtian linguistic re-coding of  the concept of  culture central to the idea of  cultural 
cosmopolitanism today, and thus is the starting point of  my subsequent discussion. To show 
this, a brief  consideration of  the varied landscape of  cosmopolitanisms will demonstrate the 
importance of  Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of  language in this regard.  
 
II. A World of  Cosmopolitanisms 
In its historical context, the ‘alternative cosmopolitanism’ of  the brothers von Humboldt is 
not ‘alternative’ by virtue of  being the sole response to a monolithic Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. Rather, a range of  what can arguably be called different cosmopolitanisms 
circulated in Germanophone learned milieus of  the period. Such a historical pluralisation of  
the idea of  cosmopolitanism has been one way to displace onto less reductive conceptual 
grounds that seemingly endless stalemate of  between primarily nationally bounded culturalist 
essentialism and liberal rights-based cosmopolitan universalism that emerged within the 
 
487 Wilhelm Humboldt, letter to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann, 18 March 1793, quoted in Ette, ‘Languages about 
Languages’, 55, (translation modified). 
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multiculturalism debates throughout the 1990s.488 Since it is not obvious whether this 
stalemate has since been overcome, a reminder that we might want to distinguish between 
different conceptions of  what a political and moral commitment to ideas of  
cosmopolitanism entail remains timely, especially since they often rest on different 
conceptions of  morality, legality and politics itself.489 Between legal cosmopolitanism and the 
idea of  a universal right to have rights, international federative cosmopolitanism, cultural 
cosmopolitanism, market cosmopolitanism, and romantic cosmopolitanism, there are as 
many differences as there are overlaps.490 Within this typology, the Humboldtian intervention 
falls within a linage of  so-called cultural cosmopolitanisms, wherein Johann Gottfried Herder 
and Georg Forster can be counted as the most important and influential early figures.  
 Broadly conceived, this form of  cosmopolitanism can be distinguished from other 
articulations by virtue of  three defining and mutually interdependent characteristics: one, a 
critique of  unreflective ethno-centrism; two, an emphasis on the incommensurability of  
value-judgements formed within different cultures; and three, an explicit affirmation of  
cultural pluralism. Taken together, they inscribe the perspective of  collectives (‘nations’ or 
‘cultures’) within the otherwise primarily individualist perspective of  rights-based and moral 
cosmopolitanism.491 Unsurprisingly, the concrete shape which this form of  cosmopolitanism 
will take, depends almost entirely upon on the conception of  ‘culture’ brought to bear on 
the cosmopolitical commitment. For this reason, there is an immense cleft between Forster’s 
cultural cosmopolitanism – with a primarily environmentally-determined conception of  
national cultural difference – and any contemporary re-actualisations of  this idea. Between 
them stand the mediation of  the concept of  culture through that of  linguistic identity and 
difference. The importance of  this mediation places the Humboldtian cosmopolitanism in 
closer proximity to Herder than to Forster and thus closer to the tensions which can be 
found in Herder’s writings, between a linguistic-cultural ‘nationalism’ and a commitment to 
 
488 Another, perhaps more urgent, debate has been the investigation of non-European cosmopolitanisms, which 
has increasingly been a point of the orientation in research on cosmopolitanism post-2000s. See Carol A. 
Breckenridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty (ed.), Cosmopolitanism (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
489 In this sense, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins’ anthology on ‘real existing cosmopolitanism’ as a cosmopolitical 
field wherein different cosmopolitical ideals circulate, remains very much actual today. See Pheng Cheah and 
Bruce Robbins (ed.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998). 
490 Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany’ in Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 1999, 505–24. Importantly, Kleingeld does not consider the years after 1800 since she considers 
the early nineteenth century to be marked first of all by the rise of nationalist and patriotic discourses. While it 
of course is true that this period saw the rise of nationalism, this delineation nevertheless causes her to overlook 
what can be considered the most important theoretical site from which to think an ‘alternative cosmopolitanism’ 
in the form of a ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ today, namely that of the brothers Humboldt. 
491 Ibid., 518. 
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international justice.492 The specificity of  the Humboldtian intervention therefore stands out 
all the clearer, if  the contrast between Forster and Herder is first taken into account. 
 Well known as a naturalist and anthropologist who published (amongst other things) 
accounts of  his travels with James Cook between 1772–75 and a series of  critiques of  Kant’s 
anthropological theories (in particular the concept of  race found therein), Forster was an 
important early interlocutor for both of  the Humboldt brothers. The idea of  
cosmopolitanism which he championed grew out of  the conviction that global cultural 
homogeneity would lead to an impoverishment of  the intellectual and artistic endeavours of  
humankind.493 In many ways, the views that Forster expressed in his writings on the many 
different peoples of  the Earth can be described as one that pairs a natural universalist 
perspective with a cultural particularistic one. The principal idea of  his late theoretical essays 
is that the essential predispositions (Anlage) for reason, imagination, and feeling are shared 
by all humans, and that planetary differences of  climate, geographical terrains, and conditions 
of  life have led, over time, to a differentiation in the cultural expressions of  these 
predispositions: 
 
What man [der Mensch] could become, he has everywhere become in accordance with the local 
conditions. Climate, location of  towns, height of  mountains, direction of  rivers… have sometimes 
favoured him from one side, sometimes limited him from another and influenced his physique as well 
as his moral behaviour. In this way, he has nowhere become everything, but everywhere become 
something different.494  
 
Contrary to Kant, with whom he carried out a public discussion on the concept of  race, 
Forster found this diversity to be inherently valuable. In correspondence with this idea, 
Forster attempted to adopt specific methodological doctrines for the study of  cultural 
differences within his earlier travel relations. With the intention to systematically describe the 
material aspects of  cultures as well as the political systems, religions and customary practices 
of  the peoples he observed, his work partook in the then-prevalent desire to render travel 
writings scientific.495 In Cosmos, Alexander noted precisely this distinctive aspect of  Forster’s 
scientific career: ‘With him a new era of scientific expeditions began with the goal of 
comparative ethnology (Völkerkunde) and regional geography (Länderkunde).’496 The central 
 
492 Herder the proto-nationalist is well-known whereas the vindication of Herder the cosmopolitan has only 
happened in recent years, in line with the work to develop an ‘alternative’ cosmopolitanism’ in the form which 
I am discussing here. See, especially, Michael Forster, Johann Gottfried Herder: Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Sonia Sikke, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire. 
493 Kleingeld, ‘Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism’, 515. 
494 Georg Forster, ‘Über lokale und Allgemeine Bildung’ (1791), quoted in ibid., 516. 
495 For the notion of ‘travel as science’ see Sergio Moravia, ‘Philosophie et geographie a la fin du XVIIIe siècle’. 
496 CAS, vol.II, 71. 
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questions in this regard were those of  the standards for evaluating and comparing different 
peoples. As a proponent of  the early anthropological ideal of  objectivity and suspension of  
prejudice in the study of  extra-European ways of  life, he emphasised the importance of  
investigating the individual character of  each people as a whole, without prematurely 
subjecting it to a cross-cultural theory of  spiritual development and without classifying it in 
relation to European conceptions of  reason and morality. On this account, stages of  
development were to be measured solely within each culture, according to the degrees of  
inner richness and differentiation. This meant that rather than by the application of  a 
universal standard in relation to which civilizational progression could be measured, the very 
notion of  complexity came to be the formal criteria of  comparison. Projected to a global 
level, it is in the combination of  a commitment to the essential moral equality of  all human 
beings with a concern for national cultural plurality that Forster’s cosmopolitanism lies. 
Politically, this form of  cosmopolitanism is therefore compatible with international 
federative cosmopolitanism, if  the latter remains protective of  cultural pluralism.  
 Although he did not have the first-hand experience of  the world that Forster did, these 
aspects resonate within Herder’s writings. If  anything, Herder took the critique of  
ethnocentrism even further, arguing in Letters for the Advancement of  Humanity (1793–7) that: 
 
There is no such thing as a specially favoured nation (Favoritvolk) on Earth… there cannot, therefore, 
be any order of  rank… the negro is as much entitled to think the white man degenerate as the white 
man is to think the negro as a black beast… Least of  all must we think of  European culture as a universal 
standard of  human values. To apply such a standard is not just misleading; it is meaningless. For 
‘European culture’ is a mere abstraction, an empty concept. Where does, or did, it exist in its entirely? 
In which nation? In which period? Besides, it can scarcely be posed as the most perfect manifestation 
of  man’s culture, having – who can deny? – far too many deficiencies, weaknesses, perversions and 
abominations associated with it. Only a real misanthrope could regard European culture as the universal 
constitution of  our species. The culture of  man is not the culture of  the European; it manifests itself  
according to place and time in every people.497  
 
Furthermore, against what he considered a false idea of  universal values – values that could 
be called ‘universal European’ values – Herder adopted the notion that an understanding of  
the substantial differences between peoples is predicated upon the understanding of  the 
differences between languages. As such, it would not be an overstatement to say that the 
fundamental insight orienting the mediation of  the philosophy of  history with a philosophy 
of  language in On Language had already been formulated by Herder in his Ideen zur Philosophie 
der Geschichte der Menschheit.498 In 1784, the same year Kant published his Idea for a Universal 
 
497 Johann Gottfried von Herder, Letters for the Advancement of Humanity, quoted in Herder on Social and Political 
Culture: A Selection of Texts, ed. F.M. Barnard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 24. 
498 In many ways Ideen is, like the On Language, the sprawling culmination to many years of writing on this very 
same topic. The multi-volume work was most notably, in this regard, preceded by Auch eine Philosophie der 
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History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, Herder both reiterated his earlier critiques of  the evaluation 
of  different societies through purportedly common standards of  perfection and proposed 
that the very act of  cultural comparison passes through comparison between languages: 
 
The finest essay on the history and the diverse character of  the human understanding and heart would be a 
philosophical comparison of  languages: for in every language a people’s understanding and character is imprinted.499 
 
In line with this view, humanity is, so Herder argued, best conceived of  not immediately from 
the side of  universally shared human traits or as an abstract universal moral ideal, but in 
terms of  the plurality of  its distinct expressions: in ways of  living, of  experiencing the world, 
and of  assigning value to certain practices.500 In forming this argument, Herder, like Forster 
and later Wilhelm, did not use the term ‘culture’ (‘Cultur’ or ‘Kultur’) in the plural, in the sense 
of  ‘different cultures’, but writes instead of  the plurality of  different nationally specific ways 
in which humankind expresses conceptions of  virtues and ideals, of  what a just community, 
a good life, and happiness looks like at different points in history and in different places on 
Earth.501 National individuality rather than cultural difference dominates Herder’s discourse. 
In strongly organicist metaphors, Herder details how each of  these nationally delineated ways 
of  life make up an internally coherent and unified whole, incommensurable to all others and 
in principle of  equal value. There is therefore not a definitive way to judge the superiority of  
one nation over the other, and this central point might be called Herder’s thesis of  the moral 
 
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit: Beitrag zu vielen Beiträgen des Jahrhunderts that, ten years earlier, had both 
ironically critiqued and contributed to the fad for writing philosophies of history. For a discussion of this text, 
and for an elegant reflection on the difficulties which Herder’s ironic style poses to interpretations of his work, 
see Bertrand Binoche, ‘Herder in 1774: An Incomplete Philosophy of History’ in A Companion to Enlightenment 
Historiography, ed. Sophie Bourgault and Robert Sparling (Leiden: Brill, 2013) 189–216. 
499 Herder, Werke, vol. 6, quoted in Forster, German Philosophies of Language, 106 (translation amended). 
500 Eva Piirimäe, ‘Herder and Cosmopolitanism’ in Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason: Timing and Spaceing the Concept 
of World Citizenship, ed. R. Lettevall and K. Petrov (Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2013), 196–97. 
501 Neither Forster, Herder, Kant nor Wilhelm von Humbolt use ‘culture’ in the sense of ‘different cultures’. As 
discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis, in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, ‘Cultur’ is distinguished from 
‘Zivilisierung’. To be cultured in this sense is to be able to restrain oneself, to act on rational purposes and to 
resist the ‘pathology’ of desire and natural determination in a way which does not necessarily entail a social 
conception of man. To be civilized, to the contrary, is the social property of wishing to share one’s pleasure in 
certain objects with others. For these terms in Kant and Herder, see Raymond Geuss, ‘Kultur, Bildung, Geist’ 
in Morality, Culture and History, Essays on German Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 34. 
That Herder does not use the term ‘cultures’ in the plural is also noted by Jörg Fisch, ‘Zivilisation, Kultur’, in 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 7, ed. Otto Brunner, 
Werner Conze, and Reinhardt Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1992), 711. When Wilhelm writes of 
civilisation and of culture in On Language, it is clear that in his view, they are different means toward the 
homogenisation of the world: ‘Civilisation and culture gradually sublates the glaring contrasts of peoples, and still 
more successful is the striving for the more universal moral form of a more deeply penetrating and nobler 
cultivation.’ OL, 34–35. 
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incommensurability of  different universalisms.502 Importantly, for Herder this moral 
incommensurability thesis did not entail the incomparability of  nations as such. Rather, it 
poses inter-national comparisons as a problem for the philosophy of  history. Herder’s own 
approach to this problem found its cue in the notion that national communities – and with 
them national identities – are recognisable by their linguistic commonalities, since it is within 
a specific language that traditions are formed and in turn gives form to the people. It is this 
intuition that guides the mediation of  the philosophy of  history with a philosophy of  
language.  
 
III. Another Philosophy of  Language, Another Philosophy of  History: Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Linguistic 
Intervention 
To construct the parameters for a philosophical comparison of  languages and to lay bare its 
theoretical presuppositions is precisely the task which Wilhelm von Humboldt sets for 
himself  in On Language, whose title moreover names the deeper motivation behind this mode 
of  comparative linguistics: to assess the influence of  language structures on the spiritual 
development of  humankind. Moreover, the two elemental fusions that the Humboldtian 
linguistic intervention into the philosophy of  history is premised upon – the intimacy of  
thinking with linguistic articulation and the intimacy of  national character with national 
linguistic characteristics – also formed the very backbones of  the German Romantic 
philosophies of  language, for which Herder equally stands as an early model. It would, 
however, be a mistake to see in Humboldt’s writings and in his concern for language merely 
the site wherein a philosophy of  language – already developed in its most notable aspects by 
Herder – came to be filled in with the empirical study of  a plurality of  languages and thus 
of  linguistic differences.503 The question of  what precisely constitutes a philosophical 
comparison – of  both the matrix and the proper units of  comparison – is in this case as 
important as the very idea of  comparison itself. In dialogue and discussion with Friedrich 
Schlegel’s 1808 philosophical study of  Sanskrit in On the Language and Wisdom of  the Indians, 
Wilhelm proposes that what should be compared are grammatical structures, not individual 
words or phonemes as Herder primarily seems to have believed. In an essay on linguistic 
comparison, Wilhelm makes clear a point that will be iterated at several moments in On 
Language and which will also function as one of  the methodological presuppositions for the 
study as a whole: 
 
 
502 For a discussion of the psychological, empirical and normative aspects of Herder’s incommensurability-
thesis, see Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire, 223–24. 
503 This is the clear tendency in Forster’s German Philosophies of Language, 112–13. 
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Languages are the true images of  the modes in which nations think and combine their ideas. The manner 
of  this combination, represented by the grammar, is altogether as essential and characteristic as are the 
sounds applied to objects, that is to say, the words.504  
 
Because languages are in some sense living wholes, since their nature is revealed not in their 
isolated elements but by how they each operate syntheses of  judgement, the essential 
problem faced by anyone who wants to study them scientifically is how to proceed from 
analytic reason, which parcels languages as an objects into units of  analysis, to a grasp of  the 
‘life’ of  the object at hand. Languages, as Wilhelm famously held, were not finished works 
or products (ergon) but living activities (energeai) that at every moment must be brought to life 
within ‘the ever-repeated work of  the spirit of  making the articulated sound capable of  
expressing thought’.505 To truly understand a language, what must be confronted is its 
grammar, its way of  producing meaningful statements in living and recorded discourses of  
speaking human beings. Moreover, when he argues that each language is a Weltbild and a 
Weltansicht,506 that the diversity of  human languages is ‘not one of  sounds and signs but a 
diversity of  worldviews’,507 both a singular image of  the world and a specific viewpoint onto 
the world, he is not only making a point about the genealogical primacy of  language – the 
primary basis for both Herder’s and Johann Georg Hamann’s largely empiricist metacritiques 
of  Kant’s Critique of  Pure Reason.508 What he does is to render the transcendental plane 
immanent to language itself, that is, to introduce a linguistic schematism into the constitution 
of  the objects of  experience. This is a way to historicise the transcendental through a focus 
on the socially malleable and therefore historically transformable linguistic structures which 
it is shaped within. The plasticity of  language then becomes, the mark of  the historicity of  
the transcendental. It is within the context of  this displacement that the tension between two 
conceptions of  linguistic difference in Wilhelm’s philosophy of  language are to be found: 
one which tends toward a view of  each language as an individual, to be explored with a view 
to determine its singular character and one which tends toward a historico-comparative 
typology of  languages more or less fit for the synthetic operation of  thought. There is split, 
in other words, between two tendencies present in Humboldt’s philosophy of  language: one 
that opens the road to attempts to think cross-cultural comparison through the comparison 
 
504 W. Humboldt, ‘An Essay on the best Means of ascertaining the Affinities of Oriental Languages’ (1828), 
Gesammelte Schriften vol.6 1827–1835, edited by Albert Leitzmann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1907), 80. 
505 OL, 49. 
506 He writes, for instance, ‘there resides in every language a characteristic world-view’ and ‘What is created from 
the world-outlook reacts back upon the language’. OL, 60, 140. 
507 Wihelm von Humbdolt, quoted in Trabant, ‘Vanishing Worldviews’, 26. 
508 ‘In Speech alone awakens slumbering reason: or rather, the bare capacity of reason, which of itself would 
have remained eternally dead, acquires through speech vital power and efficacy.’ Herder, Outlines for a Philosophy, 
87 
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of  languages without an axiological overdetermination and one which (p)re-inscribes a 
hierarchy of  cultures within the classification of  the different languages of  the world.509 It is 
only by emphasising the former and by adding to it the explicit anti-slavery arguments made 
by Alexander – which will be discussed later in this chapter – that one can claim that ‘the 
Humboldt Brothers together developed a historical anthropology that sought to appreciate 
every human group on its own terms, for none were in any meaningful sense ‘superior’ or 
‘inferior’ to any other’.510 How, then, does this split appear within the philosophy of  language, 
and how does it therefore also come to be at stake in Humboldt’s mediation of  the 
philosophy of  history with his philosophy of  language? 
 
IV. Two Roads in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Philosophy of  Language 
That the transcendental field is rendered immanent to language, entails that languages can no 
longer be viewed as mere mediums through which thinking becomes communicable and 
exteriorised in speech. To think at all is to move within a specific language, to the extent that 
thought only happens in language and that only that which can be expressed linguistically can 
be thought. As Wilhelm von Humboldt phrases this insight: ‘language is the formative 
[bildende] organ of  thought’ and, as such, ‘thought and language […] are inseparable from 
each other’.511 But while the inseparability of  thought and language is therefore a 
fundamental presupposition of  any investigation into the nature of  either, they are not for 
that reason assumed to be simply identical. Rather, from the perspective of  Wilhelm’s 
linguistics, 
 
the true precondition of  any kind of  intellectual activity is ultimately the formative power of  language 
which, as Sprachform, precedes the contingent linguistic manifestations of  which it is the ideal essence 
[…] Language, as a form, becomes the very structure of  thought, an a priori structure. Thought is once 
again conditioned by language, but this time in a framework in which language is seen as the carrier of  
the a priori structures of  subjectivity.512  
 
509 As often happens, this has meant that a lot of interpretational effort is put into adjudicating which of these 
two tendencies are revelatory of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ‘true’ philosophy of language. Along these lines, 
Donatella Di Cesare argues that while Wilhelm creates a typology of languages, he is fundamentally disinterested 
in the effort to hierarchically classify them. Cleaving typology from classification, she argues that the former is 
integral to his utterly new philosophy of language and the latter merely an external remnant of traditional 
conceptions of linguistic difference. The more truthful approach, in my view, would be to attempt to account 
for the presence of both within one and the same oeuvre. See Donatella Di Cesare, ‘The Philosophical and 
Anthropological Place of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Linguistic Typology’, in Leibniz, Humboldt, and the Origins of 
Comparativism, ed. Tuillo de Mauro and Lia Formigari (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 1990), 160. 
510 This is how Walls describes the cosmopolitanism of the Humboldts. She does not, however, consider how 
this cosmopolitanism stands in tension with other aspects within the Humboldtian philosophy of language. See 
Walls, The Passage to Cosmos, 174. 
511 OL, 54 [GS VII, 53]. 
512 Lia Formigari, Signs, Science and Politics: Philosophies of Language in Europe 1700–1830 (Amsterdam and 
 164 
 
Languages are neither entirely subjective nor entirely objective, but ‘objectively active and 
independent, precisely in so far as it is subjectively passive and dependent’.513 No language 
has a permanent abode outside of  its usage and it must always be brought to life by an 
individual speaker who in turn both shapes and is shaped by the language spoken. In the 
final instance, On Language mediates the philosophy of  history with a philosophy of  language 
by continually triangulating the national character of  a people, its expression in linguistic 
form, and the individual freedom of  inventiveness within the limits of  the semantic and 
grammatical schemas of  a given language.  
 It is however important to maintain that this mediation does not simply collapse 
language and history. In On Language, Wilhelm’s notion of  the ‘the historian’s task’ – the 
deceptively simple ‘presentation [Darstellung] of  what has actually happened’514 – provides a 
model for the ‘task of  the linguist’: to produce a presentation not just of  the component 
parts of  language but of  the concrete conditions under which humans attempt to reach 
reality through linguistic forms.515 The deeper motivation for the analogy between the tasks 
of  the linguist and historian arises from the historical and linguistic objects themselves, which 
demand a reconfiguration of  the relation between the empirical and philosophical. What 
these tasks attest to is the need for philosophy not simply to compliment itself  with empirical 
research, but further to be shaped in a passage through empirical research in order to secure 
its proper objects as totalities. That is, for the philosophy of  language to pass through a more 
highly developed empirical study of  languages and for the philosophy of  history to pass 
through more conscientious empirical study of  history. The rationale behind such a 
reconfiguration, can be gleaned from two early sketches for texts on world history, 
‘Considerations on World History’ and ‘Considerations on the Dynamic Forces in World 
History,’516 which also outline Wilhelm’s conception of  an alternative philosophy of  history. 
 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1993), 171–72. 
513 OL, 53. 
514 OHT, 58. This essay is widely considered one theoretically foundational for the development of modern 
German Historicism and therefore as a text which places Wilhelm von Humboldt at a distance from earlier 
‘philosophies of history’. It also in many ways shares Dilthey’s later concerns with the development of a ‘critique 
of historical reason’. This section argues that Wilhelm’s essay is, rather, an attempt to realign the relation between 
historical research and philosophical construction within another philosophy of history. 
515 For the ‘task of the linguist’, see OL, 27 [GW VII, 20] (translation modified). While Humboldt does not use 
the same terms – Geschäft for the language researcher, Aufgabe for the historian – the cross-reference within On 
Language to precisely the lecture on the historian’s task supports my interpretation of the two as non-trivially 
aligned. 
516 From these early sketches to the later more developed form to be found in ‘On the Historian’s Task’, there 
is an important line of enquiry, not broached here, that centres on the concept of force and in particular the role 
of vital forces in world history. In ‘Considerations on World History’ and ‘Considerations on the Dynamic 
Forces in World History’ alike, two orders of force obliquely conjoin within Wilhelm’s idea of humanity. It is 
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 Two overarching themes – which will also reappear both in ‘On the Historian’s Task’ 
and in On Language – meet in these texts: that of  correctly determining the concept of  the 
human species such that it might guide the conceptual apparatus of  the philosophy of  
history, and that of  adjudicating the character of  and relations between two orders of  
dynamic forces in history, those of  nature and of  freedom. In these early sketches, Wilhelm 
is at pains to distance himself  from ‘philosophical world histories’ and the ‘so-called history 
of  humanity [Menscheit] and its culture’ which he understands as highly fictionalised 
depictions of  an incremental development from savagery towards increased perfection. His 
ambivalence toward Kant’s conception of  universal world history indicates the predicament 
he sees the philosophy of  history to be caught within: 
 
There exists more than one attempt to bring under a single point of  view the individual, scattered, and 
seemingly random events of  the world history and to derive them from one another according to a 
principle of  necessity. Kant did this first, most systematically and most abstractly and several others 
have followed in his tracks. All so-called philosophical histories are attempts of  this kind and the 
obsession with presenting observations about history has nearly displaced history, at least in the 
historical sense. 517  
 
Kant’s idea of  universal world history is, in a sense, to Wilhelm both an ideal and the perfect 
image of  the problem with philosophies of  history. Its systematicity, although admirable, is 
ultimately flawed since its starting point was too abstract. Wilhelm’s critique is, therefore, 
specifically of  a conception of  history which would orient itself  toward an abstract ideal of  
perfection rather than the richness of  individual forms.518 The counter to this tendency is 
found in a new conception of  the human species, one which does not fall prey to what 
Wilhelm considers an overly intellectualist bias, wherein an idea of  the social or individual 
perfectibility and perfection of  the abstractly human imposes a unilateral schema onto the 
history of  humankind. In these early texts, he situates his reworked concept of  the human 
species in the concrete natural-historical terrain where life unfolds and within the natural 
universe as a whole. In ‘On the Historian’s Task’, the linguistic perspective joins the natural-
historical conception of  the human species, in a text that oscillates between rejecting and 
 
oblique both in the sense that it is hard to determine precisely how Wilhelm von Humboldt approaches this 
question and insofar as it seems that the most convincing account to be constructed out of what he writes on 
this issue is that he leaves it, in a Kantian manner, as something which is simply beyond the bounds of our 
experience. In my reading of these I have drawn on Jean Quillien, ‘Introduction’ to Guillaume de Humboldt, 
La tâche de l’historien (Lille: Septentrion, 1985), 7–43. 
517 W. Humboldt, ‘Betrachtungen über die bewegenden Ursachen in der Weltgeschichte’, in Gesammelte Schriften 
vol.3 1799–1818, ed. by Albert Leitzmann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1904), 360 (my translation). 
518 ‘dass man die Vollendung des Menschengeschlechts in Erreichung einer allgemeinen, abstract gedachten 
Vollkommenheit, nicht in der Entwicklung eines Reichthums grösser individueller Formen sucht.’ W. 
Humboldt, ‘Betrachtungen Über die Weltgeschichte’, in Gesammelte Schriften vol.3 1799–1818, ed. by Albert 
Leitzmann (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1904), 358. 
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accepting the philosophy of  history as an intellectual endeavour. With this text, it becomes 
clear that, 
 
[t]o comprehend the diversity of  human nature, one must begin by comprehending the diversity of  
human language. For Humboldt, the value of  comparative linguistic study resides in its use toward 
understanding man; it is a need that arose from his anthropology.519 
 
The study of  human differences – of  the differences between modes of  thought, political 
practice and artistic expression – depends on a preliminary investigation of  the characters 
of  different languages. Any attempt to capture the characteristics of  a specific people will 
therefore be entirely amiss if  it fails to comprehend what is distinctive of  the language in 
which its self-conception is formed and reflected. Additionally and inversely, a deeper 
understanding of  a specific language requires knowledge of  the cultural whole within which 
it is alive. Ultimately, however, the careful warnings we find in ‘On the Historian’s Task’ 
against the imposition of  a priori schemas as explanatory devices in historical expositions, is 
not a full displacement of  the philosophy of  history but a way to emphasise how one might 
do history better – and, thus, how one might do the philosophy of  history better. Practically, 
the work of  the historian proceeds in two directions, accompanied by two separate sets of  
commitments. The first is the critical mode, which aims to determine the procedure for 
finding, among all strains of  transient and temporal human activities, the facts out of  which 
a historical narrative will be constructed: a source critical as well as self-critical endeavour in 
the suspension of  pre-judged conclusions. The second is the mode of  connecting and 
presenting the facts, which demands insight into how events are connected, an insight 
irreducible to any single fact.520 The latter is the commitment to finding and presenting the 
essence of  history, not in a single idea but in its multiplicity. The problem, as Wilhelm frames 
it, is that as much as it must be assumed that ideas are operative in world history, and as much 
as ‘universal history cannot be understood without world governance [Weltregierung]’,521 we 
possess ‘no special faculty for inquiring into the plans of  world governance’.522 Not directly 
perceptible, they are also not ‘made up’, not fantastical – the ideas which organise universal 
history ‘originate in the mind through contemplation of  these events [the mass of  events] 
undertaken in a true historical spirit.’523 How precisely this is supposed to happen largely 
remains mysterious within this texts. Ideas are described as accessible, in some sense, in that 
 
519 Cesare, The Philosophical and Anthropological Place’, 162. 
520 OHT, 62. 
521 Ibid., 67. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid., 64. 
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they are attached to phenomenal objects and ‘can be perceived in them like non-corporeal 
beings which one never perceives unless one leaves the realm of  phenomena and enters 
mentally into the realm where they originate’.524 And although Wilhelm states that it is 
without doubt that ideas exist, and that certain phenomena cannot be explained without 
them since they cannot be explained according to the laws of  nature, he also does not specify 
which phenomena he has in mind. Instead, he ventures the proposal that this kind of  idea 
manifests, or ‘externalises’, itself  into the course of  events, either in the form of  trends in 
which many particulars are affected by something general or in the creative energy that 
exceeds the conditions out of  which it arose. In the latter case, the ideal of  Greece holds a 
special place, since it is regarded as the site where the multiplicity of  different individualities 
were brought to active corporation through a division into different nations and cities 
beautifully reunified. What emerged among the Greeks was the very idea of  national individuality 
as an aesthetic ideal. In a passage from On Language that approaches Greece with many of  
these questions, this is extended to the idea that it is the Greeks that place their individuality 
into ideal form and thus spiritualise themselves in such a way that later generations can form 
a relation to this spirit rather than to the ‘historical Greeks’. This is the reason, in Wilhelm’s 
view, for the special place allotted to the Greek national spirit in the history of  man. Out of  
the Greek example, it becomes possible to recognise in others that there must be an ‘idea’ 
according to which their history and character are to be understood, while such an 
understanding at each instance must pass through the comprehension of  the linguistic forms, 
the semantic and grammatical schemas, of  the people in question. It is here that we can begin 
to appreciate the outline of  the two separate tendencies in both the philosophy of  history 
and the philosophy of  language. For the philosophy of  history, there is a split between the 
emerging-historicist intuition that historical phenomena always are to be interrogated as 
individuals (according to their specific idea) and the expansively systematic approach that 
would afford a view onto the multiple possible realisations of  these ideas in their possible 
interactions, ordered according to degree of  internal development. From both perspectives: 
‘The goal of  history can only be the actualisation of  the idea which is to be realised by 
mankind in every way and in all shapes in which the finite form may enter into union with 
the idea.’525 
 A similar split between a tendency toward individuation and one toward classification 
in the study of  language is revelatory of  the two possible avenues for thinking cultural-
linguistic difference: one that enables cross-cultural comparison through linguistic 
 
524 Ibid., 67. 
525 OL, 70. 
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comparison without axiological overdetermination, and one that (p)re-inscribes a hierarchy 
of  cultures within the classification of  world languages. In the latter, the superiority that 
natural-historical classifications of  race assigned to white Europeans is displaced into and 
recoded as linguistic superiority of  some linguistic community over others.526 Typically, such 
a hierarchy in early comparative linguistics had taken form on the basis of  a primary 
distinction between literary and non-literary linguistic communities, but in Wilhelm’s case 
matters were more complicated, since he considered such a divide to have primarily a 
heuristic function. The heuristic function of  this distinction should be underscored, because 
he, unlike many contemporaries, does not appear to have considered literacy a mark of  
intelligence, but simply a trait which, if  lacking, would contribute to the difficulty of  truly 
understanding a people’s national character:  
 
With people among whom we can discover the marks of  their individuality only in the particular 
elements of  their language, we are seldom ever able to project a coherent picture of  what is peculiar to 
them. Although this is everywhere a difficult task, it becomes possible only where nations have set down 
their world views in a more or less extensive literature and imprinted on their language in connected 
discourse.527  
 
Wilhelm’s point, here, is that the absence of  literacy does not necessarily reflect greater 
simplicity within the languages in question, but causes the one studying them to assume a 
greater uniformity than is actually the case. ‘We do not recognise’, he writes, ‘their 
distinguishing traits, because they are not conveyed to us by the medium that would enable 
us to see them.’528 The tension between a non-hieratical and hierarchical thought of  linguistic 
difference is nevertheless unmistakable. The former is found in the several assertions to the 
effect that ‘[t]he difference of  character among languages need not necessarily consist, therefore, 
in any absolute advantage of  one over any other’529 and that ‘every language contains the whole 
conceptual fabric and mode of  presentation of  a portion of  mankind’.530 Among all the 
worlds languages, ‘we cannot, unless the facts imperatively demand it, presuppose a gradual 
progress since every significant enhancement appertains, rather, to a peculiar creative force’.  531 
Similarly, he outright rejects the division between cultivated and uncultivated languages, and 
especially the view that because some peoples are more cultivated, so are their languages. In 
these instances, he argues instead that the causal relations in this case are much more complex 
than what can be captured within such a division. Every language, moreover, contains within 
 
526 Cesare, ‘The Philosophical and Anthropological Place’, 161.  
527 OL, 153 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid., 156. 
530 Ibid., 60. 
531 Ibid., 32. 
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it ‘a totality corresponding to the range of  untrammelled human capacity for cultivation, from 
which everything particular that humanity encompasses can be created, without alien 
assistance’.532 In the many different linguistic paths, ‘the human mind is always capable of  
producing something great, and both fruitful and inspiring in its reverse action upon the 
mind itself. These particular points decide nothing however, as to the advantages that 
languages have over one another.’533 From this perspective, typological division can only be 
generated out of  the comparison of  languages, it cannot be the basis on which they are 
compared. But, it also seems clear that Wilhelm’s intuition was that when such a typology was 
constructed, it would be possible to determine the lesser and higher degree to which a 
language facilitated rational thought. Here, he relied on and developed Schlegel’s distinctions 
between inflected and isolating languages, with the assumption that some languages – namely 
those inflected such as Sanskrit and Greek – have a greater capacity to facilitate the formation 
of  thought: ‘That nations of  happier gifts, and under more favourable circumstances, possess 
languages superior to others, lies in the very nature of  the case.’534 Similarly, Humboldt writes 
of  imperfect languages whose coarseness produce weaker grasps of  finer points: 
 
The Chinese structure, however we may explain it, is obviously founded on an imperfection in the 
making of  the language, probably a custom, peculiar to that people, of  isolating sounds, coinciding with 
an insufficient strength of  the inner linguistic sense that calls for their combination and mediation.535 
 
This difference between languages and their suitability for rational thought is however, 
decidedly one of  degree, not of  ontological character. This is partly the case because of  the 
space left open for poetic and philosophical innovation of  individual language usage. Since 
the development of  languages happen in a dynamic interchange between the language 
structure and the creativity of  the language user, language itself  can, on this view, be 
stretched, expanded, and even morphed in different attempts to grasp truth. The poetic force 
of  individual language use also opens an avenue out of  an otherwise oft-noted problematic 
aspect of  the concept of  culture mediated with linguistic difference; namely, that it conceives 
of  languages and cultures alike as closed totalities and therefore largely foreclose the 
perspective of  hybridity and points of  encounter. Such an enclosure is a danger for both 
tendencies present in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work, so while the passage to the properly 
‘alternative’ cosmopolitanism undoubtedly goes through the practical affirmation of  the 
equality of  all cultures regardless of  their national-linguistic modes of  expression, this in 
 
532 Ibid., 33. 
533 Ibid., 146 
534 Ibid., 27. 
535 Ibid., 206. 
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itself  could just as easily entail a cosmopolitan accommodation of  nationalised cultural 
essentialism. Moreover, the moral affirmation of  equality needs its political counterpart in 
the intervention into the politics of  racial difference in colonial modernity, for which the 
work of  Alexander von Humboldt provides key insights. 
 
V. Alexander von Humboldt: Race in the Currents of  an Anti-Colonial Cosmopolitanism  
‘Die gefährlichste Weltanschauung ist die Weltanschauung derer, die die Welt nie angeschaut 
haben.’ These words – for which an English approximation might be phrased as ‘the most 
dangerous worldview, is that of  someone who has never taken the world into view’ – have 
often been attributed to Alexander von Humboldt. Regardless of  their true or apocryphal 
status, they aptly summarise the premise of  Alexander’s alternative cosmopolitanism, which 
entails the willingness to explicitly relativise the systems of  value and modes of  life from 
within which one forms judgements. Following this statement, encounters with difference 
dissolve any particular worldview’s absolute claim to universality. To this effect, Alexander’s 
publications from his long expedition in the Americas warned at several points against the 
ethnocentrism of  many prior texts on the region, which denigrated Amerindian forms of  
life, languages and cognitive capacities:  
 
[O]ne must be infinitely circumspect in criticizing what one might call the moral and intellectual 
disposition of  peoples from whom we are separated by the multiple barriers that arise from differences 
of  language, customs, and manners. A philosophical observer finds inaccuracy in what has been 
published on the national character of  Spaniards, French, Italians, and Germans in the middle of  
civilized Europe. How could a traveller stranded on an island, or who had lived in a distant country for 
some time, presume to judge the different faculties of  the soul and the prevalence of  reason, wit, and 
imagination of  other peoples?536 
 
In her portrayal of  Alexander as an anti-colonial cosmopolitan, someone for whom the 
cosmos was to be understood as a constantly changing and reciprocal sets of  causal relations, 
Soraya Nour argues that true comprehension of  the cosmos required the passage through 
different and difficult-to-access worldviews. As such, a particular cosmopolitanism – such as 
the alternative cosmopolitanism I have sketched here, one which includes not only the 
respect for universal human rights but also the recognition of  the equal worth of  different 
forms of  life – comes to form an ethico-political condition for comprehending the cosmos, 
as it can only truly be understood through the recognition of  multiple perspectives.537 In a 
 
536 PEKNS, 249. Humboldt returns to such cautions several times within this text and further develops the 
point that the misery travellers today might observe among indigenous populations should be taken as the 
expression of the devastating effects of colonial repression and years of subjection to ideological re-education 
by missionaries rather than as that of any innate characteristics. See 236–37 and 254–57. 
537 Soraya Nour Sckell, ‘Le cosmos et le cosmopolitisme d’Alexander von Humboldt’, in Le Soi et le Cosmos 
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world where there are real imbalances in how different perspectives are valued, this condition, 
for Alexander von Humboldt, translated into a critique of  the colonial system of  exploitation 
and cultural dominance.538 Where his critiques of  colonial institutions retained a partially 
diplomatic tone in his published travel writings, his private diaries from the expedition offer 
a much more frank assessment: 
 
the very idea of  a colony is an immoral idea, it is the idea of  rendering one country subordinate to 
another, of  a country in which only a certain degree of  prosperity is allowed, in which industry and 
enlightenment should only be propagated up until a certain point. For beyond this point, the mother 
country – so popular belief  has it – would gain less. Beyond this mediocrity, the too powerful and too 
self-reliant colony, would seek its independence. Every colonial government is a government of  mistrust 
[...]. Safety is sought in disunity, divisions between castes are ratified, the hatred and dissensus between 
them encouraged and unity by marriage forbidden just as slavery is protected because the Government 
may one day, when lacking all other means, resort to the cruellest of  all, which is that of  arming slaves 
against their masters, of  having them cut their throats before seeing their own so cut, which will always 
be the end of  this horrible tragedy. Jobs are only given to those who have come in hunger exile from 
Europe, these are allowed to publicly despise the natives of  the Colony. People who suck the blood of  
the Creoles are sent over, and these talk incessantly about the goods they have abandoned to settle in a 
land where everything displeases them, where the sky is not blue, where meat has no taste, where 
everything is despicable and yet they do not leave [...]. European governments have been so successful 
in spreading hatred and disunity in the Colonies that the pleasures of  society are almost unknown there. 
(Guayaquil, Ecuador, 4 January–17 February, 1803.)539 
 
Here, it is not a matter of  designating better or worse colonial governments – as was seen, 
for instance, in Protestant propaganda advancing the colonial claims of  North-European 
powers against the Spanish colonial regime – but of  a more radical critique of  colonial 
governance as such and of  the hypocrisy of  those who would try to justify their ends in ideas 
of  the paternalist guidance of  so-called lesser races:  
 
Nowhere in the world should a European be more ashamed of  being so, than in the Islands, be these 
French, English, Danish or Spanish. To debate which nation treats the blacks with most humanity is to 
make a mockery of  the word humanity and ask whether it would be gentler to slit open a person’s 
stomach or to skin them.540 
 
Clearly what lies at the heart of  these issues is the question of  modern slavery and of  race 
as the cipher of  difference most forcefully mobilised in the justifications of  its 
institutionalisation within the plantation economies of  the colonial system. Before his travels, 
 
d'Alexander von Humboldt à nos jours, ed. Soraya Nour Sckell and Damien Erhart (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 
2015), 23. 
538 Nour, ‘Le cosmos et le cosmopolitisme d’Alexander von Humboldt’, 18. 
539 Alexander von Humboldt’s personal journals were written in both German and French, with this passage 
originally in French. A. Humboldt quoted in Nour, ‘Le cosmos et le cosmopolitisme d’Alexander von 
Humboldt’, 31 (my translation). 
540 A. Humboldt, quoted in Sandra Rebok, ‘Alexander von Humboldt’s Perceptions of Colonial Spanish 
America’, Dynamis 29, 54 (my translation). 
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Alexander had, at the University of  Göttingen, been a student of  Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, whose work on the concept of  race both rivalled and was informed by that of  
Kant.541 (In)famously, it was Blumenbach who proposed that the white race might be 
considered the primeval type from which other races, as he phrased it, had degenerated.542 In 
Blumenbach’s classificatory system, the human species had, through various processes of  
degeneration, been diversified into five separate races. As both Blumenbach and Kant 
understood it, the central issue which such classificatory schemas posed to the sciences of  
man was whether and how they could be said to correspond to anything like a true system 
of  nature. In other words, could the principle of  categorical division be grounded in natural 
divisions, or would it always remain an arbitrary imposition in the face of  innumerable 
degrees of  differentiation in human appearances? For his part, Alexander clearly considered 
it an organisational artifice without scientific basis, however these racial differences were 
determined. In considering man’s place within the natural universe in the conclusion of  the 
first volumes of  the Cosmos, he notes that while the variation among humans customarily 
designated by ‘the somewhat vague appellation of  “races”’ has been the focal point of  much 
debate, ‘it is impossible to recognise in the groups thus formed any true typical distinction, 
any general and consistent natural principle’.543 Instead, two different avenues, one explicit 
and one implicit, can be discerned within his writings. The first follows closely Wilhelm’s 
work on languages, such that a more fine-grained classificatory device might identify the 
‘relations existing between races and languages’544 to effectively address the numerous 
contemporary questions about the intellectual and cultural differences between races in terms 
of  more complexly articulated differences between national-linguistic communities. The 
second eschews questions concerning the scientificity of  the concept of  race altogether, to 
instead analyse the politics of  racial difference and its inextricability from the history and 
institutions of  the transatlantic slave trade in the colonies and former colonies. The first of  
these approaches concludes the first volume of  the Cosmos, which largely consists of  
extended quotes and summaries of  On Language paired with a more outspoken commitment 
to the moral equality of  all humans and a natural historical monogenism. In a cosmos of  
many different linguistic worlds, Alexander emphasised that ‘[w]hile we maintain the unity 
of  the human species, we at the same time repel the  
 
541 See Bernasconi, ‘Who Invented the Concept of Race’, 11–36; and Chapter Three of this thesis. 
542 Although the term ‘degeneration’ means, to Blumenbach, something like development away from an original 
specimen, and not explicitly a deterioration. 
543 CAS, vol.1, 353. With a focus on these passages, Antenor Firmin’s anti-Gobineau war-machine of an 
argument relies on the authority of Alexander von Humboldt the scientist to support his own deconstruction 
of the concept of race in De l’égalité des races humaines (Paris: 1885). 
544 CAS, vol.1, 358. 
  173 
 of  superior and inferior races of  men’.545 It is precisely the practical commitment to 
countering ideas of  white superiority – one that positively becomes a commitment to the 
equality not only of  each individual but of  the worlds to which they belong – which leads to 
the second perspective onto questions of  race in Alexander von Humboldt’s writings, that 
of  its socio-political reality.  
 This perspective is overwhelmingly present in the Political Essay on the Kingdom of  New 
Spain and the Political Essay on the Island of  Cuba, wherein discussions of  the conditions of  life 
imposed on the indigenous populations after the Spanish conquest and of  the unjustifiability 
of  slavery are weaved into both geographic and socio-economic analyses. Constructed out 
of  personal observation – visits to mines, factories, and plantations – as well as from 
statistical materials drawn for the colonial archives of  the major cities Alexander had visited, 
these volume-long essays attempt to provide complete impressions of  the current conditions 
of  these Spanish colonies, including outlines of  the historical dynamics by which such 
conditions had been brought about. With these studies, he challenged the common view of  
the Americas as inherently inferior, degenerate, and underdeveloped continents, culturally, 
botanically, and zoologically – a view that is found in G.W.F. Hegel’s contemporaneous 
writings which, in turn, echoed Cornelius de Pauw’s earlier paradigmatic articulation of  this 
position in Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains (1771).546 In line with the more general 
critique of  colonisation found in his notebooks, Alexander seems to turn this view on its 
head, seeking to display through import–export tables, production statistics, and analysis of  
the conditions for agricultural production how the colonial regime actively under-develops 
the colonies. With this, he showed himself  moreover to be a keen observer of  both the 
complex terrains on which tensions between creole independence movements (some of  
which had already proved successful) and European powers were refracted into the questions 
concerning the abolition of  slavery, and of  the very explicit ways in which proximity to 
whiteness in the colonies formed the significant determining factor for personal rank. In the 
Political Essay on the Kingdom of  New Spain, which Alexander in his dedication to Charles IV 
described as a ‘statistical essay’ on the Mexican territories, race figures not primarily as a 
scientific category, but a legal and socio-political one, operationalised in a finely tuned system 
of  social control: 
 
In a country governed by whites, the families reputed to have the least amount of black or mulatto 
blood [sang nègre ou mulâtre] are naturally the most honoured […] In the Americas, the degree of whiteness 
 
545 In the footnote to this exclamation he adds: ‘The very cheerless, and, in recent times, too often discussed 
doctrine of the unequal rights of man, and of slavery as an institution in conformity with nature, is unhappily 
found most systematically developed in Aristotle’s Politica’. Ibid. 
546 See Gerbi, The Dispute over the New World. 
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of the skin determines a person’s rank in society. A White man [Blanc] who rides barefoot on horseback 
takes himself for local nobility. Colour even establishes a certain equality between men who, as is the 
case wherever civilisation is little advanced or backward, complacently refine the prerogatives of race 
and origin. Whenever a local man has an argument with one of the titled lords of the country, he is 
frequently heard to say, ‘Could you possibly think that you were whiter [plus blanc] than I am?’ 
Consequently, it is of great interest for public pride and respect to estimate accurately the fractions of 
European blood that one assigns to the different castes.547 
 
Whiteness here becomes a matter of  social convention ratified by law, rather than a natural 
given, as is attested to by the comments on those court processes through which mix-race 
families of  some economic means could request (and often were granted) the status ‘white’. 
‘These declarations’, Alexander wrote, ‘do not always correspond to the judgement of  the 
senses.’548 It is at the intersection of  these two modes of  conceptualising difference – one 
that centres linguistically-mediated cultural difference without an axiological 
overdetermination and one that centres the efficaciousness of  legal and political orders that 
ratify and enforce precisely a hierarchy among humans – that the real strength of  the 
Humboldtian alternative cosmopolitanism lies, even if, as will now be demonstrated, the 
latter aspect is inscribed within the analysis of  colonial practice rather than explicitly 
articulated. 
 The diagnostics of  institutionalised racism in the colonies turns into direct critique in 
the later Political Essay on the Island of Cuba which is, in essence, a complex argumentative 
machine aimed at persuading readers that the colonial institutions of slavery did not 
constitute a ‘necessary evil’, as its defenders liked to claim.549 It does so according to rhetorical 
strategies that in turn emphasised the economic benefits of  gradually phasing out slavery,550 
the political threat posed by the potential revolts of  immiserated slaves, and finally the moral 
indefeasibility of  slavery as an institution which denies the fundamental insight that as 
 
547 PENKS, 289–90 
548 ‘One sees very dark-skinned Mulattos [Mulâters très basané] who have skilfully whitened themselves [se faire 
blanchir] (this is the vulgar expression). When a person’s skin colour is too contrary to the solicited judgment, 
the petitioner is satisfied with a somewhat problematic expression. The judgment then reads that “such and 
such individuals may consider themselves white [que se tengan por Blancos]”.’ Ibid., 290. 
549 PEIC. The version quoted from is based on the French 1826 edition in two volumes. 
550 It would be interesting to consider the degree to which Alexander in these economic and political lines of 
reasoning is making a parallel case to that of the French Physiocrats in the late-eighteenth century, where the 
recognition that the mistreatment of slaves was not profitable and that the potential destabilisation of the colonial 
system apparent after the Berbice slave revolt in Dutch Guyana in 1763, called for serious reforms among slave-
owners if control over the colonies were to be secured. There are clear overlaps in the arguments presented, to 
the degree that one might consider Alexander as providing the empirical base (the statistics and political-
economic data of the West Indian colonies) for these very same arguments, especially since the Haitian 
Revolution of 1791–1804 would have rendered the strategic-political case for reform even more prescient. While 
a few sources remark on the ‘influence’ of the Physiocrats upon Humboldt’s conception of wealth as generated 
out of agriculture, I have not found any that explore this angle further. For the case of the Physiocrats and their 
anti-slavery arguments, see Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières, 160–68. 
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humans ‘all alike are designed for freedom’.551 And while he goes to great pains to convince 
the reader that Spanish reforms may have already ensured that the form of  slavery which he 
witnessed was not the harshest existing in the colonies – and, moreover, that the lot of  the 
enslaved varied widely according to which form of  work they were bound to – the reasoning 
underlying these lines of  argument is that no degree of  paternalist care for an enslaved 
population could make up for the absolute evil of  slavery.552 As the essay draws to an end, it 
is clear that while it may have been directed at a general public – as part of  Alexander’s 
extensive opus Americana – the intended audience for its interventionist agenda was not 
European learned circles but those who, within the colonies themselves, had the power not 
only to declare but also to realise the reforms.553 The distance between metropoles and colony 
mirrors that between ideal and reality in as much as the leadership of  European governments, 
 
will have no effect if  landowners, colonial assemblies or legislators, do not adopt the same views and do 
not act accordingly to orchestrated plans, whose final end is slavery’s cessation in the Antilles […] all 
these regulations, created with the best of  intentions, are easy to evade. The plantations isolation renders 
their enforcement impossible.554 
 
To Alexander, nothing must have seemed better suited to counter those notions according 
to which plantation economies by necessity required slave-labour than the minutely detailed 
portrait of the current state of Cuba: the composition of its territories and of its population, 
its capacities for agricultural production, its imports and exports as well as how all these 
factors compared to that of the other Antilles (in particular British Jamaica), Mexico, and 
Brazil. To this effect, the main parts of the text carefully constructs the economic and 
political case against slavery through a synoptic and systematic analysis of amply provided 
tables, tracing demographics, tax overviews, and colonial goods revenue. These tables were 
clearly constructed with the premise that every rational consideration of the given materials 
would lead the reader to conclusions similar to his own: that the only reasonable course of 
action for lawmakers and authorities would be to let the 1820 British abolition of the official 
slave-trade be followed by the abolition of the institution of slavery as such:555  
 
551 CAS, vol.1, 358. 
552 PEIC, 143, 144 and 153. 
553 The insight that Alexander’s arguments would have the most powerful effect if they convinced those in the 
colonies did not escape the attention of local creole elites in Cuba. The 1827 Spanish translation of the Political 
Essay on the Island of Cuba was banned upon publication. 
554 This line of reasoning again resonates with the Physiocratic insight that economic policy is to be implemented 
according to careful considerations of local conditions. Colonial assemblies and legislateurs should be granted a 
privileged place in the decision processes surrounding the transformation of the colonial system from one based 
on slave labour to one based on wage-labour because they ‘understand the locales, know how to calibrate the 
means of improvement to each island’s mores, customs, and circumstances’. PEIC 145, cf. 152. 
555 While certainly progressive, Alexander is no revolutionary on these issues: ‘I offer the following as the most 
urgent subjects for colonial legislators: enact laws that fix the numbers of  female blacks, and of  blacks in relation 
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The slave trade is not only barbaric; it is also unreasonable, because it fails to achieve its end. It is like a 
current of  water that one has channelled across a great distance to the colonies, where the water does 
not reach the soil for which it had been intended. Those who keep repeating that only black slaves can 
cultivate sugarcane seem unaware that there are 1,148,000 slaves in the Antilles Archipelago, and that 
only five or six hundred thousand of  them produce all the colonial crops in the entire Antilles.556  
 
Foreshadowing this economic line of reasoning is a carefully detailed demographic analysis 
of the Caribbean islands – based on tables horizontally divided according to the territories in 
question and vertically divided according to the categories of i) ‘whites’, ii) ‘free people of 
colour, mixed, and blacks’, and ii) ‘slaves’. This, in part, attests to Alexander’s keen awareness 
that, in a context wherein the politics of racial differences were so all-pervasive, the very 
fearfulness which informed the brutality that maintained the power of whiteness, might itself 
be leveraged in the case against slavery. To commence the reform of the slavery system, so 
he argues, might quell the trepidations of those who in the Haitian Revolution of 1781–1804 
saw the terrifying prospect of a slave-revolt supported by the free people of colour amongst 
themselves: 
 
In all of  the Antilles, men of  colour (black and of  mixed race, free and enslaved) add up to 2,360,000 
or 83 percent of  the total population. If  the laws in the Antilles and the legal status of  people of  colour 
do not change for the better soon and if  we continue to talk without acting, political supremacy will 
pass into the hands of  those who have the power of  labour, the will to emancipate themselves, and the 
courage to endure long privations. This bloody catastrophe will occur as a necessary result of  
circumstances without any involvement on the part of  Haiti’s free blacks, who will not have to abandon 
the isolation in which they have lived up to now. Who would dare predict the impact that an African 
Confederation of  the Free States of  the Antilles, situated between Colombia, North America, and 
Guatemala, would have on the politics of  the New World? The fear of  this eventuality no doubt affects 
the spirit more than do the principles of  humanity and justice […] The spirit in which even the earliest 
censuses (such as the one of  1775) were undertaken, using rubrics of  age, sex, race, and states of  civil 
liberty, deserves the highest praise. What was lacking were only the means for doing them properly. One 
sensed that the inhabitants’ peace of  mind depended in part on knowing the occupations of  black 
people, that is, their numerical distribution on sugar plantations, on the farms, and in the cities. In order 
to remedy the evil of  slavery, to avert public dangers, and to console the unfortunate members of  a race 
that suffers and is feared more than anyone cares to admit, it is necessary to clean out the wound. There 
are restorative forces in any intelligently lead social body – as there are within an organic body –, and 
with those one can eradicate even the most ingrained of  evils.557 
 
 
to each other, for each sugar plantation; grant freedom to every slave who has served 15 years and every black 
woman who has raised 4 or 5 children; emancipate both under the condition that they work a certain number 
of  days for the plantation’s profit; give slaves some of  the net profits to incentivize their interest in the growth 
of  agricultural wealth; and set aside a certain amount of  public funds in the budget for buying slaves’ freedom 
and improving their lives.’ Ibid., 145. 
556 Ibid., 118. 
557 Ibid., 68. Alexander also belonged to the minority of  European intellectuals of  the time who considered the 
Haitian revolution in a positive light 
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These different lines of  argument, which seek to convince from several angles, converge in 
the concluding paragraphs of  the Political Essay on the Island of  Cuba, where the forceful moral 
case against slavery and for its abolition is articulated in a more directly personal register, 
emphasising the obligation of  one who has ‘witnessed up close the torment and degradation 
of  humanity, to bring the laments of  the wretched to the ears of  those who have the 
power’.558 The institutionalisation of  barbarism in modern slavery is to Alexander von 
Humboldt ample evidence that history does not progress toward greater perfection in the 
sense of  moral improvement. Rather, it presents a complex landscape within which reasoned 
intervention ultimately decides within the field of  multiple possible outcomes. This is not 
the least of  the reason why, by reading Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work 
together, the lineages of  both an alternative cosmopolitanism and an alternative philosophy 
of  history can be discerned. From the standpoint of  Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work alone, 
his conceptualisation of  cultural-linguistic difference of  course points forward to a rich 
tradition of  cultural anthropologies, wherein Franz Boas, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro mark distinct but related propositions for how to navigate and theorise 
in a world of  difference.559 Wilhelm von Humboldt’s conception of  culture and cultures, 
however, has to be mediated with Alexander von Humboldt’s conception of  the politics of  
colonial modernity. Alexander’s meta-political writings on colonial modernity and the politics 
of  racial difference demonstrate, through their explicit commitment to the abolition of  
slavery, that if  the ideal for an alternative cosmopolitanism with a positive valuation of  
cultural-difference is not to run aground on its incapacity to fathom the significance of  real 
power differentials, then a comprehension of  what produces such inequalities must 
ultimately be considered as important to this cosmopolitanism as the philosophy of  language 
and culture that it is conceptually articulated within. Taken together, their works point toward 
a thinking of  what Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbin’s called the cosmopolitical: ‘an apposite 
term for this global force field of the political’ treated as a continuously mutating ‘field of 
political, economic and cultural forces in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism are 
invoked as practical discourses’.560 Then, the alternative cosmopolitanism looks not just like 
 
558 Ibid., 144. 
559 Matti Bunzl, ‘Franz Boas and the Humboldtian Tradition’ in Volkgeist as Method and Ethic, ed. G. W. J. 
Stocking (Madison and London, University of Wisconsin: 1996). With good reason, Bunzl does not include de 
Castro’s work in this article, but the ontological turn in anthropology and the perspectivism which de Castro 
has spearheaded, arguably falls within the linage of cultural anthropologies which he does consider as 
‘Humboldtian’. 
560 Pheng Cheah, ‘Introduction Part II: The Cosmopolitical – Today’, in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (ed.), 
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 31. 
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an abstract ideal of  cultural co-existence, but also, properly speaking, a cosmopolitics that, 
within a field of  contested universalisms, seeks to practically construct the common. 
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Philosophy in general, as long as it was at all useful, was also a doctrine of society, except that ever since it consigned 
itself without demur to societal power, philosophy must professedly isolate itself from society; the purity into which 
philosophy regressed is the bad conscience of its impurity, its complicity with the world.  
 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Progress’, 1962/64561 
 
To think that philosophy, however much it might aim to purify itself, springs from a 
complicity with the world, is to embrace an altogether more complicated conception of what 
constitutes the ‘history of philosophy’ than what is typically understood as such. To pursue 
this path, is in part to ask of the history of philosophy that it become altogether more 
historically informed but also that it expands its conception of what precisely constitutes 
philosophy, since it is largely still the case that,  
 
[h]istorians of philosophy tend for the most part to isolate Locke, Kant and Hegel from the historical 
realities which nurtured them and to which they responded. Furthermore, whole volumes of their 
works are disregarded. In short, the basic rules of good history are disregarded. For largely historical 
reasons, the study of the history of philosophy in the English-speaking world has much more to do 
with maintaining its philosophical legitimacy in the face of the very narrow conception of philosophy 
that came to prominence in the period immediately after the Second World War than with meeting 
the standards that would establish its credentials as history.562 
 
To render explicit, critically examine, and question the geopolitical imaginary of philosophy 
is in this regard an indispensable if not in-itself sufficient component of the work still to be 
done, especially, today, in response to calls to ‘decolonise’ universities, disciplines, and 
curricula. Notably, it is one way to counter that prevalent tendency to minimise instances of  
Enlightenment racism or bigotry within the philosophical canon, which argues that these are 
merely the expressions of  an unreflected transmission from so-called ‘travel literatures’. A 
 
561 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Progress’ in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchphrases (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 148. 




more thoroughgoing analysis of  precisely the degree to which the emerging consciousness 
of  an increasingly globalised world was shaped by a host of  different literatures whose 
conditions of  production were inextricable from the colonial and imperialist projects of  the 
age, destabilises this impulse to brush off  inconvenient truths. Understood in this sense, it is 
to the interrogation of  the geopolitical imaginary of  philosophy that this thesis has 
endeavoured to contribute. The temporalisation of  geographically coded differences that 
herein was questioned with  respect to the construction of  savagery as primitivity would need, 
as part of  this broader inquiry, to be supplemented by that aspect of  the geopolitical 
imaginary of  philosophy that concerned not just not just perceived ‘others’ of  civilisation as 
such but just as importantly other and older civilisations, with India, China and the Persian 
Empire as particularly important figures. To pursue this path is to enter the terrain of  the 
‘pre-history’ of  the formation of  Orientalism properly speaking; to question not just the 
construction of  the idea of  primitivity but also those of  stagnation and immutability.  
 That an emphasis on the geopolitical imaginary of  philosophy need not flatten the 
field into a uniform conception of  colonial ideology can be seen from how each of  the three 
critical models constructed in this thesis point to different pathways out of  the conjuncture 
in question. They each articulated different philosophies of  history and in turn project 
different ideas about the geopolitical world order, its reality and normative horizons. If  not 
just philosophy but also critical theory more broadly is to continue to draw strength form its 
own history, we might do well to measure both the tensions internal to and between each of  
them.
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* Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Von der “historia universalis” zur “Weltgeschichte”’, an extract from 
the entry ‘Geschichte, Historie’ by Odilo Engels, Horst Günther, Christian Meier and 
Reinhart Koselleck in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache 
in Deutschland, Band 2. E–G, Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, und Reinhart Koselleck (hsg.), 
Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1975, 686–91. Translated by Marie Louise Krogh. All 
referencing follows Koselleck’s.  
 
With the transformations of nature and of sacred history into one generalized historical 
process, the very concept of history [Geschichte] was elevated into a fundamental concept of 
human experience and expectation. To specify the outcomes of these shifts, the expression 
‘world history’ [Weltgeschichte] was particularly accommodating.  
 In regard to the purely terminological history, the transition from ‘universal history’ 
[Universalhistorie] to ‘world history’ [Weltgeschichte] was fluid and completed without a heavy 
emphasis on the transition itself. In the eighteenth century, the terms could perfectly well be 
used alternately. The expression uuerltgeskíhten had already been coined by Notker (d.1022) –
who employed it in relation to divine providence – but the word did not catch on at that 
point.563 The first examples of Historia universalis are not found till much later and, when such 
a work did appear in 1304, it was soon given the more appropriate title of Compendium 
historiarum.564 Histories of this world, which attempted to gather the sum of individual 
histories under a pretence to universality did not, in Borst’s words, emerge until the worldview 
of the Christian people of God had been shattered.565 Once the conquests overseas were 
under way and the unity of  the church disintegrated, published universal histories intended 
 
563 Notkers des Deutschen Werke, ed. Edward H. Sehrt and Taylor Starck (Halle: De Gruyter, 1952), 33. 
564 See Arno Borst, ‘Weltgeschichten im Mittelalter?’ Geschichte Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. Reinhart Koselleck and 
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to register and unify this new and heterogeneous experience began to pile up. In this 
seventeenth-century context,  the previously lost word, ‘world history’ or ‘Weltgeschichte’,  
reappeared, possibly under the influence of  Sir Walter Raleigh’s History of  the World (1614).566 
In Stieler’s 1691 dictionary of  the German language, there is an entry on Weltgeschichte/historia 
mundi, sive universalis567 and in the eighteenth century other hybrid forms, such as 
‘Universalgeschichte’ or ‘Welthistorie’ readily followed.  
 In spite of  these terminological variations, the increased pervasiveness of  the 
expression ‘Weltgeschichte’ attests to a profound conceptual change. An indication thereof  was 
already to be found in the German translation of  that essay wherein Voltaire set out to 
discredit the idea of  providence in history: ‘Essai sur l’histoire général’ which in its 1762 German 
translation became ‘Versuch einer allgemeinen Weltgeschichte’.568 
 The plural form of  ‘world histories’, such as we find it in collections of  the most 
remarkable world histories [merkwündigsten Weltgeschichten], had long since been naturalised into the 
sense of  worldly (that is, secular) histories, at the very least since the end of  the seventeenth 
century.569 For this reason Chladenius could, in 1752, assert that: Common world history is therefore 
only about the deeds of  humans, while the great deeds of  god are to be found in revelation.570 Precisely this  
antithetical delineation of  the human world as a region of  meaning, lent a greater impact to the 
newly emerged expression than to the more traditional ‘universal history’ [‘Universalhistorie’]. 
 The worldly thematic [Weltbezogene Thematik] proliferated, and consequently needed 
an adequate concept. In 1773 the Teutsche Merkur noted how peculiar it was that, in the last two 
to three years, so many universal histories [Universalhistorien] have been written,571 and Schlözer, 
one of  the writers of  these histories, in that same year remarked that the concept of  world history 
[Weltgeschichte] remained vague and indeterminate. If  it was to be allotted the fundamental 
position which it deserved, a plan, a theory and an ideal for this science had to be developed.572  
 Already in 1785, little more than a decade later, could Schlözer retrospectively declare 
that: universal history [Universalhistorie] was formerly nothing but ‘a hodgepodge of  some historical data’ 
which the theologian and the philologist had used as an auxiliary science. With world history 
[Weltgeschichte], it was another matter.  In the title of  Schlözer’s works it was printed as World-
 
566 Sir Walter Raleigh, The History of the World, (London, 1614).  
567 Stieler, Der Deutschen Sprache Stammbaum und Fortwachs (1691; edition from 1968), 1747. 
568 Voltaire, Essai sur l’histoire générale et sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations depuis Charlemange jusqu’au nos jours, 7 vol. 
(1756) translated to German as Allgemeine Weltgeschichte, vorin zugleich die Sitte und das Eigene derer Völkweschaften von 
Carl dem Großen bis auf die Zeiten Ludwigs XIV. beschrieben werden, 4 Bde. (Dresden 1760/62). 
569 Joh. Christof Gatterer, Handbuch der Universalhistorie nach ihrem gesamte Umfange, Bd. 1: Nebst einer vorläufigen 
Einleitung von der Historie überhaupt und der Universalhistorie insonderheit, 2. Aufl. (Göttingen 1765), 127ff. 
570 Chladenius, Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft (1752).  
571 ‘Schreiben aus D... an einen Freund in London über den gegenwärtigen Zustand der historischen Litteratur 
in Teutschland’, Teutsche Merkur, vol. 2, 1773, 262.  
572 A.L. Schlözer, Vorstellung Seiner Universal-Historie, vol. 2 (Göttingen, Gotha 1773). 
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History [WeltGeschichte], since he still preferred this typography which flagged the composite 
character of  the concept: to study world-history is to think the entirety of  the changes of  the Earth in 
continuity and connection with those of  humankind [MenschenGeschlechts], in order to fundamentally come 
to know the current state of  both.573 
 Schlözer thereby named the two criteria which distinguished the new world history: 
it was concerned spatially with the whole of  the globe and temporally with the entirety of  
humankind. The interrelation of  the two was to be comprehended with a view to account 
for and explain the present. Following suggestions from Gatterer and Herder, Schlözer even 
took a step further and paved the way for Kant,574 in criticizing the old universal historical 
sum of  all special histories, as a mere aggregate, in order to make way for the new system of  world-
history. At a higher level of  abstraction, this system made claim to a higher degree of  reality. 
It mediated small and grand causes, such that world history itself  became philosophy. Above 
all, it sought to distinguish the real connection [RealZusammenhang] of  events from their temporal 
connection [ZeitZusammenhang], since, despite their mutual interdependence, one cannot be 
reduced to the other. From this duality stems the difficulties of  presentation [Darstellung], 
which Gatterer had already pointed to,575 and which had to be overcome for the global 
interdependence of  modern history to be comprehended. Chronological and synchronic points 
of  view, or, in modern terms, diachrony and synchrony must complete and complement one 
another, if  world history is to be organised according to immanent criteria. The four divinely 
prophesied Monarchies then became superfluous and new epochs instead were considered 
to arise from the importance of  either primary or secondary peoples to world history itself. As 
Gatterer pointed out, only revolutions mattered, not the particular history of  the King and regent, nor 
even all of  their names. This is in fact the history [historie] of  the major events, of  revolutions old or new 
that may concern humans and peoples directly or concern their relation to religion, state, science, art and 
craft.576 
 The new field of  meaning had thereby been delineated and with this renunciation of  
transcendence, humankind [Menschengeschlecht] was for the first time appealed to as the 
presumed subject of  its own history in this world. How helpless did the definition offered by 
Sulzer in 1759 then seem: when it comes to individual events, universal history [Die allgemeine 
Geschichte], Historia Universalis, of  all times and all peoples cannot be anything but very brief. It therefore 
 
573 Schlözer, Weltgeschichte (1785) B.1, 1. 71. 
574 Gatterer, ‘Vom historischen Plan’ in Allgemeine historische Bibliothek, vol. 1 (1767), 15 -89. Herder, A.L. Schlözers 
Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie (1772), Kant, ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht’ (1784). 
575 Gatterer, Vom historischen Plan, 66f. 
576 Gatterer, ‘Einleitung in die synchronistische Universalhistorie’ (Göttingen 1771), 1f. 
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cannot possess the same usefulness as a detailed and elaborative history [Historie].577 Thirty years later, 
Köster would summarise both the debate which in the intervening period had ensued as its 
results, in the ‘German Encyclopaedia’ (1790). The relation between general and specialised 
history [allegemeiner und spezieller Historien] is relative to the definition of  their subject areas 
[Gegenstandsbereichte] and therefore ambiguous… There is however also another universal history 
[Universalhistorie], which simply goes ones that name or which is also called universal world history [allgemeine 
Weltgeschichte]. It concerns the whole of  humankind [Geschlecht] and the Earth [Erdboden] as its 
field of  action [Aktionsfeld]. It demonstrates why humankind [das menschliche Geschlecht] became 
what it really is, or what in each period [Zeitraum] it was.578  
 Toward the last third of  the eighteenth century, a certain consensus formed around 
the idea that world history [Weltgeschichte] in this sense was a leading science, if  one that was  
still to be written. In Kant’s words, its Newton or Kepler had yet to be found.579  
 However, this same author simultaneously asserted that only at this very point in time 
had it become possible to write such a world history, an indication of  precisely that modern 
experience which developed out of  ‘world history’. Herein lies the actual superiority, the 
advantage in experience [Erfahrungsvorsprung], over the ancients.580 The constitutional changes 
and that spread of  Europe across the globe in which world trade became every more 
entangled, meant that it was no longer possible to write the individual history of  a state since 
the real connections were pervasive throughout. At points, it seemed as if  the whole of  world 
history gradually dissolved into that of  European trade.581 A 1783 dissertation written in Mainz 
could begin with the emphatic and a-syntactical assertion that: Humankind [Das 
Menschengeschlecht] has come to a point where, through well-known revolutions, the walls which 
separated parts of  the world [Weltteil] and peoples from peoples have been torn down and 
the individual divisions of  humans have flown together into a great whole, animated by a 
spirit [Geist] – and so also history [Geschichte] – the world is a single people and there is for 
this reason also a single universal world history [eine allgemeine Weltgeschichte], which must be 
treated in a useful and influential manner. History [Geschichte] gradually educates people for 
universal cosmopolitan citizenship, it expands to world history. This is a truth which is itself  
grounded in history.582 
 The self-referential modern concept of  history sought its empirical support in ‘world 
history’ [Weltgeschichte]. This was the field of  action [Aktionsfeld] of  humankind as that 
 
577 J.G. Sulzer, Kurzer Begriff aller Wissenschaften und anderen Theile der Gelehersamkeit (1759), 35. 
578 Köster, ‚Art. Historie‘ in Deutschen Encyclopädie, 651, 654. 
579 Kant, ‘Ideen’.    
580 Büsch, Encyclopädie (s. Anm. 347), 123; vgl. ebd., 133. 165. Ferner Halle Bd.1 (1779), 537. 
581 Georg Forster, Die Nordwestküste von Amerika und der dortige Pelzhandel (1791) Bd. 2, 287. 
582 Nikolaus Vogt, Anzeige, wie wir die Geschichte behandelten, benutzten und darstellen werden (Mainz 1783), 3.ff 
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hypothetical subject which only in its open temporal extension could be conceived of  as one. 
In parallel to world historical designs, numerous anthropologically motivated guides to the 
history of  mankind therefore also appeared.583 What history lacked in terms of  present 
fulfilment, the future was expected to deliver in compensation. The true ideal for such a history, 
no longer a simple aggregate of  all particular and special histories, has only been sketched in modern times, 
as Krug writes of  Kant, since the history of  humanity should properly speaking be defined 
as the history of  human culture.584  
 Schiller’s famous question in his Jena inaugural lecture in 1789 ‘What is, and to what 
end do we study, Universal History?’ briefly and magnificently summarised all the arguments 
which made of  world history the primary science of  all experience and expectation. Just as 
modernity [die Neuzeit] with and in ‘progress’ learned to conceptualise itself  as ‘modern’ [ein 
neue zeit], so it also assured itself  of  its spatio-temporal totality with and in ‘world history’. 
Therefore the expression, as a precondition and boundary determination of  possible 
experience, also became a structural feature of  any possible history: All histories are only 
understandable through world history and in world history585 or, as Novalis more consistently phrased 
it: Every history must be a world history and only in relation to the whole of  history is a historical [historische] 
treatment of  an individual matter possible.586 
 The new concept hat gained a self-enclosed claim to totality, which excluded 
competing explanatory models. In 1805 Friedrich Schlegel could therefore open his ‘Lecture 
on Universal History’ with the phrase: Since all science is genetic, it follows that history must be the 
most universal, the most general and the highest of  all sciences. Insofar as it is concerned with human 
history, it is simply called history’. 587 It was ’world history’ which, in the age of  the French 
Revolution, assigned a guiding function to the concept of  history which it was never to lose 
again. In 1835, Marx and Engels noted in their remarks on German ideology: We know only a 
single science and that science is history. It envelops nature and man. Neither side can be separated from 
the other: as long as humans exist, history of  nature and history of  humans will mutually condition one 
another.588 ‘History’ was only conceivable as both natural and human history, that is, only as 
world history, so that the meaning of  each is both abolished and preserved within that term.  
 
583 Friedrich August Carus, Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, Nachgel. Werke, Bd.6 (Leipzig 1809), 10ff. 
584 Krug, Enz. Bd.1, 66. 
585 Heinrich Luden Ueber den Vortrag der Universalgeschichte, Kl. Aufsätze, Bd.1 (Göttingen 1807), 281; Schiller, 
‘Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?’, SA Bd. 13, 418. Vgl. Eberhard Kessel, 
Ranke, ‘Idee der Universalhistorie’, Hist. Zs. 178 (1954), 269ff. 
586 Novalis, Fragmenten und Studien, Nr.77 GW Bd. 3, 566. 
587 Schlegel, Vorlesung über Universalgeschichte (1805/06), SW2. Abt., Bd.14 (1960), 3. 
588 Marx and Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, MEW Bd. 13 (1962), 18. 
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 The all-encompassing world historical representations lost their force after Ranke’s 
major ‘Gesamtkonzeption’, partly because the historical-critical method increased the demands 
placed on scholars and thereby promoted a greater specialisation and partly because the 
interminability of  all history itself  increasingly mounted objections to universal designs in 
history.589 In any case, these representations for the most part remained unaware of  the idea 
that Europe’s world history – in the sense of  Hans Freyer’s concept of  Weltgeschichte Europas590 
– only began in the 20th century and then gradually passed over into ’world history as such’. 
The horizon of  expectation which the concept exposed in the eighteenth century is thereby 
changed but not transcended. 
 In its reception history, the only consequential attempt to wrest world history from 
its processual and ever-renewed singularity has been Oswald Spengler’s attempt to derive the 
coming fall of  the West [Abendland] from a cyclical process in a natural morphology of  world 
history, of  the world as history.591 The extent to which his structurally analogous pluralist 
cultural cycles will affect the future of  world history, is for the time being an open question. 
 
589 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Tübingen 1922, Berlin 1962), 652, 706; Wilhelm Dilthey, 
‘Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1922, Ges.Schr. Bd.1, (Leibzig, Berlin, 1922) 93ff. 
590 Hans Freyer, Weltgeschichte Europas, (Wiesbaden 1948). 
591 Oswald Spengler, Die Untergang des Abendlandes (München 1922). 
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